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SOCIAL OUTCOMES OF COMMUNITY-BASED RANGELAND MANAGEMENT  




Community-based rangeland management (CBRM) has been proposed as a promising option to 
reduce rural poverty and resource degradation in post-socialist Mongolia. To date, research on CBRM in 
Mongolia has been limited to small samples and case studies within one or two ecological zones. Results 
have been mixed, with some studies showing favorable outcomes and others no effect or negative 
impacts of CBRM. Few studies have directly compared the outcomes of formally organized CBRM with 
management by traditional herder neighborhood groupings, or attempted to identify the causal 
mechanisms that explain variations in CBRM outcomes. Using data from 142 pastoral groups and 706 
member households across 36 counties (soum) in four ecological zones, I assessed social outcomes of 
CBRM organizations in comparison with non-CBRM groups, explored causal mechanisms underlying 
these social outcomes, and examined the effects of external facilitation on institutional design of formal 
CBRM organizations.  
I found that formal groups had more information sources, stronger leadership, greater 
knowledge exchange, cooperation and more rules. Members of formal groups were more proactive in 
addressing resource management issues and used more rangeland practices than traditional 
neighborhoods. However, the two types of groups did not differ on most livelihood measures and had a 
weak difference in social capital. Four factors, access to diverse information sources, leadership, 
knowledge exchange and resource management rules, significantly facilitated the effect of formal 
organization on pastoralists’ traditional and innovative rangeland practices, proactive behavior and 





variables creating a sequential chain of information diversity  leadership  knowledge exchange  
rules. This ordered chain of four mediators explains the mechanisms through which formal organization 
leads to comparatively greater social outcomes. I also found that these mediated effects on members’ 
proactive behavior and social networking varied among ecological zones.       
Donor facilitation approach significantly influenced CBRM group attributes and external 
environments, but did not affect institutional arrangements. Small group size, homogeneous interests, 
and heterogeneity of well-being predicted higher levels of intermediate outcomes including information 
diversity, leadership, and income diversity. Institutional arrangements such as the presence of sanctions, 
group-devised rules, frequent meetings, and recording documents increased cooperation, rules and 
information diversity. Similarly, access to training and local government support provided a favorable 
external environment for achieving intermediate outcomes. Regarding ultimate social outcomes, group 
characteristics such as dependence on livestock, homogeneity of interests and leader legitimacy were 
critical for increasing social capital, livelihoods, rangeland practices, and proactive behavior. Frequent 
meetings of group leaders had the greatest influence on ultimate social outcomes. Local government 
support and ongoing donor support were associated with increased trust and norms of reciprocity, 
rangeland management practices, proactiveness, and per capita livestock holdings. Overall, group 
attributes and external environment had a greater influence on social outcomes of pastoral CBRMs in 
Mongolia than institutional arrangements.     
I found strong evidence that formal CBRM is leading to increased social outcomes across 
Mongolia. Many CBRM facilitation strategies were shown to be adequate for fostering social outcomes 
of the pastoral groups. Early achievements of individual household level variables such as rangeland 
practices and behavior appeared to be “fast” variables that respond quickly to new institutions. In 
contrast, building social capital and reaching livelihood improvement may be “slow” variables that 





Globally, the promising case of CBRM in Mongolia may encourage mobile pastoral communities 
elsewhere to cooperate on the sustainable management of their resources. However, as this study 
showed, careful facilitation is needed to achieve intermediate outcomes, and consideration of the 
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1.1.1. Background of the study. 
Since the late 1990s, post-socialist Mongolia has been facing two major rural development 
problems: poverty and resource degradation. Various assessments have reported over one-third of the 
population living below the national poverty line (NSO and World Bank, 2001; World Bank, 1996). 
Recent studies also documented declines in conditions of natural resources including rangelands 
(Addison et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013; Sankey et al., 2009). Issues have been further exacerbated by 
recorded changes in climate, particularly, warming temperature and increasing frequency and intensity 
of climatic hazards such as dzud and drought (Batima, 2006; Dagvadorj et al., 2010) and experienced by 
herders (Bruegger et al., 2014; Marin, 2010). These problems increase the vulnerability of Mongolia’s 
livestock sector by threatening the sustainability of ecosystem services and human well-being (MEA, 
2005a).  
  Today the livestock sector accounts for 14% of Mongolia’s Gross Domestic Product, and 28% of 
the workforce is directly dependent on this sector (Ganibal, 2015). Rangelands comprising about 83% of 
country’s territory provide a natural basis for the livestock sector and rural inhabitants, over 80% of 
whom are pastoralists (World Bank, 2009). Furthermore, Mongolia’s pastoral systems have global 
significance, providing unique biodiversity and cultural landscapes. In preserving this natural and cultural 
heritage, scientifically-informed policy solutions are necessary.  
This dissertation contributes to this important task by examining social outcomes of community-
based rangeland management (CBRM) in Mongolia, which has been promoted as a promising option to 
address the challenges of poverty and resource degradation. The results of this research suggest 





from CBRM in Mongolia, and add to global scientific and policy debates around the effectiveness of 
CBRM in addressing problems of common pool resources. This study addresses a major research gap by 
investigating causal relationships among factors influencing CBRM outcomes and testing the 
applicability of institutional design principles proposed by common pool resource governance theorists 
in the Mongolian pastoral context. To do this, I used a large sample of 142 pastoral groups distributed 
across four ecological zones, coupled with surveys of 706 member households. This unusually large and 
geographically extensive sample provides for a statistically powerful design with broad validity and 
generalizability under a range of Mongolian conditions.   
 
1.1.2. Theoretical framework. 
The theoretical framework of this CBNRM study is grounded in the new institutional theory 
(North, 1990) focusing on small-scale common pool resource (CPR) regimes (Ostrom, 1990), the theory 
of design principles for robust common property institutions (Agrawal, 2002), and complex adaptive 
systems theory (Gunderson & Holling, 2002). Mirroring the complexity of CBNRM, which requires 
multiple perspectives and interdisciplinary approaches (Armitage, 2005), my theoretical framework 
comprises diverse contributing concepts. Details of the theoretical foundation of the study are provided 
in the subsequent literature review section. Here I summarize the main elements of the conceptual 
framework as a basis for forthcoming research questions.  
Within the new institutional framework, I consider CBNRM a management regime 
encompassing institutional, property rights and CPR aspects. Commonly accepted definition of CPRs 
emphasizes two attributes of these resources: difficulty of excluding potential users while each 
additional user’s withdrawal reduces resource amount available to others. Various types of users may 
possess property rights over CPRs including private individuals or corporates, state and local community 





resource use and access by committing to collectively agreed rules. Theoretically, such common 
property institution should overcome the problems of resource overuse and practices and behaviors 
harmful to resource condition. Smaller (less spatially extensive) resources and resource user groups 
reduce transaction costs for rule enforcement through trust, shared norms and reciprocity.  
The design principles for robust commons institutions predict favorable outcomes of CBNRM 
under certain conditions in four different aspects of CBNRM. These include characteristics of a CPR 
under CBNRM, attributes of a CBNRM group, internal governance arrangements among group members 
and external context to the CBNRM institution (Agrawal, 2002; Ostrom, 1990). More successful 
outcomes can be expected if (1) the resource system has clear boundaries, is stationary and of 
manageable small size, and resource units can be stored; (2) resource users reside in the same 
geographic location, share common norms over CPR practices, build social capital living together longer 
and frequently interacting, have strong leaders, and can exclude other potential beneficiaries; (3) rule 
change originates from resource users, is devised and enforced by them so that the rules are easy to 
understand, and has gradually increasing severity of punishments; and (4) national government legally 
recognizes the autonomy of CBNRM, and backs up their rule enforcement, external support for local 
capacity building is available, and market forces and technology are not hindering local resource 
economy.  
The theory of complex adaptive systems (CAS) and its recent application to natural resource 
systems, have established that pastoral social-ecological systems exhibit CAS characteristics of non-
linearity, uncertainty, emergence, scale and self-organization, and these characteristics are recognized 
among policy makers and the international development community (Berkes, 2004). This study 
considers essentials of pastoral social-ecological systems while placing it within the CPR field. Although 
theories of institutions, property rights, and design principles are largely applicable for pastoral 





(Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002; Turner, 2011) pointed out, in pastoral systems, mobility and flexibility need 
to be prioritized over exclusivity of resource access, social boundaries of users, and property rights to 
harmonize with unpredictable and variable  environments of drylands.  
In this study, on the basis of the theoretical framework elaborated, I advance the following 
research questions: 
1. Does community-based rangeland management (CBRM) increase ultimate social outcomes 
of pastoral groups in Mongolia measured as livelihood, social capital, and rangeland 
management practices? 
2. Can formal organization and intermediate social outcomes, including access to information, 
knowledge exchange, leadership, cooperation, income diversity, and the presence of rules, 
predict ultimate social outcomes of CBRM, accounting for differences among ecological 
zones? 
3. How and why do social outcomes of CBRM groups differ from those of traditional non-
CBRM groups in similar social, political and environmental contexts? 
4. How does the ecological zone of pastoral groups influence relationships between formal 
organization, intermediate outcomes and ultimate social outcomes? 
5. Are access to information, knowledge exchange, leadership, and the presence of rules 
causally associated, and if so, is there any causally-associated order? 
6. Does donor facilitation approach influence the institutional design of CBRM in Mongolia? 
7. Which institutional design elements are most influential in achieving greater social 
outcomes of Mongolian CBRM groups? 
 I define social outcomes as any positive status in the social well-being, environmental behavior, 
or collective action of group members including resource management practices, constructive behavior, 





intermediate and ultimate social outcomes. I hypothesize that intermediate social outcomes are 
enhanced by donor support and facilitate ultimate social outcomes. Hence, I consider intermediate 
outcomes as an output of CBRM. Ultimate social outcomes are a product of both formal organization 
and intermediate social outcomes. Thus, they are outcomes of CBRM. I assumed increased social 
outcomes are an integral part of long-enduring commons institutions. 
 The study has the following limitations.  First, the data reflect a point-in-time measurement. 
Hence, I am unable to make truly causal inferences, which would require before and after 
measurements of both “treatment” and “control” groups. Second, the study does not fully consider 
external contextual variables, which may have an important influence on social outcomes of CBRM 
groups. Finally, I did not include qualitative analysis, which may limit nuanced interpretation of the 
results of quantitative analyses.   
 
1.1.3. Organization of the study. 
This dissertation is presented in five chapters.  Chapter 1 introduces the background of the 
study, statement of the problems, objectives of the study, theoretical framework, research questions, 
definition of CBRM social outcomes, assumptions and study limitations.  It also presents a review of the 
literature, which is further subdivided into six topics. The review starts from the common property 
institutions theory moving to the concept of CBNRM, its evolution and results, and then narrows to 
pastoral commons institutions. The review further covers the issue of measuring CBNRM outcomes, 
description of pastoral institutions in Mongolia, and studies on Mongolian CBRM. 
Chapter 2 compares social outcomes of CBRM groups with those of non-CBRM groups, 
addressing Research Question 1. The chapter demonstrates that CBRM groups have more social 
outcomes than non-CBRM groups. Chapter 3 reports the results of a causal analysis of factors that 





causal relationships of formal organization and intermediate outcomes on ultimate social outcomes; (b) 
mediating effect of intermediate outcomes on the relationship between formal organization and 
ultimate social outcomes; and (c) moderating effect of ecological zone on the relationship of formal 
organization and ultimate social outcomes. Chapter 4 compares different CBRM institutional design 
models in Mongolia with respect to their social outcomes. It addresses Research questions 6 and 7, 
which explore the applicability of CPR institutional design principles in the Mongolian pastoral context 
by identifying influential institutional design elements and effective facilitation strategies for Mongolian 
CBRM. Chapter 5 synthesizes the findings of the entire study, discusses their theoretical, methodological 
and practical implications, and provides recommendations for future research and CBRM policy.  
 
1.2. Review of the Literature 
1.2.1. Introduction. 
The overall goal of this literature review is to establish the theoretical foundation of my 
research, its relevance and contribution to the field. For this purpose, I walk the reader through several 
logical steps all connected to the concept of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), 
the topic of my research. The literature review is comprised of seven sections starting from the broader 
concept of common pool resources down to the review of studies of community-based rangeland 
management in the Mongolian pastoral context by gradually narrowing themes essential in CBNRM 
research. Throughout these sections, I lay out my arguments for CBNRM being a potential solution to 
address current resource management problems with a strong theoretical substance.   
In Section 1.2.2, I place CBNRM in its theoretical realm of common pool resources (CPR). While 
bringing in key conceptual definitions, I define two CPR characteristics that challenge science and 
practice: excludability and subtractability. I further narrow a specific space of CBNRM within small-scale 





problems. Next, I explain property right institutions, the means for solving the two problems. Here, I 
highlight important nuances of CBNRM, its dependence on CPR characteristics, resource users’ 
attributes and external larger governance systems that ultimately favor or impede efforts for addressing 
appropriation and provision problems leading to mixed results of CBNRM. 
Section 1.2.3 defines CBNRM and briefs on its theoretical evolution, subsequent influence on 
international development and mixed results reported. I give more details on positive and negative 
results, which inspired more research on conditions that favor or constrain overcoming appropriation 
and provision problems of CPR. Also, issues of the methodological nature in CBNRM studies were 
described. Further, I point out rather limited research in pastoral commons field. 
In Section 1.2.4, I narrow the CBNRM field down to the pastoral system and describe specifics of 
its social-ecological systems while providing definitions of key terms. I inform fairly unsuccessful 
outcomes of community-based rangeland management (CBRM) internationally. Hence, I turn reader’s 
attention on details of problems for adjusting CBRM practical implementation to the general theoretical 
framework of CPR and institutions. 
In section 1.2.5, I elaborate on issues of measuring outcomes of CBNRM as many relate the 
problems of mixed results to research methods. The section describes not only challenges and 
limitations of current studies of CBNRM, but identifies existing research gaps including the lack of 
examination of causal relationships and existence of causal order among influential factors, and a need 
for larger-N studies, more powerful for generalization and theoretical validity.   
Section 1.2.6 provides essential details of Mongolian pastoralism and situates it among global 
CPR arena and more narrowly within pastoral systems with its resource characteristics, culture of 
resource users, their social organizations, property rights and key strategies. Simultaneously, the section 
clarifies the uniqueness of Mongolian pastoralism with its historical past and recent experiences of 





promoted as an alternative solution to rural poverty and resource degradation faced by transitional 
Mongolia.   
The last section reviews the state of knowledge in the CBRM in Mongolia. I describe overall 
research scope, geographic coverage, variables examined, methods applied and key findings. I define 
not only strengths and contributions of these studies but their limitations and gaps for furthering CBRM 
research in Mongolia. I conclude that there is an apparent need for larger sample studies covering 
different geographic scope important for CBRM outcomes and examining causal relationships of factors 
influencing CBRM results and testing applicability of theoretical models in the Mongolian pastoral social-
ecological systems.  
Based on this literature review, I contend that my research has strong theoretical foundation 
and will make necessary contribution to the scientific field while addressing existing research gaps.   
 
1.2.2. Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) as an institutional option 
for addressing the dilemma of Common Pool Resources.   
CBNRM evolved as a promising option to address the dilemma of common pool resources (CPR) 
more effectively than state or market-based solutions. The CPR dilemma occurs due to resource 
attributes that make it difficult to exclude potential users (excludability) while harvest by each user 
reduces the resources available to others (subtractability) (Berkes, 1996; Ostrom et al., 1994). In this 
context, the ability of resource users to communicate with each other and agree on rules to self-
regulate resource use for their collective benefit determines the final outcomes.  In the absence of 
communication and agreement among resource users, the resource system is in a “tragedy of 
commons” situation of overexploitation (Hardin, 1968). This occurs because group members prefer 
short-term personal gain over the long-term group welfare, a situation known as a “collective action 





contrast, when resource users possess the ability to communicate and negotiate rules, they can obtain 
continuous benefits from their resources while maintaining adequate livelihoods (Ostrom, 1990). 
Ostrom  (1990, p. 26) specified that such outcomes relate to small-scale CPRs within a locality shared by 
resource users “heavily dependent on the CPR for economic returns.” The number of CPR users in the 
setting is small enough to allow repeated interactions with one another and to learn who is trustworthy, 
and how their actions will affect the resource as well as each other. Small size and high dependence 
provide the key factors for resource users to communicate, negotiate and self-organize to solve 
common problems. In addition, their CPR should be renewable but scarce, and rational behaviors of 
users can substantially harm other users (ibid).  
Within small-scale CPRs, not all situations are necessarily dilemmas. Dilemmas are present in 
two conditions (Ostrom et al., 1994). It is a dilemma when resource users perceive that their current 
management strategies produce suboptimal outcomes. Secondly, it is a dilemma if there exist other 
strategies that are more efficient than the current practices and are “institutionally feasible” (p.16). The 
efficiency implies that “total discounted benefits exceed total discounted costs” (p. 16) of applying new 
strategies and resource users have a strong consensus for changing their strategies. When resource 
users face a CPR dilemma, they need to address two types of problems: appropriation and provision 
problems. Appropriation problems relate to the resource flow or products of a resource system like 
water and fodder (Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). These problems may include rational behaviors harmful to 
others, unfair allocation of or access to resources due to a heterogeneous distribution of resources 
spatially and varying technology for resource harvesting (Ostrom, 1990). Provision problems focus on the 
resource stock or resource systems including grazing land, irrigation system or a bridge (Ostrom & 
Schlager, 1996). These problems concern activities negative to the productive capacity of the resources 
and free riding on other users’ investment (Olson, 1965) for provision and maintenance of a CPR (ibid). 





where, and with what technology to withdraw resources and/or (2) how much and when to invest in 
supply or maintenance to the CPR stock” (Ostrom et al., 1994, p. 16). When resource users self-organize 
and agree on rules prohibiting or allowing certain activities under particular conditions, they create a 
common property institution.  First, I need to clarify the term institution.  
As North defined them, “any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human 
interactions, and limit the set of choices of individuals, are institutions”(1990, p. 4). Institutions have 
formal and informal forms. According to North, formal institutions are construed in laws and devised by 
a society, while informal institutions have evolved over time as codes of conduct and behavioral norms. 
Formal institutions can be created rapidly as a result of socio-economic or political changes while 
informal institutions in the forms of customs, traditions, and shared norms are rather resistant to a 
deliberate change. A group of resource users aka agents of institutional change with new rules to 
address the CPR dilemma, form an organization (ibid). Organizations have common objectives, which 
can be achieved by enforcing those rules through various governance structures, skills, and learning 
(ibid.). From the dialectic perspectives, institutions provide opportunities with structured incentives and 
“organizations are created to take advantage of those opportunities, and, as the organizations evolve, 
they alter the institutions” (p. 7). In this manner, institutional changes occur incrementally, when 
individuals within an organization believe that they can do better with new, more efficient strategies or 
rules (North, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994). Inherent elements of institutions that come together with rule 
setting include costs for protecting rights, monitoring rule enforcement and punishments for violations. 
However, Ostrom contended that in small-scale CPR settings, resource users who live in the same 
geographic location over a long period of time build shared norms and reciprocal relationships and know 
whom to trust. Presence of such social capital facilitates the emergence of institutional arrangements 





to reduce uncertainties by providing a framework, which guides behaviors and interactions of 
individuals and organizations (North, 1990). 
The second term common property specifies one of four broad types of property regimes over 
resources including private, state and common property and open access. These are named by who has 
the rights to own or access the resources except the latter, in which everyone has free access to the 
resources. Such open access is part of CPR problems leading to tragedy of commons due to the lack of 
“enforceable authority” (Ostrom & Schlager, 1996, p. 130) that specify users’ rights to and 
responsibilities for access, use or management of a resource. Such mechanisms present property right 
regimes that are the product of institutions or rules (Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). Hence, property right 
regimes link the human system with the natural system (Berkes, 1996). The presence of all property 
rights including private, state and communal types facilitates viable solutions to appropriation and 
provision problems (Feeny et al., 1990), but none of these regimes alone has been more efficient than 
others for addressing environmental issues when lacking strong rule enforcement (Berkes, 1996). For 
instance, when national governments fail to adequately enforce laws for natural resources, they create 
de-facto open access to resources resulting in overuse and conflicts (Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). In 
practice, different property regimes overlap in various combinations not necessarily in a “pure” form of 
above-stated types. Among all variations, common property resources present a distinct category 
because by nature, many such resources have exclusion and subtractability problems explained earlier.  
The ways different property rights regimes form have been shaped by three major factors: (1) 
CPR attributes, (2) characteristics or cultures of resource users and (3) larger governance regimes 
(Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). (1) CPR physical attributes such as stationarity of the resource and possibility 
for storage, heterogeneity of resources across space substantially influence the property regimes 
(Blomquist et al., 1994). Further, they also affect the effectiveness of institutions to address 





costly to asses potential annual yields for allocation purposes. In addition, stationarity allows resource 
maintenance activities such as planting desirable species or dealing with weedy plants. Similarly, when a 
CPR can be stored, it reduces uncertainty and lessens competition for resource appropriation among 
users. Also resource users are more motivated to contribute to the resource maintenance. When CPRs 
are stationary and can be stored, information on resources and expected yields or flow of benefits can 
be obtained in a less costly manner for addressing appropriation and provision problems (ibid.). Lastly, if 
a CPR is heterogeneous spatially, resource users need to keep it in a larger unit to reduce their risks and 
costs (Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). (2) In terms of cultures of users, there are identified types of resource 
groups who are likely to be more effective in addressing CPR problems under their communal property. 
These include small and stable groups having relatively homogeneous preferences for resource use, 
shared norms of reciprocity and trust, low discount rate, and common understanding about potential 
benefits and risks from changing rules (Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). (3) Larger governance regimes such as 
national government substantially influence local property regimes (ibid). Ostrom et al (1996) 
highlighted potential positive roles they can play in the effectiveness of local property right institutions. 
These included definition of property rights for larger resource systems, provision of information about 
resource systems, enabling conditions for collective action and local decision-making and backing-up 
enforcement efforts.  
Within property regimes there are five types of property rights including (1) access to the 
resource, (2) withdrawal of resource units, (3) management of resource system, (4) exclusion of 
potential beneficiaries, and (5) alienation of the resource (Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). First two types are 
operational level property rights, where participants simply exercise their rights. The other three were 
categorized as collective choice level rights, where participants are involved in deciding their future 
rights to be exercised (ibid). Apparently, collective choice rights are more powerful, with important 





CBNRM has been suggested as an alternative to address CPR problems because it has 
encompassed many of the features described above in terms of characteristics of resources and 
community of resource users. However, since CBNRM is embedded within larger governance systems, 
its success has been also subject to the support of such regimes. The phenomenon of conflicting CBNRM 
results has been called the “drama of the commons” (NRC, 2002), with either happy successful or sad 
failed endings. In the next section, I will elaborate on theorized factors affecting these mixed results in 
the context of CBNRM, along with its evolution, definition and core characteristics.   
 
1.2.3. CBNRM: definition, evolution, outcomes and institutional designs.  
The outline in the prior section allows us to define CBNRM and explain why it gives promising 
perspectives for CPR management. It is a small-scale management regime (McCay, 1996) by local 
resource users who have a CPR held as communal property with the goal of overcoming the CPR 
dilemma. As a management regime, CBNRM combines CPR under its management, a property 
institution and an organization of resource users. CBNRM has two well-recognized objectives: 
conserving resources and maintaining the livelihoods of resource users (Campbell & Vainio-Mattila, 
2003). According to Armitage (2005), CBNRM promotes better resource management with the 
participation of local resource users in decision-making by combining traditional institutions, customary 
practices, and knowledge with formal regulatory and enforcement processes. From the property types 
perspective explained in the prior section, CBNRM aims to provide collective choice level rights to local 
resource users.  
Conceptually, the evolution of CBNRM has been influenced by three paradigm shifts in 
ecological thinking: “(1) a systems view, (2) inclusion of humans in the ecosystem, and (3) management 
by participatory approaches,” (Berkes, 2004, p. 624). A move away from a reductionist linear approach 





Characteristics of a complex resource system including non-linearity, uncertainty, emergence, scale, and 
self-organization (Gunderson & Holling, 2002), require equally complex social strategies instead of a 
rigid uniform system of a state administration. Such management approaches must be flexible, scale-
sensitive, and adaptable to effectively respond to non-linearity and uncertainty of resources (Berkes et 
al., 2003). Secondly, the inclusion of humans in the ecosystem, referred to as a social-ecological system 
(Berkes et al., 1998), highlighted not only the effects of humans on nature and dynamic interactions 
between them, but human-devised institutions at different scales of the system. Lastly, recognition of 
the importance of place-specific qualitative information, which compliments broadly generalized 
quantitative data, has led to a participatory management approach (Berkes, 2004). Such participatory 
strategies involve various stakeholders including representatives of local government, resource users 
and higher level management agencies. Hence, the new approach acknowledges the significance of 
place-based traditional knowledge complimentary to the expert knowledge.  
From these theoretical perspectives, CBNRM presents a promising approach for sustainable 
management of small-scale CPRs, which is flexible enough to deal with local resource complexity. The 
basis of this argument includes intimate knowledge of local users about their resources and locally 
evolved informal institutions in the forms of cultures and norms that, in turn, have been shaped by their 
environment. The theory also clarified CBNRM’s institutional scale (Berkes, 2004) and its embeddedness 
in larger governance systems. Such positioning of CBNRM implies not only its dependence on the 
external systems but its influence on larger scales of resource governance as a part of a nested system 
(Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). Putting local resource users at the center of CPR management required 
nuanced communication with them, learning from them and sharing expert knowledge with them. This 
demand has been enabled through sets of participatory tools designed to address varying levels of 
educational and language barriers and cultural differences between “outsiders” and local community 





These theoretical approaches considerably influenced international development policies to 
undertake a major shift in their strategies. For development organizations, CBNRM has provided a 
plausible option to tackle both resource degradation and poverty problems, which used to be separate 
action fields (Armitage, 2005; Campbell & Vainio-Mattila, 2003). A broad recognition of local initiatives 
and their roles in sustainable development involving both conservation and livelihood objectives was 
first formalized in the Brundtland Commission Report released by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development in 1987 (Campbell & Vainio-Mattila, 2003; Dressler et al., 2010; Leach et 
al., 1999). This strong mandate for local participation in development agendas was further strengthened 
by subsequent global forums, has guided programs of national governments and funding priorities of 
donor agencies and international environmental organizations. Since then, CBNRM has become a 
popular development narrative in developing countries, particularly Africa (Blaikie, 2006) and South-east 
Asia (Leach et al., 1999), and more recently in post-socialist countries of the Central Asia (Crewett, 2015  
Fern ndez-Gim nez, 2012). 
For the last three decades of “policy experiments” (Agrawal & Gibson, 2001) of CBNRM, it has 
produced mixed results, challenging both CBNRM practitioners and commons scholars. Through 
increased engagement of local communities, CBNRM promoted positive behaviors and practices in 
managing natural resources, better decision making and contribution to the improvement of ecological 
and economic well-being in local areas (Lyons, 2013; Measham & Lumbasi, 2013; Taylor, 2009; 
Thompson, 2013). However, studies also have reported unequal distribution of benefits among 
community members, or “elite capture” of gains and exclusion of disadvantaged community members 
(Balint & Mashinya, 2006; Cleaver, 2005; Duffy, 2006; Saito-Jensen et al., 2010; Suich, 2013a). Moreover, 
the challenges of decentralizing resource management and defining social boundaries for exclusive 
membership have hindered CBNRM efforts (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Agrawal & Ostrom, 1999; Blaikie, 





attention to investigating the conditions under which it works or does not work (Agrawal, 2001; Berkes, 
2004).   
Persistent scientific efforts on the topic inspired by Ostrom (1990) have resulted in a “well-
developed framework” (Agrawal, 2014, p. 89) of design principles for evolving CBNRM institutions and 
conditions for the institutional development process (Ostrom, 2008). In line with the prior empirical 
results outlined in section 1.2.2, the design framework consists of four major sets of variables that favor 
sustainable commons institutions. These include (1) resource system characteristics, (2) characteristics 
of resource user group, (3) institutional arrangements or rules, and (4) external environment (Agrawal, 
2002; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988). Agrawal (2002, p. 62) analyzed prior studies 
on design variables within each set and created a comprehensive list to aim future research. Resource 
attributes such as relatively small size, well-defined boundaries, stationarity, possibilities for storage of 
resource benefits and predictability of resource flow were identified to be positive factors for 
institutional effectiveness. Correspondingly, resource user groups that are small, with clear membership 
boundaries and shared norms, having social capital built over time and leadership, homogenous identity 
and interests but heterogeneous skills and endowments, and low rates of poverty were shown to have 
better chance of achieving success. Among the institutional arrangement variables, rules that are simple 
enough to understand, devised by group members, easy to enforce and have graduated sanctions 
(punishment severity increases by steps), less costly adjudication and the monitors are accountable to 
resource users, were more likely to be effective. Lastly, advantageous external environments included 
less expensive exclusion technology, low rate of technological advancement for resource harvesting, less 
integration with external markets, central government acknowledging local authority, supportive 
external sanctioning institutions, adequate levels of external aid, and nested structure for appropriation, 





After analyzing 91 cases that tested the framework, Cox et al. (2010) found it to be a viable basis 
for future research. However, the framework has been criticized for being incomplete (Agrawal, 2001; 
Baland & Platteau, 1996; Schlager et al., 1994), rigid (Blaikie, 2006; Cleaver, 2000) and with too much 
focus on rules while not accounting for social complexity (Blaikie, 2006; Cleaver, 1999). The critics were 
also concerned about the possibility of the framework turning into “blueprints” for governance of 
commons institutions despite its nature of universal propositions or general features of successful 
commons management (Agrawal, 2002). In response, Ostrom highlighted the importance of “matching 
the rules of a system to the underlying biophysical world and type of human community involved” 
(2008, p. 16).  
The institutional design framework has been used to assess the effectiveness of commons 
institutions managing a range of resource types in varying social-ecological settings. However, the 
interest in testing the tool for the pastoral institutions has been modest; only 7% of the 91 cases 
reviewed by Cox et al. was in the pastoral sector (2010, p. 7). In the following section, I will bring 
readers’ attention to CBNRM in the pastoral context with specifics of resources and strategies 
developed by pastoralists to respond these resource characteristics. I will also highlight issues of CBNRM 
implementation in the pastoral social-ecological systems.  
This section elaborated on three major theories on which my conceptual framework was built. 
The new institutional theory, theory on institutional design principles and complex adaptive systems 
theory were major contributors to frame my research on CBRM development in Mongolia. 
Consequently, I shall frequently refer to these theories in my later chapters for analyzing social 






1.2.4. CBNRM and pastoralism. 
In the last decade, community-based management of pastoral commons has had considerable 
attention of national governments and international assistance agencies but results have not been 
impressive (Turner, 2011). Reasons for such modest achievements have been thought to be associated 
not only with those factors discussed in the prior sections but with much broader socio-economic and 
political circumstances that affected pastoral development (Galvin et al., 2008; Niamir-Fuller & Turner, 
1999; Turner, 2011). I will elaborate on specifics of pastoral social ecological systems including 
resources, humans and their interactions. This will lead to further discussions on mixed CBNRM 
outcomes in the pastoral context.     
Pastoralism presents a socioeconomic system well adapted to dryland environments by means 
of developed sets of practices and knowledge for maintaining a sustainable balance among pastures, 
livestock and people (Agrawal, 1991; Koocheki & Gliessman, 2005; Niamir-Fuller & Turner, 1999; UNDP, 
2003). Drylands, home to pastoralism, cover 41.3% of the global terrestrial area (MEA, 2005b, p. 23), 
where about 200 million pastoralists make their living (Koocheki & Gliessman, 2005). According to the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005b, p. 7), about 90% of dryland populations live in developing 
countries with far lower human well-being indicators than the rest of the world. Drylands are 
characterized by water scarcity, a limiting factor for ecosystem provisioning services such as production 
of forage, crops, and wood (MEA, 2005b). In these regions, precipitation that is low and highly variable 
in space and time has challenged humans and animals over time, influencing their adaptive capacity. 
Pastoralists, who live in drylands, derive most of their livelihoods from grazing livestock that in turn are 
highly adapted to feeding on natural forage under extreme climatic conditions (Sandford, 1983). Lands 
that produce natural forage for grazing and browsing animals without human manipulation have been 
termed as rangelands (Holechek, 2011). Pastoralists’ livelihoods depend on their intimate knowledge of 





geography of terrain and economic benefits, pastoralists herd different types of livestock including 
camels, horses, cattle/yaks, sheep, goats, reindeer, llamas and alpacas.  
A defining feature of pastoralism is mobility, the key strategy for responding to ecological 
variability of drylands (Fernandez-Gimenez & Le Febre, 2006; Niamir-Fuller & Turner, 1999; Sandford, 
1983). Pastoralists are classified as nomadic, transhumant, or sedentary, based on the type and degree 
of livestock mobility. Nomadic pastoralists have highly frequent mobility in irregular patterns, while 
transhumant herders move seasonally between fixed grazing areas (Niamir-Fuller & Turner, 1999). 
Sedentary pastoralists move less frequently, have permanent residence places and their livelihoods are 
dependent in certain degree on non-pastoral sources (Koocheki & Gliessman, 2005). Although 
pastoralists make productive use of rangelands with limited potential for economic benefits such as crop 
production, they have been marginalized socially and politically with negative stereotypes and myths 
(MEA, 2005b; UNDP, 2003). Persistent colonial views of pastoralism as backward, unproductive, and 
environmentally damaging dominantly shaped government policies and donor interventions till the mid-
1990s (Galvin et al., 2008; Jun Li et al., 2007; Turner, 2011). Such policies included restriction of mobility, 
forced settlement of pastoralists, land titling, and destocking programs (ibid).  
A new pastoral development paradigm under the influence of major shifts in ecological thinking 
discussed above fundamentally challenged these adverse portrayals of pastoralism and pastoral policies 
(ibid). Adaptive strategies of pastoralists including mobility, flexibility of decision-making, opportunistic 
stocking, diversification  of livestock species, reserving key resources for hard times, splitting of herds 
and redistribution of assets were scientifically acknowledged as being most efficient and sustainable 
(Ellis & Swift, 1988; Scoones, 1994). Pastoral institutions encompassing these essential practices 
regulate resource use and conservation, minimize risks to people and livestock, avoid disease outbreaks, 
and promote collective actions for human safety and subsistence (Niamir-Fuller & Turner, 1999). Vital 





trust, and ability to communicate with one another that all contribute to strong social capital among 
pastoralists (ibid). However, pastoral strategies have been blamed for social and political instability and 
marginalization of pastoralists for political participation, social service delivery and development 
investments (UNDP, 2003). Nowadays, pastoralists face many constraints including vulnerability to 
climate change, water scarcity, increasing sedentarization, poor access to markets, growing population 
pressure and insecure land tenure and land fragmentation (Galvin et al., 2008; Niamir-Fuller & Turner, 
1999; UNDP, 2003). 
Having clarified specifics of pastoral social-ecological systems, I can now turn to the results of 
community-based rangeland management (CBRM) in drylands. Studies have concluded that communal 
property regimes are better suited to variable, unpredictable and low rate of resource flow in pastoral 
regions, which allows mobility (Niamir-Fuller & Turner, 1999). State management or privatization of 
grazing lands have often failed, leading to increased resource degradation, human poverty and 
marginalization of pastoralists (Galvin, 2009; Hobbs et al., 2008; Jun Li et al., 2007). These experiences 
demonstrated the viability of customary institutions that communally manage grazing lands. However, 
as a result of decades of social and political assaults with a loss of their pastures and cultural identity, 
traditional institutions have been much weakened or disintegrated in many pastoral regions. From these 
perspectives, CBRM has provided a means to revive pastoral institutions by strengthening inherent 
elements of pastoral culture and reclaiming their access to resources and acquiring formal recognition. 
Nonetheless, as noted earlier, empirical studies have shown a substantial disconnect between theories 
and on-the-ground practices of CBRM.  
Turner (2011) argued that there were several factors leading to the ineffectiveness of CBRM for 
improving resource condition and pastoral livelihoods. These included perpetual negative views of 
pastoralists among policy-makers, development officials and experts, recent political socioeconomic 





education, regulatory policies, and market economies originated from the West (ibid). These contextual 
dynamics all undermined in some extent the development of CBRM, but there were more specific 
conceptual issues as highlighted by Turner. Essentially, he pointed out “vagueness surrounding the 
concepts of livestock mobility and common pastures, and contradictions between the institutional 
requirements of these two conceptualizations” (p. 475) due to dryland resource characteristics. First, 
many CBRM programs suffered from “abstract understanding” of livestock mobility without considering 
its complexity that involves “labor availability, access to markets, the knowledge and social networking 
of herders, (in)security in rural areas through which livestock moves, and access to the paths, pastures, 
and water sources needed to reach destination pastures” (p. 477). Hence, those programs often fail to 
facilitate the institutional capacity to support these necessary preconditions for the mobility and 
regulate “spatiotemporal distribution of livestock grazing” (p. 476) at larger scales.  
Second, Turner underlined the contradictory nature of two goals prioritized by CBRM efforts: (1) 
reducing transactions costs related to the mobility, and (2) overcoming provision problems of 
overstocking common pastures. Paradoxically, under conditions of drylands, the former goal would 
require flexible non-exclusive management approach, while achieving the latter needs delineated 
boundaries of resources and users holding access rights with clear exclusion. Using a Sahelian case of 
West Africa, Turner demonstrated that prioritization among the two goals can be very context-specific 
but management policies in drylands should emphasize addressing uncertainty and avoiding procedures 
constraining livestock mobility. The lack of understanding of this important contradiction has led to 
negative results such as resource degradation and conflicts, which have been viewed as problems of 
community based management. As it was mentioned earlier, failures of exclusionary measures in the 
pastoral systems shown in other studies (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002; Jun Li et al., 2007; Quinn et al., 
2007) have been in line with the arguments of Turner. Hence, it is apparent that a demand for a 





is emerging. Such sub-theory would remove the existing confusion over limitations of the general 
commons theory for fitting dryland conditions and associated policy failures. Apart from these issues of 
disjuncture between theories and practices, many have raised concerns of methodological flaws for 
measuring outcomes of community based management, which in turn contributed to the varying results 
reported (Agrawal, 2002; Shackleton et al., 2010). In the following section, I will review literature on 
issues of measuring CBNRM results with a focus on social outcomes.    
 
1.2.5. Measuring outcomes of CBNRM. 
Scientific assessment of CBNRM outcomes has been a challenging task due the complexity of the 
social-ecological systems it involves (Agrawal, 2002; Agrawal, 2003; Plummer & Armitage, 2007). 
Starting from the definition of success for CBNRM that can be commonly accepted, measuring its 
outcomes has faced multiple complications. For instance, assessment of environmental outcomes 
encounters many confounding variables; variability among case studies limits comparison and 
generalization (Agrawal, 2002), and often ecological results are slow to appear (Koontz & Thomas, 
2007). Similarly, evaluation of social outcomes has difficulties for measuring abstract concepts such as 
trust and values, defining appropriate scale for determining social outcomes, and examining processes 
and causal relationships between CBNRM, environmental and social outcomes (Agrawal, 2003; Agrawal 
& Chhatre, 2006; Lyons, 2013). In addition, there has been a less emphasis on comparative studies of 
outcomes of CBNRM with non-CBNRM approaches, as well as few large-N studies with greater 
potentials for generalization and validity (Agrawal, 2002).  
CBNRM encompasses a multiplicity of perspectives and diversity of ecosystems and institutions 
that require an interdisciplinary approach to evaluate its outcomes (Gruber, 2010; Plummer & Armitage, 
2007) involving resource users and stakeholders (Mulrennan et al., 2012; Sultana & Abeyasekera, 2008). 





two major goals: improving resource condition and well-being of resource users. From the CPR 
perspective, assessments investigate to what extent CBNRM is successful in addressing appropriation 
and provision problems. From social-ecological systems thinking, CBNRM evaluation explores adaptive 
capacity of CBNRM institutions, its ability to learn and self-organize and foster innovative solutions to 
external shocks while maintaining its inherent system features (Armitage, 2005; Gooch & Warburton, 
2009). Within the institutional framework, studies analyze which CBNRM design principles work better 
for different CPR types, socio-cultural groups, internal governance arrangements and external economic 
and political contexts (Agrawal, 2002). Our review concerns social outcomes of CBNRM, roles of 
resource users and their institutions, the core of all three perspectives mentioned above.  
Empirical studies assessing social outcomes of resource user groups commonly use different sets 
of variables: livelihood measures (Suich, 2013b), social capital including trust and norms of reciprocity 
(Wagner & Fernandez-Gimenez, 2008), social networks (Lauber et al., 2008), cooperation, and interests, 
conflicts, power relations (Zulu, 2008) and practices of individual members (Thompson, 2013). 
Institutional evaluation of CBNRM social outcomes applies not only these attributes of the user groups 
but internal arrangements such as rule-setting and modification, rule types, enforcement mechanisms, 
leadership, legitimacy, equity (Kellert et al., 2000), participation (Constantino et al., 2012) and external 
economic and political systems, to which CBNRM is embedded (Ogbaharya & Tecle, 2010). Following 
Ostrom’s design principles (Ostrom, 1990, 2008) many studies appraised institutional designs in terms of 
their effectiveness and sustainability of CBNRM outcomes (Brooks et al., 2012; Cox et al., 2010; Crewett, 
2015; Quinn et al., 2007). Research also links these variables at user group and institutional levels with 
ecological conditions and CPR issues that substantially influence CBNRM outcomes (Agrawal & Chhatre, 
2006).  
Although a body of literature has studied these factors for CBNRM performance and social 





2002) in terms of their output-versus-outcome link. For instance, variables such as increased cash 
income, household assets, livestock holdings and favorable practices to resources can be clearly 
considered as outcome variables. While other factors including information, communication, leadership, 
and available assistance lack such intuitive outcome quality. Rather, they are more likely to be output-
type variables that contribute to achieving outcome variables. In addition, researchers also pointed to 
the dynamic process-oriented and interrelated nature of the variables influencing CBNRM outcomes 
(Agrawal & Chhatre, 2011; NRC, 2002). In this respect, outcome-type variables created by output-type 
factors can require higher levels of output for further strengthening of CBNRM institutions. For example, 
increased social capital through frequent interaction, communication, cooperation, and leadership can 
foster more collective action and innovation among members that would in turn demand greater 
information, leadership and social networking. Another gap highlighted by researchers (Agrawal, 2002; 
Poteete & Ostrom, 2008) was a need for large-N studies that could complement qualitative case studies 
and expand potential for representativeness and generalization.  
The prior four sections clarified connections of CBNRM with CPR theories and its potential for 
addressing CPR dilemmas. I also placed CBNRM among other property rights institutions with its 
strengths, weaknesses and dependence on larger governance systems. I explained specifics of CBNRM in 
the pastoral context with management implications while emphasizing a need for more studies 
examining CBRM institutions. Problems of the disconnect between theories and practices of CBRM, the 
lack of understanding of existing contradictions of CPR theories among those facilitating CBRM and its 
negative consequences on resource condition and well-being of resource users were elaborated in an 
effort to explain reasons for the ineffectiveness of community-based rangeland programs. The last 
section illustrated the complexity of measuring outcomes of CBNRM and existing gaps in studying causal 
relationships among variables influencing CBRM results and vagueness of output-outcome links among 





reputation. In the following section, I will discuss the context of Mongolian pastoral institutions, their 
place among global CPR community sharing similarities as well as their uniqueness in terms of the 
ecological and social-political background. The section will also review how rural development problems 
resulted from broader social reforms triggered the emergence of CBRM institutions in Mongolia.   
   
1.2.6. Mongolian pastoral institutions. 
 Pastoral institutions in Mongolian rangelands have been shaped by its resource characteristics 
under the influence of country’s geography and climate. According to the classification of Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (2005b), Mongolia’s climate falls into arid and semi-arid categories of drylands. 
Mongolia’s geographic location at the center of Asian continent remote from oceans at the elevations 
ranging between 800-1500 m exposes the country to the winds of the southern desert (Douglas et al., 
2006). Additionally, mountain systems in the western and northwestern Mongolia capture atmospheric 
currents containing moisture from the Atlantic Ocean (ibid). The dry continental climate of Mongolia is 
characterized by long cold winters and short warm summers, low precipitation and high fluctuation of 
temperatures spatially and temporally (Batima, 2006). Mean annual temperatures and precipitation 
increase from the south to the north of the country by three major ecological zones: in the desert 
steppe, these are 4.5C and 75 mm; in the steppe, 1.5C and 200 mm; in the mountain steppe, -2.5C 
and 270 mm (Dagvadorj et al., 2010). The coldest month is January with average temperatures ranging 
between –15C and –35C. July is the warmest month with the mean temperature reaching 25C. The 
absolute temperature fluctuations recorded were -56C in 1972 and 44C in 1999 (Batima, 2006). In 
terms of precipitation, 70-90% of annual precipitation occurs in summer and the aridity gradient follows 
altitudinal gradient with a gradual shift from humid alpine zone via semi-arid mountain steppe to arid 
lowlands of the southern desert zone (Zemmrich et al., 2010). As Batima (2006) noted precipitation 





precipitation, vegetation production and species diversity vary across ecological zones, where annual 
standing crop (dry weight) has higher yields in the mountain forest (1,150-1,940 kg/ha) and steppe (650-
1,300 kg/ha) regions (Douglas et al., 2006). In the desert steppe, standing crop yield ranges between 
290-380 kg/ha but with diverse vegetation communities (ibid). In the condition of such highly variable 
and low resource production, forage availability for livestock has been the determining factor for 
rangeland management regimes in Mongolia (Okayasu et al., 2011).   
Through centuries-long adaptive processes in the dryland conditions described above, 
Mongolian pastoralism has developed efficient institutions for managing rangeland resources. However, 
in the last century, Mongolia has gone through substantial social transformations challenging pastoral 
social-ecological systems. These changes considerably influenced pastoral institutions and property 
regimes that ultimately led to the development of CBRM in Mongolia. Hence, it is essential to explain 
the ways these reforms affected Mongolian pastoralism and the emergence of CBRM. 
Fernandez-Gimenez (1999b) considered three major periods that historically shaped 
contemporary pastoralism in Mongolia. These included (1) pre-communist period before 1924, (2) 
socialist collective era from 1960 to 1990, and (3) post-socialist time since livestock privatization in 1993 
(p. 319). I will briefly summarize major changes occurred in each period with corresponding implications 
for the pastoral social-ecological systems while describing dominant institutions, social organizations 
and rangeland practices. 
In the first period, the Manchu colonial rule divided Mongolia into smaller administrative units, 
which restricted herders’ movement outside of their native principality (Bold, 2001). According to Bold 
(pp. 45-47), pasture lands were divided into several use types by different appropriators: (1) for the 
personal use of the Manchu emperor for his herds and hunting; (2) for the state use such as the relay 
post services (Mong. urtuu), border protection (Mong. kharuul) and the army and military households 





(Mong. otog); (4) hereditary use by noble princes; and (5) use by common herders. This typology meant 
the existence of certain degree of exclusion and the hierarchy for accessing the best grazing areas. 
Despite the legally prescribed rights, common herders had constraints to truly exercise their rights 
including the lack of transportation and labor (ibid). In addition, Bold argued that in the nomadic 
economy, ownership of land was inferior to the ownership of livestock as a means of production. Hence, 
property regimes included access, withdrawal, management and exclusion without alienation.  
Institutionally, both formal and informal types coexisted for allocation of grazing areas and 
regulation of seasonal movements and pasture use (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002; Upton, 2005). Major 
social organizations of herders included khot ail, bag, khoshuu and aimag. Khot ail was the smallest unit 
including 2-12 households under acknowledged leadership of an experienced or wealthier member. 
Families in khot ail camped, travelled together sharing their labor, cooperated on labor-intensive tasks 
such as seasonal migrations. In this manner, khot ail functioned as a social safety net reducing risks 
where poor members benefited from subsistence help of wealthier ones in exchange for their labor 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999b; Simukov, 1934). Membership in khot ail was flexible and varied seasonally 
or yearly (ibid). Other types of social organizations reflected more of formal administrative divisions. 
Bag consisted of 50-100 households, who resided in the same geographic location sharing common 
pastures and resources. Within bag, there were informal social groupings of neighborhoods called neg 
nutgiinkhan (people of the same area or valley) consisting of several adjacent khot ails, who shared 
common norms for resource use and cooperated on larger scale rangeland management activities 
(Mearns, 1996a). These included coordination of pasture use, hay areas, water sources, salt licks, search 
of lost animals, fire wood collection and long-distance movements (ibid). Aimag was administratively 
largest unit with its territories stretching horizontally from the south to the north crossing all ecological 
zones, which allowed seasonal movements of livestock. With the imposed division by the Manchu into 





The second period started with the victory of struggles of Mongolians for independence since 
the early 20th century. Subsequent reforms turned Mongolia into a socialist system under the strong 
influence of newly created communist Russia (Baabar, 1999). During the socialist period, land and 
livestock were nationalized and herders became employees of state livestock collectives (Mong. negdel). 
These collectives existed over 30 years and coordinated pastures and seasonal migrations taking care of 
transportation, water availability, social and veterinary services and necessary labor (Academy of 
Science, 1990). During the collective years, major traditional pastoral practices were maintained and 
strengthened by education, social services and technology improvement (Swift, 1995). In 1931, the 
socialist government further divided the country into 18 provinces and 320 soums (counties) and 
cooperatives for the purpose of the economic development (Bruun & Odgaard, 1996). Hence, the scope 
of livestock mobility was further curtailed (Galvin et al., 2008). State collectives created a new 
generation of herders who were totally dependent on the state support for not only rangeland 
management activities such as transportation and labor for migration, supply of fodder, water and camp 
facilities, and marketing livestock products but also other services of social welfare, education and 
health (Bruun, 2006).  
The third period commenced with an adoption of Mongolia’s new Constitution in 1992, which 
officially declared the country’s shift to a democratic system of government and free market economy. 
Hence, privatization of state-owned industries occurred rapidly, including state livestock collectives 
(Mearns, 1996a). Privatization of livestock attracted many laid-off state factory workers from urban 
settlements back to their home areas. This influx of inexperienced herders sharply increased the herder 
population reaching 43% of country’s population in the early 1990s (Mearns, 1996a; NSO and World 
Bank, 2001). With decollectivization, formal institutions for rangeland management became nearly 
absent leaving pastures under much weakened informal institutions (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002; 





access (Upton, 2008). Herder households were left without social and veterinary services, 
transportation, labor assistance and rural infrastructure maintenance once livestock became their own 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999a; Mearns, 1996b). In addition, inexperienced in marketing their products 
under the new economic system, many herders were exploited by urban traders with sharply decreased 
terms of trade (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002; Rossabi, 2005).  
Without the support from collectives, many now private herders lacked access to transportation 
and additional labor that restricted their seasonal movements (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999b, 2001). Along 
with decreased mobility, “new” herders increased a demand for pastures placing further grazing 
pressures. These dynamics led to negative changes in rangeland practices and behaviors such as 
increased out-of season grazing, year around use of key resource and trespassing of reserved pastures 
by others (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001; Upton, 2008). Such adverse trends implied overall retreat from 
traditional cooperation with others, adherence to customary norms for resource use, and a rise of 
conflicts and mistrust and a move to more opportunistic strategies (Upton, 2005, 2008; Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2002). It is likely that these patterns in resource management contributed to the perceived 
degradation of rangeland resources and increase of rural poverty by the mid-1990s (Mearns, 1996b; 
Swift, 1995). A poverty assessment conducted in 1996 reported that 80% of the rural poor were herders, 
of which a half was “small herders” having less than 15 animals 1(World Bank, 1996). Further, these 
studies informed about increasing inequality among the herders, emergence of informal labor market in 
the livestock production and herders’ acute needs for education, health and communication services 
highlighting their “information hunger” (NSO and World Bank, p. xii). These issues have been further 
exacerbated by ongoing climate change documented by scientists (Angerer et al., 2008; Dagvadorj et al., 
2010) as well as by herders (Bruegger et al., 2014; Marin, 2010).  
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Several external development organizations saw CBNRM to be a potential option to address 
these problems (Agriteam-Canada, 1997; Swift, 1995). Projects of the German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) first introduced the community-based natural 
resource management model to Mongolia (Ministry of Nature and Environment, 2007; Schmidt, 2006; 
Upton, 2008). The process of engaging herder communities in natural resource management has further 
been expanded by other external donors, initially as aids to address consequences of dzud2 in 1999-
2001. These efforts have gradually led to institution-building objectives for rangeland management 
substantially weakened by the transitional reforms following the decollectivization and livestock 
privatization. According to a UNDP (2006) herder group assessment, there were 14 different programs 
facilitating the capacity building of over 2000 herder groups in 19 out of 21 provinces.  
The results of CBNRM in Mongolia have been mixed, as is the case internationally. Currently, 
rangelands comprise about 83% of country’s territory (Lkhagva et al., 2013) under de-jure state 
property, but de-facto communal regime of herder communities (Addison, 2012; Upton, 2008). 
Mongolian pastoralists still retain key herding strategies at mainly khot ail level but changes in practices 
have been noted as mentioned earlier. Although there was a report on reviving cooperation among neg 
nutgiinkhan (Mearns, 1996a), this has been contested by others (Bruun, 2006; Muller & Bold, 1996; 
Upton, 2011). 
 Despite the growing economic importance of the mining industry, the livestock sector accounts 
for 14% of Gross Domestic Production, and approximately 28% of the work force is directly dependent 
on this sector (Ganibal, 2015). In this context, scientific assessment of the CBNRM efforts is much 
needed to inform continuing external support to community-based institutions in Mongolia as well as 
ongoing policy debates on pasture land regulations. Recent studies contributed to this gap by providing 
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valuable insights for future policies for managing rangelands and for building adaptive capacities of 
pastoral institutions (Addison et al., 2013; Baival, 2012; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014; Hess et al., 
2010; Upton, 2008). However, existing studies have some limitations, such as small samples, dominance 
of case studies, and restricted geographic coverage, that may weaken the overall representativeness of 
the findings and their theoretical contributions. The following section will bring more detailed accounts 
on the recent assessments of community-based rangeland management in Mongolia.  
  
1.2.7. Study of Mongolian CBRM. 
 Over the last decade, several scientific studies examined outcomes of herder groups facilitated 
by international agencies who responded to the need for addressing rural development issues of 
transitional Mongolia. Table 1.1 in Appendix displays the list of studies conducted so far with a brief 
summary including study subject, research method and study sites, and key results. A close examination 
of the table reveals several important trends in the current study of CBRM in Mongolia.   
First, these studies all focused on outcomes and internal processes of donor-supported pastoral 
groups in Mongolia and related their outcomes to the pastoral institution development. However, few 
conceptually connected these donor-induced initiatives to community-based resource management. 
The majority were independent studies by western scientists published in peer-reviewed international 
journals, with the exception of two dissertations (Baival, 2012; Murphy, 2011), and a donor-funded 
assessment (Usukh et al., 2010). Among them, five publications had Mongolian researchers as first 
authors. The dominance of case studies was observed with exception of six mixed-method studies with 
sample sizes ranging from 50 to 280 informants. Unit of analysis was mainly individual herder or 
household level though some made conclusions at the group or institution level.  
The studies covered sites of five donors including GTZ-funded New Zealand Nature Institute 





Program (RPRP) of International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Swiss Development Agency 
(SDC) funded Green Gold Pasture Ecosystem Management Project, and UNDP-funded Sustainable 
Grassland Management project. Herder groups facilitated by three donors, namely, GTZ/NZNI, UNDP 
and WB/SLP received greater research attention.  
Geographically, studies covered three ecological zones including desert steppe, steppe and 
mountain forest steppe, among which the desert steppe was most studied. However, coverage of 
different ecological zones within a study remained limited; five studies examined outcomes in two 
ecological zones and only Usukh et al. (2010) included groups in four ecological regions in their study. In 
addition, thorough examination of potential influence of ecological zones on outcomes of community-
based management has not been conducted.    
 Starting from Upton’s early assessments (2008, 2009), most studies framed the process of group 
organization around rangeland management using commons theories, Ostrom’s institutional design 
principles including resource characteristics, user groups’ attributes, external social political context, and 
concepts of property rights, collective action, social capital, and social-ecological systems. Within these 
CPR-related theoretical frameworks, research inquiries comprised widely ranging topics including the 
role of external agencies in facilitating collective action and social capital among pastoral groups, 
evolving changes in property rights, rangeland management practices, community dynamics, equality, 
power relations,  adaptive capacity and resilience of pastoral communities. Several studies examined 
outcomes of group collective action for rangeland management by measuring resource condition, 
livelihoods of members and their adaptive capacity in comparison to those outside of such donor-
funded initiatives (Addison et al., 2013; Baival & Fernández-Giménez, 2012; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 
2014; Fernández-Giménez et al., 2012; Upton, 2008, 2011, 2012). Nonetheless, investigation of causal 
associations between these variables influencing CBRM outcomes or testing theoretical models 





 Despite the fact that all of them studied the same phenomenon occurring in the same time 
using common theoretical foundations, few explicitly defined the subject in association with CBRM. 
Terms used for naming for the study subject included community groups, herder groups, pasture user 
groups, cooperative groups, donor-initiated institutions, and community-based rangeland management 
groups. This diversity may reflect actual variety in the field settings that researchers found. Since the 
transition, there has been an explosion of different community-oriented programs in Mongolia with a 
wide range of sectors including health, education, small business, disaster, saving and credit, and many 
natural resource fields such as forestry, water, rangeland, and wildlife or biodiversity conservation. 
Under the global agendas of sustainable development discussed earlier, policies of the government of 
Mongolia and international donors have facilitated the growth of these programs. Hence, it is essential 
to distinguish among these community-oriented programs which may be considered as CBRM in the 
Mongolian context.  
For instance, a more careful investigation of a few programs covered by CBRM studies in Table 
1.1 could reveal an important clue. On the basis of my knowledge and experience of facilitating donor-
supported herder groups in Mongolia, it is worth noting some differences between these donor 
programs, which have essential implications for the program implementation, hence facilitation of 
CBRM. Projects implemented by GTZ/NZNI, UNDP and SDC were technical assistance programs granted 
under strict monitoring and reporting requirements with clear outcome benchmarks by a primary 
funder or upper agency. These projects primarily aimed at building the capacity of Mongolian 
stakeholders including government offices of various levels and local resource users for sustainable 
resource management and rural livelihoods. In contrast, programs of the World Bank and IFAD were 
loans to the Government of Mongolia with poverty reduction objectives rather than resource 
conservation and management capacity building. The accountability for loan use and repayment 





monitoring of the program went through different levels of government. These programs did not include 
costs for initial participatory processes engaging local communities3, continuous facilitation of group 
development and regular monitoring. Accordingly, their results, when viewed from a CBRM perspective 
have been fairly poor (Murphy, 2011; Upton, 2011) and negative to the overall reputation of the CBRM 
efforts in the country. At this point, I can turn our discussions to the actual findings of the CBRM studies.  
As reported, the majority of donors used participatory approaches for facilitating herder group 
formation, interactions among local stakeholders and trust-building (Baival, 2012; Leisher et al., 2012; 
Upton, 2008). Most CBRM efforts resulted in strengthened social capital, leadership, and organized 
cooperation by increasing members’ access to training and peer learning and empowerment of women 
(Baival, 2012; Baival & Fernández-Giménez, 2012; Leisher et al., 2012; Upton, 2008). CBRM members 
increased their use of proven traditional rangeland practices while adopting new adaptive innovations 
for resource management (Baival, 2012; Baival & Fernández-Giménez, 2012; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 
2014) and improved pasture conditions and livelihoods in the forms of income and assets (Leisher et al., 
2012). In addition, CBRM facilitated adaptive capacity of the members in the forms of income 
diversification, communal pooling of labor and marketing livestock products, and social networking for 
risk sharing (Baival & Fernández-Giménez, 2012; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014; Fernández-Giménez et 
al., 2012; Upton, 2012). Regarding effect of CBRM on mobility and storage activities, some found no 
effect(Upton, 2012) while others revealed positive influence of CBRM in setting aside reserve pastures 
and fattening livestock by doing more movements (otor) (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014; Fernández-
Giménez et al., 2012). Groups’ resilience built through CBRM has been rather limited as many activities 
ceased to almost non-existence with the end of the supporting projects (Addison et al., 2013; Baival, 
2012; Upton, 2012).  
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There were no differences in wealth and age of CBRM members, but some reported a 
reluctance of wealthy households or those having sufficient labor force to join CBRM (Fernandez-
Gimenez et al., 2014; Upton, 2008). Some conflicting results included outcomes in income diversity, 
livelihoods, pasture condition, the presence of sanctions, enforcement and group size (Addison et al., 
2013; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014; Leisher et al., 2012; Upton, 2008; Usukh et al., 2010). 
Comparative studies showed the presence of strong traditional knowledge, customary norms, reciprocal 
information sharing, mutual support (Baival & Fernández-Giménez, 2012), equity and the lack of conflict 
(Upton, 2011) among non-CBRM members. Regarding group size, Usukh et al. (2010) argued that larger 
groups had more potential for rangeland management than smaller groups as it enabled greater 
mobility. In contrast, Upton reported about a group disintegration, which was too large for effective 
management (Upton, 2008). Upton also concluded that compulsory membership to create larger groups 
was inefficient in terms of addressing intragroup dynamics, power relations and equity in resource 
access. Rather these groups looked more like “paper” groups (Upton, 2011). A few studies reported the 
ineffectiveness or perceived inappropriateness of collective pasture management in the desert steppe 
(Addison et al., 2013; Usukh et al., 2010).  
Studies raised concerns over the cases of exclusion of non-members from accessing CBRM 
contracted pastures with delineated boundaries, haymaking areas or water sources improved by 
supporting donors leading to pasture disputes (Baival, 2012; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2008; Upton, 
2008, 2009, 2011, 2012; Usukh et al., 2010). In several cases, it was hard for non-members to join 
already established CBRM groups (Upton, 2009, 2011). Such exclusion may increase inequality among 
community members, restrict mobility of non-members and threaten their livelihoods (Murphy, 2011; 
Upton, 2009, 2011)(Fernández-Giménez et al., 2012). For many herders, the main incentives for joining 
CBRM were access to collective labor, training opportunities (Upton, 2008), obtaining well contract with 





(Murphy, 2011). Several studies pointed out constraints for organizing or joining CBRM such as the lack 
of information and leadership (Baival & Fernández-Giménez, 2012), inability to pay initial membership 
fee and inability to contribute to the group collective action lacking labor (Upton, 2008). CBRM 
implementation difficulties included setting boundaries of grazing areas for collective management, 
achieving goals of reducing livestock number to avoid overgrazing, marketing livestock products, poor 
financial capacity, and coordination of seasonal migrations at the inter-soum and aimag levels (Usukh et 
al., 2010). 
Lastly, research highlighted the importance of supporting external agency, strong leadership and 
support of local government, and longer experience of cooperation (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014; 
Usukh et al., 2010) for desired outcomes of emerging CBRM institutions.   
The review of recent studies of CBRM experience in Mongolia revealed several gaps that need to 
be addressed. As Agrawal (2002) called for, quantitative examination of larger-N samples with greater 
power for generalization and validity is needed. Further, more research on causal relationships of 
influential factors such as ecological zones and testing of theoretical models for predicting CBRM 
outcomes are required. Importance of defining CBRM in the Mongolian pastoral context as well as 
measuring group level variables was also noted for the benefit of advancing the research in this field.  
Findings of the CBRM studies mirrored problems of the lack of understanding of specifics of pastoral 
social-ecological systems raised by Turner as shown in section 1.2.4. Reported attempts of formalizing 
exclusionary rights over rangeland resources and setting social boundaries possessing those rights have 
led to the same unintended negative outcomes as documented internationally. It is clear from the 
findings of these studies that CBRM in Mongolia is in its infancy. Many CBRM groups ceased their 
activities by the end of supporting donor programs and turned back to their traditional reliance on kin-
based groups because they have not gained sufficient organizational strengths and capacity to continue 





and lack clear understanding of legal aspects of procedures like pasture contracts or making them 
effective preventing outsider encroachment as reported by researchers (Addison et al., 2013; Upton, 
2011). The results also confirmed how absence of true participation of local resource users in decision 
making over access to government assistance and distribution can directly influence resource 
appropriation problems.  
Mixed results of recent CBRM studies may reflect two realities. First is the timing of the 
research. Those assessments were conducted during the donor program may report more positive 
results reflecting perceptions of members enjoying benefits of collective action. In contrast, evaluations 
conducted after the end of donor program may show less enthusiastic pictures containing certain 
degree of members’ frustration. Second is a question of research independence. Knowing Mongolian 
pastoralists’ attitude and their delicate relationships with donor organization staffs, it is highly unlikely 
to obtain frank constructive responses to project related questions when former project workers act as 
data collection team members. To avoid this, the herders should be well assured that responses will not 
affect potential future benefits and create their trust in such promise. Hence, designs of future research 







CHAPTER TWO:  DOES COMMUNITY-BASED RANGELAND MANAGEMENT INCREASE SOCIAL OUTCOMES 




This study measured social outcomes of community-based rangeland management in Mongolia 
by comparing 77 formally organized pastoral groups with 65 traditional neighborhoods. We used focus 
group discussions, key informant interviews with the group and local leaders, and synthesized 
qualitative information into a semi-quantitative group profile.  In addition, we surveyed 706 households 
representing these groups in 36 districts across four ecological zones. We hypothesized that formal 
organization would increase groups’ social outcomes. We found that formal groups had more 
information sources, stronger leadership, greater knowledge exchange, cooperation and more rules. 
Members of formal groups were more proactive in addressing resource management issues and used 
more desired rangeland practices than traditional neighborhoods. However, the two types of groups did 
not differ on most livelihood measures and had a weak difference in social capital. These results signify 
the increased social effect of formal community-based management approach but call for consideration 
of how to reach livelihood outcomes, a key incentive for community-based management.   
 
2.1. Introduction 
Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) aims to manage resources 
sustainably through active participation of local community members in decision-making, while meeting 
ecological and socio-economic needs (Armitage, 2005; Berkes, 2004). As such, CBNRM has emerged as 
an alternative to state or market-driven management of common pool resources. Essentially, CBNRM 
draws on local people’s intimate knowledge of their resources and strong motivation to conserve them  





that decentralization of management and devolution of tenure rights to local communities incorporating 
customary tenure systems leads to improved resource governance (Bennett, 2013; Pagdee et al., 2006). 
However, since donor-sponsored and exogenous CBNRM efforts began in the late 1970s, CBNRM has 
produced mixed results. On one hand, through increased engagement of local communities, CBNRM 
promoted positive behaviors and practices in managing natural resources, better decision making and 
contribution to the improvement of ecological and economic well-being in local areas (Lyons, 2013; 
Measham, 2007; Taylor, 2009). On the other hand, studies also reported unequal distribution of benefits 
among community members, or “elite capture” of gains and exclusion of disadvantaged community 
members (Balint & Mashinya, 2006; Cleaver, 2005; Duffy, 2006; Saito-Jensen et al., 2010). Moreover, the 
challenges of decentralizing resource management and defining social boundaries for exclusive 
membership have hindered CBNRM efforts (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Agrawal & Ostrom, 1999; Blaikie, 
2006; Dressler et al., 2010).  
There are noted flaws in research methodology for assessing CBNRM results (Agrawal, 2002; 
Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006). Case studies or small-N studies with limited geographic scope examining a 
single resource domain, have limited generalizability and representativeness (Poteete & Ostrom, 2008). 
In recent years, there have been an increasing number of larger-N studies employing both quantitative 
and qualitative methods, but similar inquiries have rarely been done in the rangelands context; the 
largest ecosystem globally (MEA, 2005). 
To remedy these issues, we examined social outcomes of community-based rangeland 
management groups in Mongolia involving a sample of 142 groups and geographic coverage of four 
ecological regions (desert, steppe, eastern steppe and mountain forest steppe zones) across ten 
provinces.  
Furthermore, Mongolia offers a unique opportunity for scientific research on CBNRM with its 





recent political and economic dynamics. In the early 1990s, Mongolia commenced social reforms 
towards neoliberal economic policies with a multi-party political system. As part of the society, 
Mongolian pastoral communities have gone through these abrupt social transformations. New socio-
economic arrangements exacerbated by natural hazards substantially challenged rural communities for 
sustaining their livelihoods and rangeland resources. This process of adaptation has had important 
lessons to reflect through scientific and policy lenses. Therefore, Mongolian CBNRM case can represent 
pastoral communities with transitional experiences from the centrally planned economy in post-socialist 
countries. In this sense, revealing the effect of CBNRM on social outcomes of pastoral groups would 
contribute to enriching theories of common pool resource management (Ostrom, 1990, Agrawal, 2001).  
In this report, we present the results of a comparative analysis of social outcomes of formally 
organized community groups in Mongolia initiated by external donors in the late 1990s. Social outcomes 
are defined here as any positive status in the social wellbeing of group members, including useful 
resource management practices, constructive behavior, improved social capital and livelihoods. Our 
main research question was “Does community-based rangeland management (CBRM) increase social 
outcomes of pastoral groups in Mongolia?” We considered groups formally organized or CBRM 
according to the members’ report of collective activities bound by bylaws and plans under the support 
of an external project. We hypothesized that formally organized groups would have greater social 
outcomes compared to traditional neighborhoods.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain our conceptual framework by 
highlighting major theoretical and empirical arguments relating to successful CBNRM. We then present 
our methods, results and discussion of how these findings inform CBNRM theory and practice. We 






2.2. Conceptual Framework   
2.2.1. Organization of pastoral groups and characteristics of resources. 
Figure 2.1 presents a graphical depiction of study’s conceptual framework. The figure shows 
that two key variables, namely, organization status of the groups (formal vs. informal) and their location 
in a particular ecological zone primarily influences the levels of social outcomes of the pastoral 
communities.   
Figure 2.1. The conceptual framework depicts the effect of organization status on 
ultimate social outcomes through multiple mutually -enforcing intermediate outcomes as 
well as the effect of ecological zone on these social outcomes.  
 
 A body of literature suggests that under certain conditions, community-based management of 
common pool resources has positive outcomes. Despite the varying social and ecological settings of 





formal and informal rules and norms that shape interactions of members with others and the nature” 
(Agrawal & Gibson, 2001, p. 14; NRC, 2002, p. 89; Pagdee et al., 2006) in any community context. 
Specifically, well-functioning rules to regulate behaviors of individual members with their potentially 
conflicting interests for meeting collective benefit have been a key element for successful, long-enduring 
resource institutions (Agrawal, 2002; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990). Such regulations limit free 
riding problems and punish those violating collective agreements (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). Traditional 
norms shared by local resource users often promote conservation by prohibiting certain harmful 
behaviors, and for CBNRM development, the presence of such customary norms encourage cooperation 
on more formal arrangements to manage common resources (Agrawal & Gibson, 2001). In most 
situations, self-organized groups initially rely on their locally evolved norms of reciprocity, built trust, 
and local leaders before moving to a formal agreement among members. This formal arrangement 
involves regulations of more complex interactions such as restricting amount, timing, place of resource 
use, and sharing costs and benefits between themselves (Ostrom, 2000). As collaborative process 
advances towards a more developed form, the groups continue developing their rules to reflect various 
situations to be regulated improving rules content and making them more formal. From these two forms 
of rules, formally agreed-upon rules that were “devised and modified over time” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 89) 
by group members themselves according to their specific circumstances and collective choice appear to 
be given more weight than traditional norms.  
Organization status in the conceptual framework contains these two forms of resource 
institutions; informal groups or traditional neighborhoods relying on customary norms and formal 
groups bound by their bylaws and resource use agreements. For the development of the latter, 
contextual factors (Agrawal, 2001) or external facilitation have played a triggering role in Mongolia. 
Pioneering technical assistance projects of the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and United Nations 





first introduced CBNRM to Mongolia. The process of engaging herder communities in natural resource 
management has further been expanded by other external donors, initially as aids to address 
consequences of dzud4 in 1999-2001. These efforts have gradually led to institution-building objectives 
for rangeland management substantially weakened by the transitional reforms following the de-
collectivization and livestock privatization. According to a UNDP (2006) herder group assessment, in 
2006 there were 14 different programs facilitating the capacity building of over 2000 herder groups in 
19 out of 21 provinces.  To reflect this in the framework, external facilitation was included as an 
influencing variable for the organization status and the intermediate outcome variables. However, the 
variable will not be the subject of analysis in this chapter and is thus shown in a faded color.  
Studies have increasingly acknowledged the importance of group attributes such as differing 
interests of members, their social status and roles in CBNRM outcomes (Agrawal & Gibson, 2001). 
Similarly, in Mongolian rangelands, a few studies reported about important roles of local leaders be they 
young dynamic herders, experienced elder members or women in rangeland management in evolving 
community groups (Ulambayar & Fernández-Giménez, 2013; Upton, 2008). Hence, we considered 
potential confounding effects of these structural features of user groups on social outcomes.      
As predicted by the theories, we hypothesized that formally organized groups will demonstrate 
greater social outcomes as compared to informal groups. In terms of group structures, it is difficult to 
propose a clear direction of its effect on social outcomes in the absence of distinct structural attributes 
specific to formal and informal groups. Therefore, our examination will be exploratory nature.  
 We included ecological zone on the basis of the consistent theoretical argument that resource 
characteristics strongly influence management outcomes of commons institutions (Agrawal, 2001; 
Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988). Studies on Mongolian rangelands have found that desert steppe regions 
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 Dzud is a Mongolian term for severe winter conditions with extremely low temperatures (possibly combined with 
climatic events such as snow blizzard or storm) that prevent livestock accessing forage causing starvation and 





are dominated by non-equilibrium dynamics, with highly variable resource productivity controlled by 
rainfall variation and timing rather than livestock grazing (Fernández-Giménez, 1997; Okayasu et al., 
2012; Wesche et al., 2010; Zemmrich, 2007). These scarce and uncertain resource attributes have 
shaped Mongolia’s main pastoral strategies including high mobility, flexibility, diversification, storage 
and pooling (Brown et al., 2013; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014). In turn, such strategies involve 
different economic and social inputs depending on ecological region of the resource users (Bazargur et 
al., 1989). For instance, herders in the desert steppe move longer distances and more frequently across 
large territories to access water sources and pastures as compared to those in the mountain forest 
steppe (Azarov, 1933; Simukov, 1934; Tsevel, 1940) (Jagvaral, 1974) in (Bazargur et al., 1989). Hence, 
moving in the desert steppe region requires more investments in terms of transportation, labor and 
time that directly impact economic outcomes of the pastoralists in this ecological zone.  
Within existing studies on Mongolian rangelands, it is difficult to hypothesize influences of 
ecological zone on social outcomes. Apparently, there has been limited scientific attention to a the role 
of ecological system in shaping socioeconomic dimensions of rangeland management in Mongolia. 
Nevertheless, we anticipated greater effect of resource attributes or ecological zone on livelihood 
variables and rangeland practices. As explained above, we expected that in the desert steppe, the 
ecological zone variable may have a negative effect on livelihoods as compared to other three regions. 
In terms of intermediate outcomes, we predicted no effect of ecological zone on majority of variables 
but rules and cooperation. Due to scarce resources, herders in the desert steppe operate in smaller 
traditional units (one, two households together) than those in other regions (2-12 households) (Azarov, 
1933) in (Bazargur et al., 1989) to avoid competition for scarce grazing resources. These conditions may 
limit their social interactions such as cooperation in daily activities and setting rules to apply in their 





2.2.2. Ultimate social outcomes. 
As shown in Figure 2.1, we selected three sets of social outcomes as our dependent variables. 
Most evaluations of CBNRM consider livelihood outcomes and changes in resource conditions as key 
measures of CBNRM success (Conley & Moote, 2003; Hibbard & Lurie, 2012; Plummer & Armitage, 
2007). However, following our research objectives, we focused on social outcomes related to social and 
economic well-being of Mongolian pastoralists rather than rangeland condition. Consequently, we 
conceptualized that livelihood, social capital and rangeland management practices and behavior present 
the ultimate social outcomes of CBRM institutions in Mongolia.  
For Mongolian pastoralists, livestock is the primary asset that defines wealth and power 
(Murphy, 2014; Sneath, 1999). Access to technology and equipment is also important to household 
production.  Essential assets such as vehicles, tractors, cell-phones and TV increase production capacity 
and herders’ access to information, which is critical in vast sparsely populated areas. Possession of these 
assets, a viable number of livestock, and cash income determine the capability of rural herding 
communities to meet their subsistence needs and address risks under uncertain and variable 
environmental conditions (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2011). We 
anticipated that through increased information, communication exchange, and cooperation, members 
gain livelihood outcomes. Hence, we hypothesized that formal organization will positively influence 
members’ cash income, per capita livestock holdings and ownership of essential assets.  
Previous research suggests that community members engaged in cooperation under agreed-
upon rules for managing common resources were more likely to adopt ecologically-friendly practices 
and behaviors for resource use (Batkhishig, 2011; Ostrom & Hess, 2010; Upton, 2008). We considered 
two existing forms of rangeland practices in Mongolia. Traditional practices include those activities 
inherited from millennia-long adaptation of the Mongolian nomads to their lands (Fernandez-Gimenez, 





2006). Innovative practices are more recently introduced by supporting donor agencies or government 
and include fencing key resource areas, monitoring pasture condition, improved animal breeding, and 
growing forage plants. All these incorporate technological developments that may be seen as “both a 
motor and a product of social change” (Sneath, 1999, p. 223). Additionally, individual member’s 
proactive behaviors on issues related to resource management are important in group collective action. 
Proactive behavior variable included members’ reports on their actions such as bringing a rangeland 
issue to the attention of local authorities, sharing own views and suggestions and joining collective 
actions for resource management. The greater a group’s use of traditional and innovative rangeland 
management practices and members’ proactive behaviors, the better their outcomes would be on the 
resources and indirectly on their livelihoods. Therefore, we hypothesized that the formal organization 
will increase the levels of management practices and behaviors among the members.  
Theoretical models of the commons institutions emphasize social capital variables such as trust, 
norms of reciprocity and social networks of members in resource institutions that strongly influence the 
levels of both livelihoods and resource conditions. These three dimensions (Putnam, 1993) interact with 
each other and facilitate social outcomes through collective action and democratic governance (Titeca & 
Vervisch, 2008) while reducing its transaction costs (Ostrom, 1990). We adopted Uphoff et al’s (2000) 
concept of cognitive and structural social capital and measured both types among the group members. 
Trust and norms of reciprocity together with other social values are defined as cognitive social capital 
specific to the local (micro) individual level (Grootaert, 2002) “resulting from mental processes”. On the 
other hand, social networking is called structural social capital (Uphoff et al., 2000, p. 4). Structural 
social capital was further subcategorized as bonding (horizontal network of like-minded individuals with 
similar social status) and bridging (ties with actors from different social or cultural backgrounds) social 
capital” (Putnam, 2000, p. 22). For pastoralists, strong bonding and bridging social capital present 





community-wide covariate hazards such as dzud and droughts (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012; Swift, 
1995). This led us to hypothesize that the formal groups engaged in CBRM will have stronger social 
capital as compared to informal groups.  
The conceptual model illustrates the internal dynamics of three dependent variables as 
explained above with their interdependence and mutually-enforcing nature. It also shows that ultimate 
social outcomes are dependent on ecological zone and organization status through a set of intermediate 
outcomes. 
   
2.2.3. Intermediate social outcomes. 
The intermediate outcomes shown in the middle of Figure 2.1 include six variables: access to 
information, local leadership, opportunity for knowledge exchange, cooperation and income 
diversification and a presence of rules to constrain resource use. Studies assessing successes of the 
CBNRM argue that these intermediate variables play an important role in ultimate achievements of 
CBNRM (Measham & Lumbasi, 2013) (NACSO, 2008; USAID, 2009).   
Ostrom in her influential work (1990) showed that the ability to obtain and exchange credible 
information is an important factor for collective actions of local users. The same applies to Mongolian 
pastoral groups. In the post-socialist Mongolia, abrupt transitional reforms resulted in limited access to 
information, and lack of training and government services, and contributed to rural vulnerability (Marin, 
2008; UNDP, 2011). With the demise of state-sponsored institutions in early 1990s, Mongolian herders 
lost their regular access to mail and newspaper delivery, local libraries, cultural clubs and mobile 
cinema5, that played a significant role in their daily activities and education as a population scattered 
across large areas with limited transportation and communication (Rossabi, 2005; Sneath, 1999).  
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 In 1987 Mongolia had 455 cultural clubs, 498 mobile cinema projectors, and 404 libraries with at least one per 





The new market condition required pastoralists selling their products and purchasing necessities 
on their own while managing daily livestock herding tasks and responding to highly uncertain 
environments (Swift, 1995). In addition, herders lacked forums for discussion to share their issues and 
exchange ideas that would help them network with each other for handling all of the issues. Many 
externally-funded CBNRM programs (Upton, 2008; Usukh et al., 2010) were sought to target this gap 
initiating information delivery and local forums in remote rural communities. 
 During the socialist system, the state cooperatives provided leadership in rangeland 
management including allocation of pasture, coordination and support for seasonal movements, 
emergency assistance, training and education, marketing goods and social services (Fernandez-Gimenez, 
1999; Rossabi, 2005). Most collective leaders were either experienced herders or professionals in 
livestock husbandry who had a strong knowledge of traditional practices and specifics of the local 
ecological conditions. Thus many customary forms of organization and resource use were reflected in 
cooperative management (Swift, 1995). A few recent studies reported deteriorating trust in local formal 
leaders as well as those wealthier community leaders showing rather individualistic strategies under the 
new market settings (Murphy, 2014; Upton, 2008).  
Traditionally, Mongolian pastoralists cooperated regularly at different levels of rangeland 
institutions.  At the neighborhood level, cooperation included coordinating use of pastures, hay areas, 
water sources, and salt licks, as well as labor sharing for nomadic movements, clearing pastures from 
snow, or searching for lost animals (Mearns, 1996b). Some authors noted revival of such traditional 
cooperation following decollectivization, which was weakened during the state cooperative times 
(Mearns, 1996a) but others contested the presence of such cooperation (Bruun, 2006). Recent 
assessments reported some forms of new cooperation encouraged by technical assistance projects 





condition, and planting vegetables. Based on the theories and empirical studies, we hypothesized that 
formal organization will increase all these intermediate outcomes of the pastoral communities.    
In summary, we suggest that ultimate social outcomes of Mongolian pastoral groups are 
influenced by organization status and social structures of groups together with their location in specific 
ecological region. Furthermore, we argue that the formal organization of resource users leads to social 
outcomes in the forms of increased social capital, improved livelihoods, and resource management 
practices. However, such effects can be produced as a result of multiple intermediate outcomes of 
formal organization such as greater access to information, presence of leadership, knowledge exchange 
and agreed rules. Consequently, we hypothesize that formally organized CBRM groups will have greater 




We used a nested sampling design (Lieberman, 2005) including two different levels of social 
organization: household and community group. Local community groups are our primary unit of 
analysis. We adopted the definition of International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) for user 
group as “a set of individuals with the same rights and responsibilities to resources” (Poteete & Ostrom, 
2003, p. 11). We sampled a total of 142 community groups (N=142) in 36 soums6 (counties) from 10 
aimags7 (provinces) of Mongolia as shown in Figure 2.2.  
We paired adjacent soums with (CBRM) and without (non-CBRM) formally-organized CBRM. 
CBRM groups comprised 54% (N=77) of the total sample, and the remaining 46% were traditional 
neighborhoods or non-CBRM groups (N=65). We purposively sampled formal groups associated with 
four different technical assistance organizations operating in Mongolia, namely, the Swiss Development 
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 Soum is a rural district, the administrative unit below aimag (province). 
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Agency (SDC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New Zealand Nature Institute (NZNI) 
and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS).  
Figure 2.2. The location of the study soums (districts) that are paired (n=18) with 
community-based rangeland management (CBRM) groups (n=77) and without (non -CBRM) 
them (n=65).  
 
Within each soum, we randomly selected one to nine community groups sharing common 
resources such as grazing areas and water sources. From each selected community group we 
interviewed on average five households. In donor-supported soums, household sampling was 
sometimes done differently depending on the size of a sampling frame. In SDC-supported soums, 
households were randomly selected from all herder households within the territorial boundaries of the 
group, which tended to follow administrative boundaries and include all households within the 





potential for random selection. For these groups, we interviewed at least five members of each selected 
group. With this sampling approach, we interviewed a total of 706 households of which 382 (or 54%) 
were members of formal groups, and 324 (46%) were from traditional neighborhoods. The number of 
sampled households per group varied from 3 to 7.   
 
2.3.2. Surveys. 
Figure 2.3 summarizes our sampling design and data collection tools at each study level. We 
used two major instruments for data collection. Household interviews were quantitative questionnaires 
measuring household demographics, livelihood, rangeland management practices, norms and behaviors, 
and social networks. Information from these surveys was designed to help explain if group cooperation 
and activities influenced household-level practices and social-economic conditions. At the group level, 
we conducted interviews of community group leaders and focus groups with members. Based on 
information from member household questionnaires, focus groups and leader interviews, the study 
team completed an organizational profile instrument for each community group, which represented an 
initial synthesis of the field data about the group’s characteristics, organizational management, social 
capital, leadership, governance and overall economic well-being. These organizational profiles together 
with the household surveys provide the primary data sources for this study. The design of instruments 
was based on the prior studies in Mongolia’s rangelands (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001; Fernandez-
Gimenez & Batbuyan, 2004; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012) and guided by the approach outlined by 
















Figure 2.3. Sampling design and size, survey instruments used for the comparative study 
of pastoral groups (N=142) in Mongolia  
a
 Aimag is the largest administrative unit in Mongolia equivalent of province. 
b
 Soum is a rural district, the 
administrative unit below aimag. 
c
 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-
organized groups and non-CBRM denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
 
All the instruments were originally developed in English, and translated into Mongolian for the 
data collection. Instruments and the total field protocol were pre-tested in the field in April 2011 and 
revised before final implementation. Two teams of Mongolian social researchers collected data from 
April 2011 to June 2012. Then, we entered the collected data into two separate MS Access databases. 







The main independent variables were organization status and ecological zone. The organization 
status was coded as either “no formal organization or non-CBRM” or “formal organization or CBRM.” 
Ecological zone included four categories: desert steppe, steppe, eastern steppe and mountain forest 
steppe.  
Group attributes related to group structure included: group size (number of individual members 
and member households), group demography (members’ age, gender, ethnicity, education, 
employment, and housing), size of management areas or customary grazing territories as perceived by 
members, and members’ affiliation with various local associations.  
Dependent variables. 
Intermediate and ultimate social outcomes were our dependent variables. As shown in Table 
2.1, intermediate outcome variables included information sources available to the members, 
perceptions about leadership including community and local government leaders, knowledge exchange 
within and outside of the group, agreed rules for rangeland management among members, income 
sources of the member households, and group cooperation. 
The three of the intermediate outcome variables were dichotomous and indicated the presence 
of cooperation, sources of information, and sources of income. We measured two types of cooperative 
activities: a) traditional activities (16 items) that were typical in pre-collective and collective times, and 
b) relatively new activities (23 items) introduced since livestock privatization in the mid-1990s. These 
arenas of group-level cooperation are similar to two types of rangeland management practices 







Table 2.1. Descriptives of Variables used in the Analysis of Pastoral Groups in Mongolia (N=142) 



















Herd sizee,i   
Cash incomee  
Herd sizee 
 
Social capital:  
Cognitive social capitale,k  







categorical; non-CBRMa vs.CBRMa  
categorical; four ecozone typesb     
 
 
Mean of 5 types on a scale of 0-2 
Sum of 16 traditional cooperation  
Sum of 23 innovative cooperation 
Sum of 39 cooperation types 
Sum of 16 information sources 
Mean of 4 items on a scale of  0-2 
Sum of 17 income sources  




Sum of 15 household assets  
Per capita annual income in USD 
Per capita livestock number in SFUj 
Log transformed cash income 
Log transformed herd size 
 
 
Mean of 6 items  
Sum of 13 items  
 
 
Sum 16 traditional practices  
Sum of 19 innovative practices  


























































































































 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Ecological zones are coded: 1 = Desert Steppe, 2 =Steppe, 
3 = Eastern Steppe, and 4 = Mountain Forest Steppe. 
c
 Rules is a group level variable coded as 0 = No Rules, 1 = 
Traditional or Informal Rules, 2 = Formal Rules. 
d 
Contributing variables for cooperation. 
e
 These variables from 
household survey dataset were aggregated to the organization level by taking the mean value for the sampled 
households within each organization or neighborhood group. 
f 
Knowledge exchange items were coded as 0 = None, 
1 = Some (1-3 people) and 2 = Many (3< people). 
g
 Leadership items were coded as 0 = Disagree, 1 =Neutral and 2 = 
Agree. 
h
 This winsorized variable trimmed 3% of the distribution at each end and replaced those values with -1,195 
and 2,283, the next valid values at each side of the distribution to address extreme outliers (Vaske, 2008, p. 562). 
i
 
This semi-winsorized variable trimmed the upper 3% of the distribution and replaced those values with 555, the 
next valid value in the distribution to address extreme outliers (ibid.). 
j
 Sheep Forage Unit is used to estimate 
forage use by different types of grazing and browsing animals. In Mongolia 1 camel is equivalent of 5 SFU, 1 horse 
is 7 SFU, 1 cattle – 6 SFU, 1 goat - 0.9 SFU. 
k
 Cognitive social capital items were reverse coded as 0 = Agree, 1 = 






However, we consider group-level cooperation as an intermediate variable and household level 
behavior as an ultimate outcome, using the logic that group cooperation in these areas motivates 
individual actions. 
The remaining three intermediate variables had scales; knowledge exchange assessed if the 
members have someone to consult and exchange ideas on essential topics of rangeland management. 
Leadership measured the presence of legitimate local leaders. Lastly, agreed rules indicated the 
presence of rules for resource management as reported by herders.   
Ultimate social outcomes comprised of three main categories: household-level livelihood, social 
capital, and rangeland practices and behaviors. Livelihood category was measured using three variables; 
possession of essential household assets, annual per capita net cash income in USD,8 and livestock 
number per household member (aka. per capita) in sheep forage units6. Cognitive social capital 
measured the level of trust and norms of reciprocity among group members. Structural social capital 
indicated the presence of bonding and bridging social ties of the members. Practices included reports of 
traditional and innovative rangeland management practices.  Proactiveness measured members’ actions 
and engagement in initiatives related to local rangeland issues.   
 As noted in Table 2.1, six of eight ultimate outcome variables were calculated from the 
household survey dataset. We aggregated household variables to the organization level by taking the 
mean value for the sampled households within each organization or neighborhood group.   
The response rate was complete for most of the variables (N=142) except structural social 
capital. Table 2.1 displayed value ranges of the variables to give an idea about the location of the group 
mean for a particular variable along the existing interval. Skewness in the variables’ curves was used to 
evaluate the normality of data distribution, where the values between +1.0 and -1.0 were considered 
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 Cash values were converted to USD for two reasons: a) to reduce decimal numbers in MNT (Mongolian tugrik at 
the exchange rate of 1USD=1712 as of January 2014) and b) to ease reader’s understanding of the values by 





acceptable given robustness of parametric statistical tests (Vaske, 2008, p. 276). Reliability tests for the 
scale variables were performed to verify the internal consistency of items as shown in Table 2.2.  
  
2.3.4. Data manipulation. 
Two household level variables, namely, per capita cash income and per capita livestock number 
had very large standard deviations (SDincome=1120.26 and SDherd=183.62) with several outliers 
( ̅income=219.05,  ̅herd=137 respectively). Hence, we had to winsorize the detected outliers that were 
about 3% of their distributions. Specifically, per capita cash income was winsorized by trimming 3% of 
the distribution at each end (22 cases) and replaced those values with -1,195 and 2,283, the next valid 
values at each side of the distribution (Vaske, 2008, p. 562). Per capita livestock number was semi-
winsorized (trimmed only in one end) as 0 value was true implying there were households with no 
livestock. Accordingly, 3% of the upper part of the distribution was replaced by 555, the next valid value. 
This greatly reduced standard deviations of these variables with moderate changes in their means 
( ̅income=206.68 with SDincome=712.11 and  ̅herd=127 with SDherd=126.76). Still the two variables had large 
unequal variances that violated assumptions for ANOVA tests used for examining differences in social 
outcomes accounting both factors of organization status and ecological zones. Hence, they were log 
transformed to satisfy the assumptions of homoscedasticity. For the same reasons, we also replaced a 
few large outliers in three organization level variables. In knowledge exchange; value of 2 replaced by 
1.40 of case # 85, in rules; value of 1.85 replaced by 1.48 of case # 85, and in livestock unit; values in five 












Table 2.2. Descriptives and Reliability of Items in Index Variables used for the Analyses 
 














Knowledge exchangeb:  
Livestock health, reproduction, and nutrition 
Livestock marketing  
Pasture rotation and resting 
Disaster preparedness and risk management 
 
Cognitive social capitalc: 
People always try to help each other  
People help each other in times of need 
Most people are trustworthy 
People mainly look out for themselvesd 
People will take advantage of othersd 
Our community is getting less friendlyd 
 
Leadershipc: 
My community has good informal leaders 
My community has some knowledgeable and 
respected people 
I know helpful organizations in my soum 




Rules exist to regulate the timing of grazing  
Rules exist to regulate the number of livestock  
Rules exist to regulate the type of livestock  
Rules exist to regulate use of hay areas 









































































































































 Cell entries show sample sizes from two datasets: household survey (N=706) and organization profile survey 
(N=142). 
b
 Items were coded as 0 = None, 1 = Some (1-3 people) and 2 = Many (3< people). 
c
 Items were coded as 0 
= Disagree, 1 =Neutral and 2 = Agree. 
d
 Items were reverse coded as 0 = Agree, 1 = Neutral and 2 = Disagree.  
e
 Items were coded as 0 = No Rules, 1 = Traditional or Informal Rules and 2 = Formal Agreed Rules. 
f
 Cronbach 
alpha is a coefficient of reliability showing consistency among items within an index variable, where score greater 
than .65 is desirable (Vaske, 2008). 
 
2.3.5. Analysis. 
We tested the following hypothesis: CBRM groups will have greater intermediate and ultimate 
social outcomes as compared to traditional neighborhoods. We used t tests, chi-square tests and 





two-way ANOVA to compare levels of dependent social outcome variables by the two independent 
variables. For ecological zone comparisons, we used the Games-Howell post-hoc test because samples 
controlling two factors had unequal sizes and mostly unequal variances (Hilton & Armstrong, 2006).  
When we found significant differences in the levels of intermediate and ultimate social 
outcomes, we further examined items of those statistically differing variables. This helped us to locate 
the exact differences between the organization types and ecological zones. For items’ tests we mostly 
used crosstabs due to varying sizes of the groups where proportions were more relevant than nominal 
values. In cases of continuous structural variables we used t-tests. When we discovered statistical 
differences in many variables in the items’ tests, we prioritized those differences with larger practical 
significance with higher effect size (Karabi, 2012; Vaske, 2008). 
    
2.4. Results 
In this section, we present our results of comparisons across three categories of independent 
variables: a) group structural variables, b) organization status and c) ecological zones.  
 
2.4.1. Group structural characteristics. 
An average traditional neighborhood group consisted of 10 households with 38 members while 
the formal groups were significantly larger, with an average of 29 households with 89 members (Refer to 
Table 2.4). On average, non-CBRM groups had 22 adult members and 16 children, while CBRMs had 51 
adults and 38 children. The reported size for grazing area per member was larger for CBRM groups ( ̅non-
CBRM=370.24 ha vs.  ̅CBRM=440.76 ha). Further examination revealed that the larger group size of CBRM 
groups was due to the size of pasture user groups (PUGs) supported by SDC program. As explained 





within the defined grazing territory that often overlaps with a smallest administrative unit or bag9 
boundary (Usukh et al., 2010).  
Table 2.3. Summary of Analysis Methods for Comparing the Two Types of Pastoral Groups 






































   Items of Information diversity 
   Items of Cooperation 
   Items of Rules 
   Items of Income diversity 
   Items of Leadership 
Ultimate social outcome variables: 
Livelihood: 
   Assets 
   Cash income  
   Herd size 
Social capital:  
   Cognitive social capital   
   Structural social capital  
Behaviors and practices: 
   Traditional practices 
   Innovative practices 
   Proactiveness  
     Items of Assets 
     Items of Structural social capital  
     Items of Cognitive social capital 
     Items of Rangeland practices 
     Items of Proactiveness  





































































































































































 Independent variable   
b
 Dependent variable 
 
The ratio of male to female members in both group types was almost the same with a good 
balance (20 : 19 for non-CBRMs vs. 40 : 40 for CBRMs). Ethnically, the groups were fairly homogenous 
                                                          
9





with the dominance of Khalkha members (92% for non-CBRMs and 95% for CBRMs) reflecting the 
national proportion (NSO, 2010).  
The same pattern was observed in the reports of ger (traditional round-shaped housing) being 
the first most frequent housing in rural Mongolia (98.5% for non-CBRMs and 100% for CBRMs). Simple 
wooden house was the second most frequent housing for herders; 44% of traditional neighborhoods 
and 57% of CBRM had these structures. 
Table 2.4. Comparison of Means for Group Characteristics Variables: Informal versus Formal Pastoral 
Groups Using t-tests and Chi-square Tests (N=142) 
Structural variables Unit Non-CBRMa CBRMa 
Group size (households) 
Group size (individual members) 
Age (over 16) 
Age (below 16) 
Gender (male) 
Gender (female) 
Ethnicity (proportion of khalkha) 
First most frequent housing (ger) 
Second most frequent housing (wooden house) 
Size of management area (per member) 






Livelihood (very poor) 
Single woman-headed households 
Household with no livestock  
Household with non-herding occupation 
Members’ affiliation with local organization #1  
Members’ affiliation with local organization #2  
Members’ affiliation with regional/national organization #1 










































































 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Sheep Forage Unit is used to estimate forage use by 
different types of grazing and browsing animals. In Mongolia 1 camel is equivalent of 5 SFU, 1 horse is 7 SFU, 1 
cattle – 6 SFU, 1 goat - 0.9 SFU (Ministry of Food and Agriculture of Mongolia, 2010).  






Both group types were very similar in their education level, wealth (proportion of wealthy, 
average, poor and very poor member households), and vulnerability (member households with single-
woman heads and those with no livestock). The majority of surveyed herders had secondary education 
(76% of non-CBRM vs. 66% of CBRM members), and smaller percentage (4% in non-CBRM and 5% in 
CBRM) of them had college education.  
Among well-being categories, the largest was the average income group (62% of non-CBRM and 
54% of CBRM) and the second largest was poor group (20% and 23% respectively). Wealthy households 
had 12% and 15% share in their respective groups while the very poor families had the smallest portion 
of 6-7% correspondingly. In terms of more vulnerable members, 9% of non-CBRM and 7% CBRM 
households were led by single women, and 2% and 9% of member families of the corresponding groups 
had no livestock.   
We also looked at membership affiliation of herders with local, regional or national level 
associations. Most frequently reported local associations included committees of women, seniors, 
interest groups for race horse coaching and pasture protection including their CBRM groups. 
Respondents named few national level organizations including environmental organizations and 
external donor projects such as the Green Gold Project of the SDC and Sustainable Livelihood Project of 
the World Bank. CBRM member households had significantly higher rates of membership in local 
associations as compared to the traditional neighborhoods; 74.3% of CBRM members belonged to at 
least one local association and 13.2% of them belonged to two local associations. Among non-CBRM 
members, 17.8% participated in one association and 2% of them affiliated to two local associations.    
In summary, formal and informal groups had similar structural attributes except their size and 
membership in local associations. In the next section, we will report effects of organization status on 






2.4.2. Effect of organization status. 
2.4.2.1. Effect of organization on intermediate outcomes. 
The test for the effect of organization status on the intermediate outcome variables given their 
locations across four ecological zones revealed a significant interaction effect of the two factors on two 
outcomes, namely, the presence of rules (F=6.27, p<.01) and cooperation (F=.4.77, p<.01 shown in 
Figure 2.4). Formal organization increases the levels of agreed rules and cooperation among the 
members in all three non-desert ecological zones but not in the desert steppe. Both cooperation and 
rules had the largest effect size (.21 and .14 respectively).   
 
Figure 2.4. A visual representation of the significant interaction effect (p<.01) of 
organization status and ecological zone on the levels of agreed rules (F=6.27, R 2= .37, 
partial η2 =.12) and cooperation (F=4.77, R 2= .34, partial η2 =.10).  
 
Table 2.5 shows significantly higher means for the formally organized groups in three other 
intermediate outcome indices: knowledge exchange, leadership and information diversity. Among 
these, information diversity had larger partial eta squared (.14) implying that the effect of organization 





Further examination of items within each intermediate outcome variable helps to explain the 
overall differences in outcomes. In the next subsections, we will describe the results by order of the 
practical significance of the statistical differences.  
Table 2.5. Results of Two-way ANOVA-1 Showing Main Effect of Organization on Intermediate Outcome 
Variables (N=142) 











































Note. ANOVA-1 tested Y1-6=X1 + X2 + X1*X2 where X1 is “organization status”, and X2 is “ecological zones”, and Y1-6 
included rules, knowledge exchange, leadership, income diversity, information diversity and cooperation. The test 
also revealed a statistically significant interaction effect of organization status and ecological zones on rules and 
cooperation as shown in Figure 2.4. 
a
 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Rules is aggregated from household data and coded as 0 = 
No Rules, 1 = Traditional or Informal Rules and 2 = Formal Agreed Rules. 
c
 Knowledge exchange is aggregated from 
household data and coded as 0 = None, 1 = Some (1-3 people) and 2 = Many (3< people). 
d
 Leadership is 
aggregated from household data and coded as 0 = Disagree, 1 =Neutral and 2 = Agree. 
e
 Income diversity is 
aggregated from household data summing 17 income sources. 
f
 Information diversity is aggregated from 
household data summing 16 information sources. 
g
 Cooperation is sum of 39 cooperation activities at organization 
level. 
h
 Partial eta-squared is the proportion of the total variability attributable to a given factor(Karabi, 2012). The 
effect size is small if η
2
< .50, medium if η
2




Cooperation. Table 2.6 shows that traditional cooperation continues to be essential among the 
pastoralists from both group types. Prevailing traditional cooperative activities include repairing and 
maintaining wells (52% of non-CBRMs and 64% of CBRMs) and shelters and corrals (59% and 69% 
respectively), shearing sheep or combing cashmere (62% both), slaughtering animals (52% and 54%) and  
exchanging livestock with each other (56% and 71%). Interestingly, only 24% of non-CBRMs and 36% of 






Table 2.6. Comparison of Cooperation: Informal versus Formal Groups (nnon-CBRM=65 and nCBRM=77) 
Cooperation activities % non-CBRMa % CBRMa Χ2 p ϕd 
Traditional cooperation: 
Manage pastures together 
Set aside and protect winter/spring pastures 
Set aside and protect dzudb reserve pastures 
Manage well use among members 
Repair or maintain a well or wells together 
Restore or maintain a spring together 
Make regular seasonal movements 
Make otorc movements in emergencies 
Repair and maintain shelters and corrals 
Harvest hay together 
Prepare hand fodder together 
Shear sheep and comb cashmere 
Slaughter animals together 
Make felt together 
Lend livestock to each other 
Exchange livestock 
Innovative cooperation: 
Determined timing of pasture use 
Determine no. of livestock to be grazed 
Determined species or age of livestock 
Monitor pasture use 
Sanction people who misuse pastures 
Monitor pasture conditions 
Determined use of specific water sources 
Determined use of other plant resources 
Determined use of wildlife 
Made rules about any other resources  
Built fences to protect pasture, hay areas 
Planted hay or fodder 
Built fences to protect springs or streams 
Marketing or selling animal products 
Distribute income from livestock products 
Sold hay or fodder harvested by the group 
Distributed income from sale of hay/fodder 
Share equipment (e.g. tractor, truck) 
Lend each other money 
Arbitrated disputes among members/users 
Interacted with soum/aimag government 
Interacted with external organizations 
















































































































































































































 CBRM or Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formal groups and non-CBRM denotes informal or 
traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Dzud is a Mongolian term for severe winter condition that causes mass 
mortality of livestock. 
c
 Otor refers to long distance movement of herders and livestock for search of better 
pastures. 
d
 Phi measures the association between two dichotomous variables. The effect size is “minimal” at .10, 





CBRM groups reported significantly more cooperation in seven areas including managing grazing 
lands (68% versus36% of non-CBRM), setting aside and protecting winter and spring pastures (68% 
versus 47%) and dzud reserves (46% versus 18%), managing commonly used wells (56% versus 30%), 
making winter otor (long distance movement of livestock and herders) in emergencies (57% versus 
37%), harvesting hay (54% versus 36%) and preparing hand fodder (29% versus 13%). We note that the 
practical significance for managing pastures (φ =.32), setting aside and protecting dzud reserves (φ 
=.30), and coordinating well use (φ = .26) were largest among these cooperation types.  
In terms of innovative cooperation, CBRM groups reported significantly greater participation in 
17 out of 23 types of activities as compared to the traditional neighborhoods. Among these arenas of 
cooperation those with the largest effect sizes were interacting with external organizations (15% of non-
CBRMs and 64% of CBRMs φ=.50), interacting with technical professionals (23% vs. 64% respectively 
with φ=.41), monitoring pasture condition (none vs. 30% of CBRMs φ=.40), protecting pastures and hay 
areas by fencing (8% vs. 42% φ=.39), monitoring pasture use (14% vs. 48%  φ=.36), interacting with 
soum and aimag government (φ=.32), sanctioning those who misuse pastures (2% vs. 23% φ=.31), and 
arbitrating resource disputes (23% vs. 52% φ=.30). Formally organized groups predominantly cooperate 
in approaching local government officials (74%), lending money each other (68%), collaborating with 
external organizations (64%), consulting with technical experts (64%), sharing tractors, trucks and other 
equipment (58%), and resolving disputes among resource users (52%). While traditional neighborhood 
groups commonly cooperated for only two innovative types; lending each other money (57%) and 







Table 2.7. Comparison of the Presence of Agreed Rules Items by the Group Types Using Chi-square Test  
 % non-CBRMa (n=65) % CBRMa (n=77) 
 No rule Informal  Formal No rule Informal  Formal 
Timing of grazing  
Number of livestock  
Types of livestock  
Use of hay areas 































Note. Cell entries show the percent of members who checked this option (within an organization type).  
a
 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal (traditional neighborhoods) groups. 
b
 Effect size (phi) was measured showing the association 
between two dichotomous variables. The effect size is “minimal” at .10, “typical at .30, and substantial at .50 or 
greater (Vaske, 2008). The effect size here was .30. 
c
 The effect size was .24. 
d
 The effect size was .16. 
e
 The effect 
size was .15. 
f
 The effect size was .18. 
g
 The effect size was .49. 
h
 The effect size was .18. 
I 
The effect size was .16. 
j 
The effect size was .30. 
k 
The effect size was .20. 
*, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at the p<.10, 05 and .01 levels. 
 
Presence of rules.  Table 2.7 illustrates proportions of members reporting if the group had no rules or 
informal or formal rules in five resource regulation areas. Significantly more traditional neighborhoods 
lacked rules for timing of grazing (48%) and type of livestock (98%) as compared to CBRMs (20% and 
84% respectively). Among non-CBRM groups 73% had no rules for use of hay areas and 69% - for use of 
wells. Similarly, for CBRMs, 84% of groups do not have rules for livestock types and numbers (78%) than 
rules for grazing timing. Over half of the formal groups have no rules for well use (53%) and hay areas 
(61%).  
Regarding the presence of informal rules, significantly more traditional neighborhoods reported 
having informal rules for grazing timing (51%) compared to formal groups (36%). However, significantly 
more number of the latter (11% vs. 2%) reported having informal rules for livestock types. The table also 
shows that both groups have more informal rules to coordinate timing of grazing (36 to 51%) and well 
use (30 to 35%) than other three resource regulation areas (2 to 27%).     
Formal rules were virtually absent among traditional neighborhoods; only 2% reported the 
presence of formal agreements for coordinating grazing timing and well use. Respectively, formal groups 





(44%), hay areas (17%), wells (12%), and number (7%) and types (5%) of livestock. Despite the greater 
number of reports for having formal rules in all five areas of resource regulation, the overall CBRM 
percent was fairly low (less than 44%).  
We found larger effects sizes for the differences for having no rule for grazing timing (typical), 
formal rules for hay areas (typical) and formal rules for grazing timing (almost substantial).   
Information diversity. CBRM members had significantly greater access to nine information sources: TV, 
newspaper or magazines, brochures or handbooks, experts/professionals, local veterinarians, CBRM 
meetings, soum and aimag level training and other sources. Table 2.8 illustrates that, CBRM meetings (φ 
=.59), soum training (φ =.27), experts or professionals (φ =.19) and training outside soum (φ =.17) had 
larger effect sizes. Furthermore, TV, local government officials, soum and bag5 meetings, and neighbors 
in khot ail10 and adjacent community, remain the major information sources for herders in both group 
types, where most of sources were local except TV.   
Income diversity. We found no significant difference in the mean values for overall income diversity 
between the two group types. However, a closer examination of the items revealed differences in few 
income sources. As illustrated in Table 2.9, significantly higher percentage of herders in formally 
organized groups have income generated from vegetable farming (6% versus 3% of non-CBRMs) and 
some other income generation activities (8% versus 3% respectively). The herders from traditional 
neighborhoods were more involved in artisanal mining (8% versus 3% of CBRMs). However, effects sizes 
for the differences were small: φ=.14 for vegetable farming, .11 for other income sources, and .10 for 
mining. 
  
                                                          
10
 Khot ail is a primary social unit in rural Mongolia consisting of 2-12 families of kin or close friends sharing daily 





Table 2.8. Comparison of Information Sources for Member Households of Informal and Formal Pastoral 
Groups (nnon-CBRM=314 and nCBRM=392) 
Organization status 





Χ2 p ϕd 
Radio  
Television  
Newspapers, magazines  
Computer or internet  
Brochures or informational handbooks  
Experts or professional people 
Soumb or bagc governor 
Local veterinarians 
Herders in your khot ail (camp) 
Herders in your neighborhood  
Herders from outside your neighborhood  
Soum or bag meeting  
CBRMa organization meeting 
Formal training or seminar in your soum 
Formal training or seminar outside your soum 

















































































Note. Cell entries show positive responses. 
a
 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Soum is a rural district, the administrative unit below 
aimag (province). 
c
 Bag is a rural sub-district, the smallest administrative unit below soum. 
d
 Phi measures the 
association between two dichotomous variables. The effect size is “minimal” at .10, “typical at .30, and substantial 
at .50 or greater (Vaske, 2008).    
* Indicates the statistical significance at p<.05 level. 
 
Leadership. The examination of leadership items (Tables 2.10) revealed that CBRM groups had 
significantly higher level of leadership only because they reported having helpful organizations in their 
soum ( ̅non-CBRM=.33 versus  ̅CBRM=.98) at p<.01. Otherwise, the groups did not differ in terms of having 
good informal leaders ( ̅non-CBRM=1.28 versus  ̅CBRM=1.35, p=.46) and knowledgeable respected 
individuals ( ̅non-CBRM=1.42 versus  ̅CBRM=1.48, p=.47) and local government officials ( ̅non-CBRM=1.04 








Table 2.9. Comparison of Income Sources of Member Households of Informal (n=314) versus Formal 
(n=392) Pastoral Groups  
Sources of income % non-CBRMa % CBRMa Χ2 p ϕb 
Livestock  
Pension 











Aid from development organization  
Small business 
Family and friends 






















































































Note. Cell entries show positive responses. 
a
 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Phi measures the association between two dichotomous 
variables. The effect size is “minimal” at .10, “typical at .30, and substantial at .50 or greater (Vaske, 2008).  
*Indicates the statistical significance at p<.05 level. 
 
Table 2.10. Comparison of Items of Leadership Using ANOVA (N=706) 
Items Non-CBRMa CBRMa F p η2b 
My community has good informal 
leaders 
My community has some 
knowledgeable and respected people 
I know helpful organizations in my 
soum 
The local government pays attention 





































 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Partial eta-squared is the proportion of the total variability 
attributable to a given factor(Karabi, 2012). The effect size is small if η2< .50, medium if η2< .80, and large if 
η2>.80.   
 
2.4.2.2. Effect of organization on ultimate outcomes. 
The test for the effects of organization status and ecological zones on ultimate social outcome 





the main effect of organization status on ultimate social outcomes as shown in Table 2.11. We will 
introduce the main effects of ecological zones on ultimate social outcomes in the next section.  
We found no effect of organization status on per capita cash income or livestock number, but a 
modest difference in possession of essential assets. Members of traditional neighborhoods had, on 
average, 6 assets while those from CBRMs had 7 of them (F=.4.07 at p=.05) with almost no practical 
significance (partial η2=.03).  
In social capital variables, there was a weak effect of organization status on the two variables: in 
cognitive social capital ( ̅CBRM=1.64 versus  ̅non-CBRM=1.55) at p=.06 and in structural social capital ( ̅non-
CBRM=2.00 versus  ̅CBRM=2.31) at p=.07.  
In behavioral variables, organization status showed a significant main effect on all three 
measures. Households from CBRM groups reported to have significantly more traditional ( ̅non-CBRM=7.40 
versus  ̅CBRM=8.45) and innovative ( ̅non-CBRM=2.43 versus  ̅CBRM=3.64) rangeland management practices 
and proactive actions ( ̅non-CBRM=1.06 versus  ̅CBRM=1.81, p<01).  
We found larger effect sizes for these significant differences in proactiveness (.17 or large), 
innovative and traditional rangeland practices (.07 and .06 respectively, both medium), and structural 
social capital (.09 or medium).  
In a similar manner as we analyzed intermediate outcomes, we further tested items of ultimate 
social outcomes with statistically significant effects of organization status. We report first results of 
items of ultimate social outcomes with larger practical significance.  
Proactive behavior. The herders from formally organized groups demonstrated significantly greater 
proactive behavior as shown in Table 2.12. Thirty-three percent of CBRM herders talked with experts 
about rangeland issues compared to 19% of non-CBRM members. Fifty two percent of herders in formal 
groups joined local initiatives for improving resource use as opposed to 19% of non-CBRMs. Forty two 





herders did this. The difference in joining local collective actions had a medium effect size of .34, and 
other activities had smaller effect sizes ranging from .05 to .22.  
 
Table 2.11. Results of Two-way ANOVA-2 Showing Main Effect of Organization Status on Ultimate Social 
Outcome Variables (N=142) 
 Non-CBRMa CBRMa F p-value partial η2 R2 
Livelihood  
Assetsb 
Cash incomec  
Livestock numberd 
 






















































































Note. ANOVA-2 tested Y1-8=X1 + X2 + X1*X2 where X1 is “organization status”, and X2 is “ecological zones”, and Y1-8 
included assets, cash income , per capita livestock number, cognitive and structural social capital, traditional and 
innovative practices and proactiveness.  
a
 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Assets is aggregated from household data and sum 15 
household items. 
c
 Cash income per capita is household level log transformed and winsorized variable trimmed 3% 
of the distribution at each end and replaced those values with -1,195 and 2,283, the next valid values at each side 
of the distribution to address extreme outliers (Vaske, 2008 p.562). 
d
 Livestock number per capita is household 
level log transformed and semi-winsorized variable trimmed the upper 3% of the distribution and replaced those 
values with 555, the next valid value in the distribution to address extreme outliers (ibid). 
e
 Cognitive social capital 
is aggregated from household data and reverse coded: 0 = Agree, 1 = Neutral, and 2 = Disagree. 
f 
Structural social 
capital is aggregated from household data and sum of 13 bonding bridging items. 
g
 Traditional practice is 
aggregated from household data and sum of 14 traditional rangeland management activities. 
h
 Innovative practice 
is aggregated from household data and sum of 21 innovative activities. 
i
 Proactiveness is aggregated from 








Table 2.12. Comparison of Items for Proactive Behavior Among Member Households of Informal (n=314) 
versus Formal (n=392) Pastoral Groups  
Items of proactive behavior % non-CBRMa % CBRMa Χ2 p φ 
Talked to local authority about problems 
Talked to experts about rangeland issues 
Joined in collective rangeland improvement 
initiatives 





























 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
* Indicates the statistical significance at p<.05 level. 
 
Rangeland management practices. Table 2.13 demonstrated that a significantly higher percentage of 
CBRM members reported reserving winter pastures (57% versus 47% of non-CBRMs), spring pastures 
(49%  versus 38%), and dzud1 pastures (32% versus 24%), culling unproductive animals before winter 
(68% versus 55%), making hay (79% versus 63%) and hand fodder (48% versus 34%), and digging new 
wells (21% versus 13%). The practical significance of these differences was small with φ ranging between 
.09 and .18. The prevailing traditional practices among herders from both group types included 
purchasing and storing grains (76% of non-CBRMs and 77% of CBRMs), cutting hay (63% and 79% 
respectively), vaccinating their livestock (88% and 90%) and deworming them (87% and 89%). About 
40% of herders in each group type reported doing fall and summer otor (38% and 39%).  
Regarding innovative practices, significantly more CBRM members reported practicing 11 out of 
19 types of new practice compared to those in traditional neighborhoods.  Particularly, important ones 
were improving sheep (45%) and growing vegetables (31%). The most common innovative activity 
among traditional neighborhood members was improving sheep (34%) and goat (38%) breeds. The 
effects sizes of differences in rangeland management practices were minimal reaching .23 as the highest 
for fencing.  
Structural social capital. We found no differences between the two groups in their bonding social capital 





of non-CBRM and 64% of CBRM) and relatives in their soums (60% vs. 63% respectively). Regarding the 
bridging social capital, significantly more CBRM herders reported help from a formal CBRM organization 
(5% versus 44% of CBRMs). Also their connections with religious leaders were modestly higher than 
members of traditional neighborhoods (4% versus 8%). The difference in obtaining aid from a CBRM 
organization had a medium practical significance (φ =.43) and minimal for their relationship with 
religious leaders φ=.09. 
 
Cognitive social capital. From six items on trust and the norms of reciprocity among the members, two 
items had significantly greater values for CBRM herders (Table 2.15). They acknowledged that people in 
their area always try to help each other ( ̅non-CBRM=1.65 versus  ̅CBRM=1.78, p<.03) and disagreed with the 
statement of people being selfish ( ̅non-CBRM=1.22 versus  ̅CBRM=1.41, p>01). These differences had a 






Table 2.13. Comparison of Items for Rangeland Management Practices by Member Households of 
Informal (n=314) versus Formal (n=392) Pastoral Groups  
Rangeland management practices % non-CBRMa % CBRMa Χ2 p ϕ 
Traditional practices: 
Reserve winter pasture 
Reserve spring pasture 
Reserve dzudb pasture 
Do fall (or summer) otorc 
Do winter otord 
Cull (sell/slaughter) unproductive animals 
Cut hay 
Prepare hand fodder 
Purchase and store grain 
Purchase and store concentrate 
Purchase other feed 
Vaccinate livestock  
Deworm livestock  
Treat livestock for external parasites 
Dig a new well 
Repair existing well 
 
Innovative practices: 
Improve camel breed 
Improve horse breed 
Improve cattle breed 
Improve sheep breed 
Improve goat breed 
Intentionally change species proportion 
Sell animals to reduce herd size 
Intentionally not breed animals due to dzud 
Fence pasture 
Fence hay area 
Fence or improve natural water sources 
Plant fodder or grass 
Use fertilizer 
Use irrigation 
Plant garden for food 
Take other action to protect key resources 
Take action to reduce soil erosion 
Take action to restore damaged lands  

































































































































































































 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Dzud is a Mongolian term for severe winter condition that 
causes mass mortality of livestock. 
c
 Otor refers to long distance movement of herders and livestock for search of 
better pastures.    






Table 2.14. Comparison of Structural Social Capital Items: Member Households of Informal (n=314) 
versus Formal (n=392) Pastoral Groups  
Items of structural social capital % non-CBRMa % CBRMa Χ2 p ϕ 
Bonding social capital:  
Help from neighbors 
Help from family in soumb 
Help from family in aimagc center or the 
capital Ulaanbaatar 
Help from distant relatives 
Help from friends 
 
Bridging social capital:  
Help from local/national government  
Help from politicians 
Help from religious leaders 
Help from CBRM organization  
Help from development or aid organization  
Help from non-governmental organization  
Help from banks 























































































CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Soum is a rural district in Mongolia below a province. 
2
 
Aimag is the largest administrative unit equivalent of a province.  
* Indicates the statistical significance at p<.05 level. 
 
Table 2.15. Comparison of Items of Trust and Norms of Reciprocity Using ANOVA (N=142) 
Items Non-CBRMa CBRMa  F p η2 
People always try to help each other 
People help each other in times of need 
People mainly look out for themselvesb 
Most people are trustworthy 
People will take advantage of othersb 
































 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Items were reverse coded:  0 = Agree, 1 = Neutral, and 2 = 
Disagree. 
 
Household assets. As illustrated in Table 2.16, we found that possession of six essential items was 
significantly greater by the members of formal groups as compared to traditional neighborhoods. These 
included radio (59% versus 62% of CBRMs), car (20% versus 28% respectively), refrigerator (12% versus 





Table 2.16. Comparison of Items for Assets Owned by Member Households of Informal (n=314) versus 
Formal (n=392) Pastoral Groups  






Truck or tractor 
Cart: cattle, horse or camel 
Refrigerator 
Butter churn 

















































































Note. Cell entries show positive responses.  
a
 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
*Indicates the statistical significance at p<.05 level. 
 
The effect sizes of these differences were minimal ranging between .03 and .13. We also learned that 
the majority of households from both group types have mobile phone (92% of non-CBRMs and 94% of 
CBRMs), TV (84% and 89% respectively), motorcycle (82% and 77%) and solar panel (91% and 87%). 
Overall, formal organization increased all intermediate outcomes in three non-desert ecological 
zones. Specifically, the effects of organization status on cooperation, rules and information diversity had 
large practical significance. Formal organization was equally influential for four ultimate social outcomes 
across all ecological zones: proactiveness of members, innovative and traditional rangeland 
management practices and household assets. Among these the former three had large to medium 
practical significance. The effect of organization status on social capital was weak. Finally, organization 
status did not influence levels of cash income and livestock number.  






 2.4.3. Effect of ecological zone. 
2.4.3.1. Effect of ecological zone on intermediate social outcomes. 
We found a significant effect of ecological zone on three intermediate outcomes: rules (F=8.38, 
p<.01), cooperation (F=3.19, p<.05) and income diversity (F=8.81, p<.01) as shown in Table 2.17. Herders 
from the mountain forest steppe zone had significantly more rules as compared to those in the desert 
steppe ( ̅mount=.54 versus  ̅desert=.21, p<.01). Herders in the eastern steppe had significantly more 
income sources than the steppe zone herders ( ̅east=3.4 versus  ̅steppe=2.7 p<.01). Herders from the 
mountain forest steppe cooperated significantly more ( ̅mount=14.73, p=.03) than those in the desert 
steppe ( ̅desert =11.85) and the steppe ( ̅steppe=11.52). We found large effect sizes
11  for the differences in 
rules and income diversity (.16 and .17 respectively, both large). 
We examined items of these three intermediate outcomes to define where exact differences 
between ecological zones occur.  
Income diversity. Table 2.18 revealed that the herders from the eastern steppe had significantly more 
income sources because higher percentage of them reported on six categories. They had incomes from 
herding others’ livestock (17%), government allowances (100%), salaries (19%), rent (2%), family and 
friends (13%), and pension (40%). However, practical significance of these differences was minimal 
ranging from .11 to .17. It was interesting that significantly higher percent of desert steppe herders 
(14%) reported having incomes from mining.   
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Note. ANOVA-1 tested Y1-6=X1 + X2 + X1*X2 where X1 is “organization status”, and X2 is “ecological zones”, and Y1-6 included rules, knowledge exchange, 
leadership, income diversity, information diversity and cooperation. The test revealed a statistically significant interaction effect of organization status and 
ecological zones on rules and cooperation shown in Figure 2.4. 
a
 Rules is aggregated from household data and coded as 0 = No Rules, 1 = Traditional or Informal Rules and 2 = Formal Agreed Rules. 
b
 Knowledge exchange is 
aggregated from household data and coded as 0 = None, 1 = Some (1-3 people) and 2 = Many (3< people). 
c
 Leadership is aggregated from household data and 
coded as 0 = Disagree, 1 =Neutral and 2 = Agree. 
d
 Income diversity is aggregated from household data summing 17 income sources. 
e
 Information diversity is 
aggregated from household data summing 16 information sources. 
f
 Cooperation is sum of 39 cooperation activities at organization level. 
k
 Partial eta-squared 
is the proportion of the total variability attributable to a given factor(Karabi, 2012). The effect size is small if η2< .50, medium if η2< .80, and large if η2>.80.   






Table 2.18. Comparison of Income Sources of Member Households by Group Ecological Zone (N=706) 





























Aid from development organization  
Small business 
Family and friends 







































































































Note. Cell entries show the percent of positive responses. 
*, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at p<.10, 05 and .01 level 
 
Presence of rules. As shown in Table 2.19, significantly higher percent of groups in the mountain forest 
steppe reported having informal rules for livestock number (31%, p<.10), and formal rules for type of 
livestock (8%, p<.10) and use of hay areas (20%, p<.01). Significantly fewer of them (67%, p<.01) checked 
the option of “no rule” for livestock number as compared to herders in other ecological zones. Practical 
significance of the differences of the mountain forest ecological zone ranged from small to medium (.22 
to .32). We also note that more groups from the steppe zone reported having informal rules for 
livestock type (26%, p<.01) and formal rules for livestock number (13%, p<.05). We know from the 
results of organization effect tests that there were fewer rules in the desert steppe. Table 2.19 showed 
that nearly all groups from this zone reported having no rules for livestock type (100%, p<.01) and 
number (94%, p<.01), hay areas (96%, p<.01) and almost no formal rules in all regulation areas. About a 





steppe did not have rules in most resource regulation areas except informal rules for hay areas (73%, 
p<.01). 
  




















No rule Timing of grazing  
Number of livestock  
Types of livestock  
Use of hay areas 


























Informal rule Timing of grazing  
Number of livestock  
Types of livestock  
Use of hay areas 


























Formal rule Timing of grazing  
Number of livestock  
Types of livestock  
Use of hay areas 


























Note. Cell entries show the percent of members who checked this option (within an ecological zone).  
*, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at p<.10, 05 and .01 levels 
 
 Figure 2.5 illustrated that more groups reported having informal rules than formal rules for 
rangeland management areas. It is apparent that most groups lack rules for type and number of 







Figure 2.5. Percentage of positive responses on the presence of rules regulating five 
areas of rangeland management among 142 pastoral groups  
 
Cooperation. Groups in the eastern steppe had significantly more cooperation because higher 
percentage of them reported in four traditional and three innovative categories than the groups in other 
ecological zones. Specifically, Table 2.20 shows their reports on harvesting hay together (91%, p<.01), 
restoring and maintaining a spring (100%, p<.01) and wells (82%, p<.01) and setting aside dzud reserves 
(46%, p<.05). In terms of innovative cooperation (refer to Table 2.21), the eastern steppe groups 
cooperated more on building fences for protection of spring or streams (91%, p<.01), making decisions 
on wildlife use (27%, p<.01), and sharing their equipment (91%, p<.05). Among these significant 
differences, several had medium to large effect sizes including harvesting hay (.51 or large), restoring 
springs and wells (.41 and .36 respectively, both medium), building fences for streams (.45 or medium) 
and deciding use of wildlife (.34 or medium).  
We highlight that groups in the mountain forest steppe reported increased cooperation as 
compared to desert steppe and steppe groups. For instance, significantly more of them prepared hand 
fodder together (31%, p<.05) and cooperated on protection of dzud reserves (47%, p<.05) as shown in 





cooperation on deciding use of plant resources (33%, p<.01), planting fodder or hay (31%, p<.01), 
monitored pasture use (48%, p<.01), sanctioning those misusing pastures (26%, p<.05), making rules for 
other resource (92%, p<.05) and building fences for protection of pasture and hay areas (39%, p<.05).  
The lack of the effect of formal organization on cooperation in the desert steppe zone was 
shown in all items of cooperation except felt making. Remarkably, higher percent of the desert steppe 






Table 2.20. Percentage of Positive Responses on Traditional Cooperation by Groups’ Ecological Zone (N=142)  
Ecological zone 
 

















Manage pastures together 
Set aside and protect winter/spring pastures 
Set aside and protect dzuda reserve pastures 
Manage well use among members 
Repair or maintain a well or wells together 
Restore or maintain a spring together 
Make regular seasonal movements 
Make otorb movements in emergencies 
Repair and maintain shelters and corrals 
Harvest hay together 
Prepare hand fodder together 
Shear sheep and comb cashmere 
Slaughter animals together 
Make felt together 




































































































 Dzud is a Mongolian term for severe winter condition that causes mass mortality of livestock. 
b
 Otor refers to long distance movement of herders and 
livestock for search of better pastures.    



































Determined timing of pasture use 
Determine no. of livestock to be grazed 
Determined species or age of livestock 
Monitor pasture use 
Sanction people who misuse pastures 
Monitor pasture conditions 
Determined use of specific water sources 
Determined use of other plant resources 
Determined use of wildlife 
Made rules about any other resources  
Built fences to protect pasture, hay areas 
Planted hay or fodder 
Built fences to protect springs or streams 
Marketing or selling animal products 
Distribute income from livestock products 
Sold hay or fodder harvested by the group 
Distributed income from sale of hay/fodder 
Share equipment (e.g. tractor, truck) 
Lend each other money 
Arbitrated disputes among members/users 
Interacted with soum/aimag government 
Interacted with external organizations 















































































































































2.4.3.2. Effect of ecological zone on ultimate social outcomes. 
Ecological zone (refer to Table 2.22) had a significant effect on five out of eight social outcome 
variables. Households from the eastern steppe zone had more assets ( ̅=7.2, F=3.43) than those from 
the mountain forest region ( ̅=6.2) at p<.05. Herders from the steppe zone had significantly higher cash 
income ( ̅=6.8, F=5.50 or 420 USD) compared to herders from the mountain forest ( ̅=6.3 or 130 USD) 
at p<.01. Pastoralists from the steppe and the desert steppe had greater level of trust and reciprocity 
( ̅=1.7, F=4.57) in comparison to herders in the mountain forest ( ̅=1.5) at p<.01. The desert steppe 
herders had significantly greater level of bonding and bridging networks ( ̅=2.5, F=4.35) than those in 
the mountain forest steppe ( ̅=2.0) at p<.01. Herders from the eastern steppe reported a higher 
average of 9 traditional activities as opposed 7 practiced by those in the mountain forest steppe at 
p<.01. Though, these significant differences in five outcomes between ecological zones had minimal 
effect sizes ranging from .07 to .18.  
We found no effect of ecological zone on the levels of per capita livestock number (F=1.36, 
p=.26), innovative rangeland practices (F=1.15, p=.33) and proactiveness of members (F=1.80, p=.15).  
 
In the following subsections, we will report results of items of the four ultimate social outcome 
variables that had the significant effect of ecological zone. As we did before, we ordered the description 
of items’ results starting from the variable with the largest statistical power for its difference.  
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Cash incomeb  
Livestock numberc 
 



































































































Note. ANOVA-2 tested Y1-8=X1 + X2 + X1*X2 where X1 is “organization status”, and X2 is “ecological zones”, and Y1-8 included assets, cash income , per capita 
livestock number, cognitive and structural social capital, traditional and innovative practices and proactiveness. 
a
 Assets is aggregated from household data and sum 15 household items. 
b
 Cash income per capita is household level log transformed and winsorized variable 
trimmed 3% of the distribution at each end and replaced those values with -1,195 and 2,283, the next valid values at each side of the distribution to address 
extreme outliers (Vaske, 2008 p.562). 
c
 Livestock number per capita is household level log transformed and semi-winsorized variable trimmed the upper 3% of 
the distribution and replaced those values with 555, the next valid value in the distribution to address extreme outliers (ibid). 
d
 Cognitive social capital is 
aggregated from household data and reverse coded as 0 (agree), 1 (neutral) and 2 (disagree). 
e 
Structural social capital is aggregated from household data and 
sum of 13 bonding bridging items. 
f
 Traditional practice is aggregated from household data and sum of 14 traditional rangeland management activities. 
g
 
Innovative practice is aggregated from household data and sum of 21 innovative activities. 
h
 Proactiveness is aggregated from household data and sum of four 
proactive behaviors.   





Traditional practices. Table 2.23 revealed the reasons why more groups in the eastern steppe reported 
about traditional rangeland practices. More of them harvested hay (94%, p<.01), treated livestock for 
external parasites (74%, p<.01) and dewormed animals (94%, p<.05) than the herders in other ecological 
zones. The difference in cutting hay had a larger practical significance (.30 or typical). 
Table 2.23. Percentage of Positive Responses on Items of Traditional Practices by Member Households 
by Ecological Zone (N=706)  
















Reserve winter pasture 
Reserve spring pasture 
Reserve dzuda pasture 
Do fall (or summer) otorb 
Do winter otorb 
Cull unproductive animals 
Cut hay 
Prepare hand fodder 
Purchase and store grain 
Purchase and store concentrate 
Purchase other feed 
Vaccinate livestock  
Deworm livestock  
Treat livestock for parasites 
Dig a new well 



































































































 Dzud is a Mongolian term for severe winter condition that causes mass mortality of livestock. 
b
 Otor refers to long 
distance movement of herders and livestock for search of better pastures.    
*, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at p<.10, 05 and .01 levels 
 
Table 2.23 also showed that the significantly fewer herders from the mountain forest steppe 
repaired wells (16%, p<.01), did fall or summer otor (22%, p<.01), purchased and stored grain (69%, 
p<.01) and other feed (19%, p<.10) than herders in other ecological zones. The differences in repairing 
wells had the larger practical significance (.52 or large) compared to other differences.  
Cognitive social capital. As shown in Table 2.24, marginally more of desert steppe herders reported 
about local people being helpful to each other ( ̅=1.78, F=2.98, p<.05) and disagreed with the statement 





steppe herders felt people being helpful in times of need ( ̅=1.79, F=4.38, p<.01), and disagreed with 
the statements of people taking advantage of others ( ̅=1.75, F=5.56, p<.01) and getting less friendly 
( ̅=1.58, F=3.26, p<.05).  


















People always try to help each other 
People help each other in times of need 
People mainly look out for themselvesa 
Most people are trustworthy 
People will take advantage of othersa 






































 Items were reverse coded as 0 (agree), 1 (neutral) and 2 (disagree).  
b-h Means in the same row that share subscripts differ statistically in the Games-Howell multiple comparison test.  
 
 Interestingly, Table 2.24 also demonstrated weakened trust and norms of reciprocity among the 
mountain forest herders. Significantly fewer of them felt that people being helpful to each other 
( ̅=1.63) and even times of need ( ̅=1.59), and disagreed with the statements of people mainly look out 
for themselves ( ̅=1.16), taking advantage of others ( ̅=1.48) and getting less friendly ( ̅=1.36). 
However, all the differences in items of cognitive social capital had a small practical significance ranging 
between .01-.02. 
Structural social capital. Higher percentage of the desert steppe herders, as shown in Table 2.25,  
reported receiving assistance from their families in soum (55%, p<.01), friends (50%, p<.01) and 
neighbors (77%, p<.01). Besides these bonding network, significantly more of them had support from 
bridging relationships such as government (64%, p<.01), an insurance company (12%, p<.01), a 
development aid agency (38%, p<.01), a non-governmental organization (15%, p<.01), a bank (20%, 






Table 2.25. Percentage of Positive Responses on Structural Social Capital Items by Member Households 
by Groups Ecological Zone (N=706) 
















Bonding social capital:  
Help from neighbors 
Help from family in souma 
Help from family in aimagb center 
or the capital Ulaanbaatar 
Help from distant relatives 
Help from friends 
 
Bridging social capital:  
Help from government  
Help from politicians 
Help from religious leaders 
Help from CBRM organization  
Help from development or aid 
organization  
Help from non-governmental 
organization  
Help from banks 




















































































































Soum is a rural district in Mongolia below a province. 
b
 Aimag is the largest administrative unit equivalent of a 
province.  
*, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at p<.10, 05 and .01 levels 
 
Table 2.25 also showed that significantly fewer herders in the mountain forest steppe had 
supports from both bonding and bridging networks compared to herders in other ecological zones. For 
instance, only 24% of them reported having help from families in aimag center, 30% from friends, 35% 
from families in soum at p<.01. In terms of bridging relationships,  a third of the mountain forest herders 
had assistance from government, only 2% had help from an insurance company, 14% - from 
development aid agency, and 16% - from CBRM organization at p<.01. Among the differences in 
structural social capital, we found larger practical significance in help from government and insurance 





Household assets. Table 2.26 demonstrated why groups in the eastern steppe had significantly more 
assets as compared to groups in other ecological zones. Significantly more of them reported having 
butter churn (42%, p<.01), animal cart (55%, p<.01), windmill (19%, p<.01) and books (59%, p<.01).  
Table 2.26. Percentage of Positive Responses on Items of Assets by Member Households by Group 
Ecological Zone (N=706) 





















Truck or tractor 



































































































*, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at p<.10, 05 and .01 levels 
 
Table 2.26 also revealed the reasons for significantly less assets possessed by the groups in the 
mountain forest steppe. Fewer of them reported having radio (41%, p<01), electricity generator (12%, 
p<01), windmill (3%, p<01) and books (27%, p<01).  
In summary, the effect ecological zone on both types of social outcomes was unidirectional. 
Among the intermediate outcomes, ecological zone positively influenced income diversity and 
cooperation of groups in the eastern steppe and rules in the mountain forest steppe groups. In contrast, 
ecological zone was unfavorable for rules and cooperation of groups in the desert steppe. Regarding 
ultimate social outcomes, ecological zone was favorable for traditional rangeland management practices 
and assets of the eastern steppe herders, social capital among those in the desert steppe, and cash 





influenced the levels of traditional rangeland practices, cash income, assets and social capital of herders 
in the mountain forest steppe.  
Ecological zone did not influence three intermediate outcomes including information diversity, 
leadership and knowledge exchange. It also had no effect on three ultimate social outcomes: livestock 
number, innovative rangeland practices and proactiveness of group members.  
2.5. Discussion  
Our study confirmed the increased social outcomes of CBNRM (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006; 
Measham & Lumbasi, 2013; Thompson, 2013) in the Mongolian context (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 
2014; Leisher et al., 2012; Schmidt, 2006; Usukh et al., 2010). It showed that the formal organization of 
rangeland resource users strongly encouraged proactive behavior in addressing local resource issues 
and increased management practices in both traditional and innovative forms. The formal organization 
also led to a moderate increase in groups’ social capital (Upton, 2008; Wagner & Fernandez-Gimenez, 
2008) by enhancing their bridging networking with other stakeholders in rangeland management.  
Our results demonstrated a strong influence of resource system characteristics on social 
outcomes of pastoral groups, in line with the institutional theories on the commons (Agrawal, 2001; 
Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988). The positive effect of formal organization on several ultimate social 
outcomes was further fostered by ecological zone. More traditional rangeland practices and assets were 
found in the eastern steppe while social capital was higher in the desert steppe. Similarly, cash income 
and trust and norms of reciprocity among the members were greater in the steppe. However, the 
mountain forest zone had a negative effect on several measures, but this does not mean that outcomes 
were reduced. Rather it implies that the level of social outcomes achieved in this ecological zone was 
lower than those in other zones. These results point to the unknown to us specifics of resource systems 





On the other hand, the study did not confirm optimistic livelihood outcomes of CBNRM shown 
in prior studies (Leisher et al., 2012; Usukh et al., 2010) measured as members’ net cash income and 
their livestock holding. However, we found an increase in assets possessed by member households. Our 
interpretation of these results will be elaborated in subsection 2.5.3.   
It is worth noting the finding of the important role of the intermediate outcomes in achieving 
CBRM ultimate social outcomes. It confirmed prevailing conceptual arguments about the essential 
capacity building elements of CBRM (Brooks et al., 2013; Measham, 2007). This result also demonstrated 
the adequacy of our typology of social outcomes and the applicability of these variables for measuring 
social outcomes in the pastoral context. On the other hand, the study showed the ineffectiveness of the 
current approach for facilitating rules and cooperation in the desert steppe ecological zone, supporting 
the findings of Usukh et al. (2010). Instead, a strategy, which considers essentials of the desert 
ecosystem and strong existing social capital among desert pastoralists, may work better.    
In the following sub-sections, we will provide more in-depth discussions of the study results.  
 
2.5.1. CBRM and non-CBRM groups are structurally homogenous.  
Within the scope of this study, we found a little variability between the two types of the groups 
in group attributes such as members’ education, sex, age and well-being status (Upton, 2008) and their 
housing. In other words, these characteristics did not show associations with groups’ social outcomes. 
Nonetheless, the effect of significantly larger group size and management areas of PUGs supported by 
SDC can be examined as part of a comparative study among the formal groups. Such study can define 
more effective institutional design for the CBRM groups in Mongolia. 
We note that 30% of CBRM member households were poor and very poor (refer to Table 2.4) 
including female-headed households and those with no livestock at all. This proportion is close to the 





2001). This may indicate rather inclusive approach of CBRM in the study areas (Fernandez-Gimenez et 
al., 2014).    
 
2.5.2. CBRM increases intermediate outcomes of pastoral groups. 
We hypothesized that the level of intermediate outcomes would be greater in formally 
organized groups and our results support this hypothesis in all ecological zones except the desert 
steppe. However, differences in income diversity between the two group types were small.  
The information advantage of members of the formal groups was associated with attending 
CBRM meetings, participating in training within and outside of their soum, and learning from technical 
experts, all brought by the donor projects. Such benefits became available thanks to their formal 
organization and commitment for sustainably managing their resources, which enabled groups’ 
cooperation with external organizations, professionals and government officials. This was also a reason 
why informal groups lacked these opportunities11. In addition, CBRM members had greater access to 
various informational handbooks, brochures, and newspapers supplied by the projects (Schmidt et al., 
2009; SDC, 2011; UNDP, 2008). Our findings revealed a perceived lack of knowledgeable and respected 
local leaders, which supports findings of other studies (Murphy, 2014; Upton, 2008).   
As theorized, formal organization facilitated cooperation among their members. Cooperation 
increased in three strategic areas of rangeland management. First, households increased pasture 
coordination for setting aside and protecting winter and spring grazing areas, fencing key pastures and 
hay fields, and managing use of water sources (UNDP, 2008; Usukh et al., 2010). Their cooperation 
advanced for managing risks by setting aside dzud reserves, preparing hand fodder collectively and 
making otor movements in emergencies (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012). Lastly, using members’ 
                                                          
11
 Skills training curricula at aimag and district level employment facilitation institutions have contents mostly 
designed for urban jobs such as hairdresser, baker, cook, plumber, beautician, etc. (Ministry of Labor and Social 
Welfare of Mongolia, 2012) In addition, according to our estimation, an average distance from CBRM groups to 





traditional knowledge and recently obtained new skills, the members started cooperating on new tasks 
such as monitoring condition and use of pastures, and sanctioning those misusing resources and 
arbitrating disputes among the herders. These types of cooperation and coordination among members 
form major roles of rangeland management institutions in the pastoral context.  
On the other hand, the regulatory function of pastoral institutions was shown to be fairly weak. 
Important areas of rangeland management such as adjusting the number and types of livestock, 
managing use of wells and hay areas remain unregulated or are largely under “traditional use” claims 
(Upton, 2012). Although formal regulation was emerging, particularly for regulating and coordinating 
the timing of grazing (Figure 2.5), formal rules remain rare. This may indicate complexity of the ongoing 
process of reviving proven traditional norms as well as adapting to the new free market system. It is 
challenging for the current generation of pastoral groups mostly brought up by socialist collectives with 
top-down administration. These dynamics accompanied by uncertainties of natural and legal aspects 
(Fernandez-Gimenez & Batbuyan, 2004) of pastoral rangeland management in Mongolia further 
complicate the development of CBRM institutions.      
 
2.5.3. CBRM increases desired rangeland management practices, proactive behavior and 
essential assets. 
Our hypothesis about ultimate social outcomes was partially supported. Formal organization 
increased proactive behaviors such as approaching authorities about resource management issues and 
joining community actions. It helped reviving traditional practices and introducing adaptive innovations, 
and moderately increased social capital of the groups.  
CBRM did not improve livelihood measures in per capita livestock number and cash income. 
Achieving these goals depend on multiple factors, some of which may be beyond CBRM potentials. 





bust” cycles (Behnke et al., 1993). Best efforts of CBRM pastoralists to overcome natural hazards by 
utilizing adaptable strategies did not succeed in saving livestock due to grazing pressures by incoming 
herders from other districts (Fernández-Giménez et al., 2012). Paradoxically, strong norms of reciprocity 
negatively affected the CBRM outcome in the absence of cross-scale coordination of otor movements 
(ibid). Institutions capable of such coordination have to be at an inter-soum or inter-aimag level, which 
is above CBRM groups. The second livelihood indicator, cash income of herder households, is, in turn, 
very much dependent on livestock number when profit per animal tends to be constant.  According to a 
study of UNDP and SDC (2007), over the half of income of households with less than 300 SFU came from 
milk. Those families having over 300 units received the same percentage of income from meat. Our data 
showed that an average share of cashmere in household income was 31 % (refer to Figure 2.6).   
 
Figure 2.6. Income structure of an average herder household in Mo ngolia (N= 706) 
 
In 2009, World Bank reported that about 69% of all herder households of Mongolia had less 






















of herder families. Considering the limitations of sale of live animals as a regular income source, 
cashmere remains the most commercially valuable commodity for many pastoralists. Hence, potentials 
of CBRM to influence cashmere market are limited. Instead, fostering alternative income generation 
opportunities and increasing risk management may contribute to long-term livelihood benefits. In turn, 
achieving livelihood improvement is challenging in the absence of reliable market access and relevant 
skills for production processes. We note that 90% of CBRM groups were, on average, in their third year 
of formal operation at the time of our study. While increasing livestock numbers and cash incomes of 
herders requires favorable external environment including improved ecological conditions and market 
factors that all take time to come to fruition. Therefore, a conclusive statement about livelihood results 
here might be premature. Instead, we highlight that behavioral outcomes can be achieved earlier than 
social capital and livelihood improvements that require more time and cooperative interactions of 
multiple actors.    
Similarly, a weak difference in social capital between CBRM and non-CBRM herders contradicted 
results of other studies (Hess et al., 2010; Upton, 2008). Closer examination showed that CBRM 
members had greater bridging social networks than traditional neighborhoods. Such higher level of 
social network was more strongly associated with available support from their CBRM organization.  
 
2.5.4. Resource characteristics influence social outcomes of pastoral communities. 
As hypothesized, the desert steppe had modest levels of rules and cooperation compared to 
other zones. Lower density of herding households due to lower productivity in the desert steppe and 
less frequent interactions may restrict members’ cooperation and make setting rules unnecessary. 
Conversely, with their already high social capital, the level of cooperation based on informal norms 





We found that households in the eastern steppe had more diversified income sources. Eastern 
steppe communities applied grazing rules to a greater extent than other regions. These differences may 
have led to the greater use of traditional practices and to the accumulation of hard assets in these 
communities. Mountain forest steppe communities had higher levels of cooperation and agreed rules, 
but their social outcomes in terms of use of traditional practices, and trust and norms of reciprocity, 
were lowest among the ecological zones. Similarly, mountain forest steppe communities had the 
smallest cash income and assets. This result did not support our hypothesis about lower livelihood 
outcomes in the desert steppe. Nevertheless, these results point to a need for a follow-up qualitative 
inquiry to explain such differences. They also show that considerations of specifics of ecological zones 
need to be intrinsic part of CBRM policy and planning. 
 
2.5.5. Other findings relevant to the development of CBRM in Mongolia. 
Along with the results of differences between the two types of groups, there were several other 
findings worth noting. Overall, Mongolian herders rely considerably on local information sources such as 
soum and bag meetings, local government officials, and their khot ail16 members and neighbors. From 
non-local sources, television (90%) and radio (70%) were most popular media. Hence, these sources 
have more potential for information dissemination and education among pastoralists.  
For both group types, bonding social capital remains a critical resource for dealing with daily 
tasks and household level risks. The report of CBRM organization as an only helpful organization 
available in a soum shows dominant self-reliance of the groups and their limited access to other sources 
for assistance.  
Although CBRM groups demonstrated greater intermediate outcomes, their mean values were 
far below the highest cases reported by some formal groups. This shows that there are ample rooms to 





other actors such as the national government and civil society organizations rather than external donors 
alone.   
 
2.6. Implications and Conclusions 
This study pointed to a need for CBRM development in Mongolia beyond the efforts of a few 
donors in the form of “policy experiments” (Usukh et al., 2010) or the creation of “model” community 
groups to convince the government of CBRM potentials (UNDP 2007). Despite contradictory reports 
about CBRM success elsewhere (Addison et al., 2013; Murphy, 2011; Upton, 2008), this paper provides 
evidence for optimism about community-based management arrangements in Mongolia. It emphasizes 
the process-oriented nature of institutional development, where some outcomes can be achieved 
smoothly in time and across space while others like livelihood improvement require more complex 
evolution. In the Mongolian context, where CBRM has been catalyzed and supported by external 
facilitation, intermediate outcomes were achieved relatively soon. Among the ultimate social outcomes, 
those outcomes at individual household levels such as proactive behaviors and the increase in rangeland 
practices were also achieved early on. Social capital outcomes that go beyond the individual level and 
involve community interactions and cooperation both horizontally and vertically, showed some 
promising signs. However, livelihood outcomes that require more investments, favorable external 
environment and time to achieve, have yet to come to fruition. Indeed, some successful CBNRM cases in 
Africa have taken over two decades of consistent work (NACSO, 2008). Thus, we caution against 
interpreting the lack of measurable livelihood outcomes of CBRM as an indicator of failure or low 
performance. Rather, these indicators may require more time to develop and must build upon a strong 
foundation of intermediate social outcomes, for which we do have evidence.  
The current process of formal organization of herder groups in Mongolia has been restricted by 





outcomes facilitated by the projects were benefited by a small percentage of local resource users12 
proactive enough to respond to the call for collective action. Since the existing government system does 
not enable these intermediate outcomes (as shown by the cases of traditional neighborhoods), ultimate 
social outcomes of the majority of non-CBRM groups remain stagnant. In the absence of the necessary 
acknowledgement from the central government, local public administration remains passive in 
maintaining the effect of technical assistance projects despite their significant roles in local rangeland 
management (Leisher et al., 2012; Upton, 2012). To sustain and replicate results demonstrated by 
formal groups facilitated by external agencies, the government needs to formally recognize CBRM, its 
role in rangeland management (Ostrom et al., 1994).  
CBRM policy should encourage self-organization of pastoral groups rather than external 
initiation of formal organization. A study of Gobi CBRM groups reported that there were many self-
initiated nukhurluls following examples of the project initiated groups in neighboring areas (Undargaa et 
al., 2007). For such initiatives, strong legal and economic incentives are needed. Only in this way can 
CBRM involve more pastoral groups. The government education and employment facilitation system has 
to integrate the goal for CBRM development but in a more pastoral-oriented fashion as modeled by 
external agencies. These essentially include herder-tailored training content and service availability at 
their immediate areas in suitable timing for herders. Simultaneously, the policy should attract other 
potential actors to bring more investments in production of intermediate outcomes for self-initiated 
pastoral groups. Such bottom-up process with necessary external facilitation should encourage revival of 
traditional institutions for rangeland management. This process will enable adaptive innovations by the 
pastoralists while carefully considering local resource characteristics in their ecological regions.  
The promising case of CBRM in Mongolia may encourage mobile pastoral communities 
elsewhere to cooperate on sustainable management of their resources. However, as the study showed, 
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 Schmidt et al. (2009) reported that their project covered about 20% of total soum herder households. UNDP 





mindful facilitation for achieving intermediate outcomes while accounting for the specifics of the local 







CHAPTER THREE: UNDERLYING MECHANISMS EXPLAINING IMPROVED SOCIAL OUTCOMES OF 





Community-based rangeland management (CBRM) has been proposed to be a promising option 
for dealing with rural poverty and resource degradation in Mongolia. However, with conflicting results 
documented domestically as well as globally, its reputation has been questioned. Yet little is known 
about the factors that influence CBRM success or lack thereof. Using data from 142 pastoral 
communities, we explored underlying mechanisms for social outcomes of Mongolian CBRM. We 
examined if the effect of formal organization on groups’ social outcomes was mediated by information 
diversity, leadership, knowledge exchange, and agreed rules using a serial-multiple mediation model. 
Mediation effect is defined as an effect of a third variable on an already established relationship 
between two variables. The study revealed a mediation effect of these variables on the relationship 
between the formal organization and traditional and innovative rangeland practices, proactive behavior 
and social networks of pastoralists. Among these interdependent mutually-enforcing mediators, 
information diversity had a triggering effect on other three mediating variables.  This ordered chain of 
information diversityleadershipknowledge exchangerules collectively increased the effect of 
formal organization on the above four social outcomes. We also found that the mediated effect of 
organization status on members’ proactive behavior and their social networking had a moderation 
effect of or dependent on ecological zone.  
 
3.1. Introduction 
Since the late 1990s, rural Mongolia has been facing two major problems: poverty, unknown to 





World Bank, 2001; World Bank, 1996) and resource mismanagement (Crisp et al., 2003; Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2001). Both have been blamed for the deterioration of country’s natural resource base. The 
issues have been further exacerbated by ongoing climate change documented by scientists (Batima, 
2006; Dagvadorj et al., 2010; Nandintsetseg & Shinoda, 2013) and observed by herders (Bruegger et al., 
2014; Marin, 2010). Several external development organizations saw community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) to be a potential option to address these problems (Agriteam-Canada, 1997; 
Swift, 1995). Projects of the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)13 and United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP)14 first introduced the community-based natural resource management model to 
Mongolia (Ministry of Nature and Environment, 2007; Schmidt, 2006). The process of engaging herder 
communities in natural resource management has been further expanded by other external donors, 
initially as aid to address the consequences of the 1999-2001 dzud (severe winter weather disaster). 
These efforts have gradually led to institution-building objectives for rangeland management 
substantially weakened by the transitional reforms following decollectivization and livestock 
privatization. According to a UNDP (2006) herder group assessment, in 2006 there were 14 different 
programs facilitating capacity building of over 2000 herder groups in 19 aimags (provinces).   
Prior studies of CBNRM in Mongolia showed mixed outcomes as has been the case 
internationally (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006; Measham & Lumbasi, 2013; Nadasdy, 2003; Saito-Jensen et 
al., 2010). Some studies found positive outcomes of CBRM in Mongolia (Baival, 2012; Leisher et al., 
2012; Upton, 2008), while others documented ineffectiveness (Addison et al., 2013; Murphy, 2011)  or 
called for cautious positivism (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014; Fernández-Giménez et al., 2012). Despite 
valuable contributions, these studies were limited by small samples and restricted geographic coverage 
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 GTZ-funded “Conservation and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in Mongolia” programs was 
implemented from 1998 to 2006 (Schmidt et al., 2009). 
14
 UNDP Mongolia started community forestry project following 1997 forest fire in Mongolia (South, 2015). Later in 
2002 UNDP-funded “Sustainable Grassland Management Project” commenced in 12 soums of three provinces 





that reduced the representativeness of the findings. In contrast, the present study used data from 142 
pastoral groups across four ecological zones in 10 of Mongolia’s 21 aimags. Our work builds on a prior 
study about whether community-based rangeland management (CBRM) increases social outcomes of 
pastoral groups in Mongolia (Chapter 2). This study found that CBRM members used more traditional 
and innovative practices and exhibited greater proactive behavior to solve rangeland issues compared to 
non-CBRM members. CBRM members also owned more household assets, had slightly higher levels of 
trust, stronger norms of reciprocity and larger social networks. However, formal CBRM organizations did 
not differ from non-CBRM groups in livelihood measures such as annual cash income and livestock per 
capita. Formal organization was associated with greater intermediate outcomes, including better access 
to information, leadership, knowledge exchange, cooperation and agreed rules, which are thought to 
facilitate social outcomes. The study found significantly varied social outcomes of pastoral groups 
among four ecological zones. These included higher levels of social capital in desert steppe groups, 
greater cooperation and rules in the mountain forest steppe, and more income sources, assets and use 
of traditional practices in the eastern steppe.   
In this paper, we investigate underlying processes that links formal organization to ultimate 
social outcomes. We ask how and why different social outcomes occur in two types of nomadic 
communities in similar social, political and environmental contexts as well as “when” and “for whom” it 
works (Wu & Zumbo, 2008). To respond to this broad question, we had several sub-questions. First, we 
ask (1) if a model of eight factors including formal organization, six intermediate variables of access to 
information, leadership, knowledge exchange, rules, cooperation and income diversity, and group’s 
ecological zone can predict the level of social outcomes of pastoral groups. Second, we explore (2) 
whether intermediate outcomes facilitate the relationship between the formal organization and 
ultimate social outcomes. We also investigate associations between the intermediate outcomes: (3) if 





sequential order. Lastly, we ask (4) whether such mediated relationship between formal organization 
and ultimate social outcomes is conditioned by the ecological zone of a group. We hypothesized that the 
organizational status of pastoral groups and their ecological zone together with intermediate outcomes 
will predict groups’ ultimate social outcomes. Second, we expected that intermediate outcomes will 
have a mediation effect on the relationship between formal organization and ultimate social outcomes. 
Third, we expected that ecological zone would have a moderation effect on this mediated relationship. 
Due to the shortage of relevant studies and theories about interconnection between the factors 
facilitating CBNRM, our analysis of the relationships between proposed mediators is exploratory nature. 
In the following section, we explain the study’s conceptual framework by highlighting theoretical 
foundations and relevant background of Mongolian pastoral social-ecological systems.   
 
3.2. Conceptual Framework  
As shown in our conceptual framework (Figure 3.1), organization status of pastoral groups 
(formally organized or traditional) and their location in a particular ecological zone influence ultimate 
social outcomes of the groups. Results of our prior study confirmed the positive relationship (Chapter 2) 
between the formal organization and ultimate social outcomes but the effect of ecological zone was 
mixed. In this study, we consider how organization status mediates ultimate social outcomes through 
multiple intermediate outcomes. Further, we propose that these intermediate outcomes are 
interconnected, and have a combined effect on ultimate social outcomes. On the basis of the prior 
results summarized earlier, we also expect that ecological zone moderates the effect of organization 






Figure 3.1. Framework depicting the effects of formal organization and ecological zone on 
three ultimate social outcomes: livelihoods, practices and behavior and social capital . 
These ultimate outcomes are facilitated by intermediate outcomes such knowledge exchange, agreed 
rules, income diversity, cooperation, leadership, and information.  
 
 Scholarship on the commons proposes that given certain conditions, community-based 
management of local resources can have positive outcomes. Despite the varying social and ecological 
settings of CBNRM globally, studies consistently point to the necessity of institutional arrangements or 
“sets of formal and informal rules and norms that shape interactions of members with others and the 
nature” (Agrawal & Gibson, 2001, p. 14) in any community context (NRC, 2002, p. 89; Pagdee et al., 





maximizing behavior in favor of actions for the collective benefit have been key for successful, long-
enduring  resource institutions (Agrawal, 2002; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990). Such 
regulations limit free riding problems and punish those violating collective agreements (Agrawal & 
Gibson, 1999). Traditional norms shared by local resource users often promote conservation by 
prohibiting certain harmful behaviors, and for community-based management, the presence of such 
customary norms encourages cooperation on more formal arrangements to manage common resources 
(Agrawal & Gibson, 2001). In most situations, self-organized groups initially rely on locally-evolved 
norms of reciprocity, trust, and local leaders before developing formal agreements among members. 
Formal agreement involves regulations of more complex interactions such as restricting the amount, 
timing, or place of resource use, and sharing costs and benefits (Ostrom, 2000). As the collaborative 
process advances towards a more developed form, groups continue developing their rules to reflect 
various situations to be regulated, improving rules’ content and making them more formal. CPR theory 
tends to emphasize the importance of formal rules over informal norms in governing common pool 
resources. Formal rules should be “devised and modified over time” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 89) by group 
members according to their specific circumstances and collective choice.  
Organization status in the conceptual framework contains these two forms of resource 
institutions: informal groups or traditional neighborhoods relying on customary norms, and formal 
groups bound by bylaws and resource use agreements. In Mongolia, contextual factors (Agrawal, 2001) 
or external facilitation played a triggering role in the formation of formal groups. To reflect this origin, 
external facilitation was included in the framework as variable that influences organization status and 
resulting intermediate outcomes. However, external facilitation will not be analyzed in this chapter and 





all intermediate outcomes and six ultimate social outcomes15. In this study, we examine the mechanisms 
underlying the relationship between organization status and ultimate social outcomes. Specifically, our 
purpose is to test the mediation effect of intermediate outcomes and the moderation effect of 
ecological zone. Theoretically, a mediator “links a cause and an effect” and is statistically correlated with 
the mediated variables (Wu & Zumbo, 2008, p. 368). A variable mediated has precedence to the 
mediator. In our case, the formal organization preceded intermediate variables. In contrast, a 
moderator “modifies a causal effect” (p. 368) and “explains its strength and direction” (p. 379). The 
moderator has precedence and is uncorrelated with those moderated. These were the features of the 
proposed moderator variable i.e. ecological zone. The mediation model answers questions “how” and 
“why” while the moderation model addresses questions “for whom” and “when” (ibid). We 
hypothesized that the effect of the organization status on ultimate social outcomes will be mediated by 
the intermediate outcomes. Further, this indirect effect may be conditioned by ecological zone.    
 Ecological zone was included on the basis of the consistent theoretical argument that resource 
characteristics strongly influence management outcomes of commons institutions (Agrawal, 2001; 
Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988). Studies on Mongolian rangelands have found that desert steppe regions 
are dominated by non-equilibrium dynamics, with highly variable resource productivity controlled by 
rainfall variation and timing rather than livestock grazing (Fernández-Giménez, 1997; Okayasu et al., 
2012; Wesche et al., 2010; Zemmrich, 2007). These scarce and uncertain resource attributes have 
shaped Mongolia’s main pastoral strategies including high mobility, flexibility, diversification, storage 
and pooling (Brown et al., 2013; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014). Depending on distinctive climatic and 
geophysical attributes, Mongolia has been divided into various ecological zones (Douglas et al., 2006). 
Such zoning considers amount and timing of precipitation, temperature extremes, elevation, frost-free 
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days, soil type and vegetation characteristics (Simukov, 1934; Tsegmid & Vorobyov, 1990). Our study 
sites were located in four ecological zones including the desert steppe, steppe, eastern steppe and 
mountain and forest steppe. Prior results showed that desert steppe pastoralists had greater social 
capital while those in the eastern steppe had more assets and used more traditional rangeland 
management practices compared to groups in other zones (Chapter 2). The groups in the mountain and 
forest steppe had more rules while members of eastern steppe groups had higher income diversity. We 
also found an interaction effect of organization status and ecological zone on cooperation and the 
presence of rules among the desert steppe groups. Hence, we hypothesized that ecological zone will 
moderate the mediated relationship between the organization status and ultimate social outcomes. Due 
to the mixed effect of ecological zone on social outcomes, we had no expectations about the direction 
of the moderation effect. 
 
3.2.1. Ultimate social outcomes. 
We selected three sets of dependent social outcome variables (Figure 3.1). Most evaluations of 
CBNRM consider livelihood outcomes and changes in resource conditions as key measures of CBNRM 
success (Conley & Moote, 2003; Hibbard & Lurie, 2012; Plummer & Armitage, 2007). However, following 
our research objectives, we focused on social outcomes related to social and economic well-being of 
Mongolian pastoralists rather than rangeland conditions. Consequently, we conceptualized that 
livelihood, social capital and rangeland management practices and behavior present the ultimate social 
outcomes of CBRM institutions in Mongolia.   
For Mongolian pastoralists, access to technology and equipment is important to household 
production (Murphy, 2014; Sneath, 1999). Essential assets such as vehicles, tractors, cell-phones and TV 
increase production capacity and herders’ access to information, which is critical in vast sparsely 





the capability of rural herding communities to meet their subsistence needs and address risks under 
uncertain and variable environmental conditions (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012; Fernandez-Gimenez 
et al., 2011). Our early study confirmed the positive effect of formal organization on the level of 
household assets.  
Empirical studies suggest that community members engaged in cooperation under agreed rules 
for managing common resources are more likely to adopt ecologically-friendly practices and behaviors 
for resource use (Baival et al., 2011; Ostrom & Hess, 2010; Upton, 2008). We considered two existing 
forms of rangeland practices in Mongolia. Traditional practices include those activities inherited from 
millennia-long adaptation of the nomads to their lands (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2000), proven strategies 
for sustainable rangeland management (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2000, 2006). Innovative practices brought 
by supporting donor agencies, or government include fencing key resource areas, monitoring pasture 
condition, improved animal breeding, and growing forage plants. All these incorporate technological 
developments that may be seen as “both a motor and a product of social change”(Sneath, 1999, p. 223). 
Additionally, individual members’ proactiveness on issues related to resource management is important 
in group collective action. Our prior findings showed that the formal organization significantly increased 
traditional and innovative rangeland management practices and proactive behaviors of group members.  
Theoretical models of commons institutions emphasize that social capital variables such as trust, 
norms of reciprocity and social networks of members in resource institutions strongly influence the 
levels of both livelihoods and resource conditions (Ostrom, 1998). These three dimensions of social 
capital (Putnam, 1993) interact with each other and facilitate social outcomes through collective action 
and democratic governance (Titeca & Vervisch, 2008) while reducing transaction costs of collective 
action (Ostrom, 1990). We adopted Uphoff et al.’s (2000) concept of cognitive and structural social 
capital and measured both types among the group members. Trust and norms of reciprocity together 





level (Grootaert, 2002) “resulting from mental processes”. Social networks are referred to as structural 
social capital (Uphoff et al., 2000, p. 4). Structural social capital was further subcategorized as  bonding 
(horizontal network of like-minded individuals with similar social status) and bridging (ties with actors 
from different social or cultural backgrounds) social capital (Putnam, 2000, p. 22). For pastoralists, 
strong bonding and bridging social capital present essential risk management strategies important for 
overcoming both household-level risks and community-wide covariate hazards such as dzud (severe 
winter weather) and droughts (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012; Swift, 1995). Our prior results confirmed 
stronger social capital among members of formal groups compared to informal groups.  
 
3.2.2. Intermediate social outcomes. 
Intermediate outcomes included six variables: access to information, local leadership, 
opportunity for knowledge exchange, cooperation, income diversification, and the presence of rules to 
constrain resource use. Studies assessing success of CBNRM argue that these intermediate variables play 
an important role in ultimate achievements of CBNRM (Measham & Lumbasi, 2013; NACSO, 2008; 
USAID, 2009). However, empirical studies to test this causal model are rare.   
Ostrom (1990) showed that the ability to obtain and exchange credible information is an 
important factor for collective actions of local users. The same applies to Mongolian pastoral groups. In 
post-socialist Mongolia, abrupt economic reforms resulted in limited access to information and lack of 
training, skills, and government services contributed to rural vulnerability (Marin, 2008; UNDP, 2011). 
With the demise of state-sponsored institutions in early 1990s, Mongolian herders lost their regular 
access to mail and newspaper delivery, local libraries, cultural clubs and mobile cinema16, that had 
played a significant role in their daily activities and education as a population scattered across large 
geographic areas with limited transportation and communication (Rossabi, 2005; Sneath, 1999).  
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Under the new market condition, pastoralists faced a need for selling their products and 
purchasing necessities on their own while managing daily livestock herding tasks and responding to 
highly uncertain environments (Swift, 1995). In addition, herders lacked forums for discussion to share 
their issues and exchange ideas that would help them network with each other to handle these tasks. 
These problems have been targeted by many externally-funded CBNRM programs (Ostrom & Hess, 
2010; Upton, 2008; Usukh et al., 2010), which initiated information delivery and local forums in remote 
rural communities. 
 During the collective era, the state cooperatives provided leadership in rangeland management 
including allocation of pasture, coordination and support for of seasonal movements, emergency 
assistance, training and education, marketing and social services (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001; Rossabi, 
2005). Most collective leaders were either experienced herders or professionals in livestock husbandry 
who had a strong knowledge of traditional practices and specifics of the local ecological conditions. Thus 
many customary forms of organization and resource use were reflected in cooperative management 
(Swift, 1995). A few recent studies reported deteriorating trust in local formal leaders and wealthier 
community members who had rather individualistic strategies under the new market setting (Murphy, 
2014; Upton, 2008).  
Traditionally, Mongolian pastoralists regularly cooperated at different levels of rangeland 
institutions.  At the neighborhood level, cooperation included coordinating use of pastures, hay areas, 
water sources, and salt licks, as well as labor sharing for nomadic movements, clearing pastures from 
snow, or searching for lost animals (Mearns, 1996b). Some authors noted revival of such traditional 
cooperation following decollectivization, which was weakened during the state cooperative times 
(Mearns, 1996a) but others contested the presence of such cooperation (Bruun, 2006). Recent 
assessments reported some forms of new cooperation encouraged by technical assistance projects 





condition, and planting vegetables. Results of our prior studies were in line with these theories and 
empirical studies (Chapter 2). We note that the effect of organization status was weak on income 
diversity. This study emphasized the relationships among the intermediate variables. We explored if a 
sequence is present among the intermediate outcomes. Further, we suggest that the intermediate 
outcomes have a mediating role for the relationship between the organization status and ultimate social 
outcomes. Following our prior results, we also argue that ecological zone has a moderation effect on this 
mediated relationship.  
 
3.3. Method 
3.3.1. Sampling design.  
Our unit of analysis was local rangeland user groups. Following a methodological guidance of the 
International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI), a user group was defined as a set of individuals 
who use and maintain rangelands within a specific geographic location for consumptive or non-
consumptive purposes (IFRI, 2013). We sampled 142 community groups in 36 soums17 from 10 aimags18 
of Mongolia. Geographically, these groups were located across four ecological zones including desert 
steppe, eastern steppe, steppe and mountain forest steppe.  
As shown in Figure 3.2, we paired adjacent soums with donor-supported community-based 
rangeland management (CBRM) groups and those without them (non-CBRM). The former comprised 
54% (N=77) of the total sample and the remaining 46% were traditional neighborhood groups (N=65). 
The study used a nested sampling design (Lieberman, 2005) including two different levels of social 
organization: household and community group. Within each soum, we randomly selected one to nine 
community groups sharing common resources such as grazing areas and water sources. 
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 Soum is a rural district, the administrative unit below aimag (province). 
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Figure 3.2. The map shows the location of  the study soums (N=36) paired with and 
without community based rangeland management groups.  
 
As some social outcomes needed to be measured at the group member level, we interviewed on 
average five households within each group. In nine donor-supported soums, we had smaller sampling 
frames that limited random selection. We interviewed at least five members of those few groups that 
were present and/or still active in the soum. With this sampling approach, we interviewed a total of 706 
households of which 382 (or 54%) were members of formal groups, and 324 (46%) were from traditional 
informal groups (refer to Figure 3.3). Due to various circumstances19 the number of sampled households 
varied from three to seven per community group.   
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Figure 3.3 summarizes our sampling design and data collection tools at each study level. We 
designed the research instruments on the basis of prior studies in Mongolia’s rangelands (Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2001; Fernandez-Gimenez & Batbuyan, 2004; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012) applying IFRI 
approach (IFRI, 2013). Household interviews were quantitative questionnaires measuring member 
household’s demographics, livelihood, rangeland management practices, norms and behaviors and their 
social networks. At the group level, we conducted interviews with group leaders and focus groups of the 
members. Based on information from member household questionnaires, focus groups, and leader 
interviews, the study team synthesized an organizational profile survey for each community group. This 
organization survey included group’s profile, organizational management, and social relations.  
The instruments were originally developed in English and then translated into Mongolian for 
data collection purposes. Two teams of Mongolian social researchers collected data between April 2011 
and June 2012. The collected data were entered into two separate Microsoft Access databases, which 
were designed in the same format as respective survey instruments. For the data analysis, we 
transferred the stored data into Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 22) software.   
 
3.3.3. Variables.  
3.3.3.1. Independent variables. 
The independent variables were (a) organization status, (b) ecological zone and (c) six 
intermediate variables. (a) The organization status was dichotomous with “no formal organization or 
non-CBRM” and “formal organization or CBRM.” (b) Ecological zone was categorical and coded as 1 





outcome variables included six variables: information sources available to the members, perceptions 
about leadership including community and local government leaders, knowledge exchange within and  
Figure 3.3. Sampling design and size, survey instruments of the comparative study of 
community groups (N=142) in Mongolia  
a
 Aimag is the largest administrative unit in Mongolia equivalent of province. 
b
 Soum is a rural district, the 
administrative unit below aimag. 
c
 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management referring to 






outside of the group, agreed rules for rangeland management among members, income sources of the 
member households, and group cooperation. We coded them differently in line with Mongolian 
rangeland context as shown in Table 3.1.   
Table 3.1. Descriptives of Variables Used in the Analysis of Pastoral Groups in Mongolia (N=142) 

















Social capital:  
Cognitive social capitald,g  







categorical; non-CBRMa vs.CBRMa  
categorical; four ecozone typesb     
 
 
Mean of 5 types on a scale of 0-2 
Sum of 39 cooperation types 
Sum of 16 information sources 
Mean of 4 items on a scale of  0-2 
Sum of 17 income sources  




Sum of 15 household assets  
 
 
Mean of 6 items  
Sum of 13 items  
 
 
Sum 16 traditional practices  
Sum of 19 innovative practices  


































































































 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-organized groups and non-CBRM 
denotes informal or traditional neighborhoods groups. 
b
 Ecological zones are coded: 1 = Desert Steppe, 2 =Steppe, 
3 = Eastern Steppe, and 4 = Mountain Forest Steppe. 
c
 Rules is a group level variable coded as 0 = No Rules, 1 = 
Traditional or Informal Rules. 
d
 These variables from household survey dataset were aggregated to the 
organization level by taking the mean value for the sampled households within each organization or neighborhood 
group. 
e 
Knowledge exchange items were coded as 0 = None, 1 = Some (1-3 people) and 2 = Many (3< people). 
f
 
Leadership items were coded as 0 = Disagree, 1 =Neutral and 2 = Agree. 
g
 Cognitive social capital items were 
reverse coded as 0 = Agree, 1 = Neutral and 2 = Disagree. 
 
Three of the intermediate outcome variables were dichotomous and indicated the presence of 
cooperation, sources of information and income for member household. The remaining three had 





ideas on essential topics of rangeland management. Leadership measured the presence of legitimate 
local leaders. Lastly, agreed rules indicated the presence of rules reported by herders.   
 
3.3.3.2. Dependent variables. 
Three main variables comprised dependent ultimate social outcomes: (a) livelihood, (b) social 
capital and (c) rangeland practices and member’s behaviors. (a) We measured livelihood by examining 
the possession of essential household assets. (b) We had two types of social capital. Cognitive social 
capital assessed the level of trust and norms of reciprocity among members. Structural social capital 
indicated the presence of bonding and bridging social ties of the members. (c) Behaviors and practices 
included reports of traditional and innovative rangeland management practices.  We measured 
proactiveness by investigating members’ responses about their actions and initiatives related to local 
rangeland issues. As noted in Table 3.1, all six ultimate social outcomes were calculated from the 
household dataset. We aggregated household variables to the organization level by taking the mean 
value for the sampled households within each organization or neighborhood group.  
The response rate was complete for most of the variables (N=142).  Table 3.1 displayed value 
ranges of the variables to depict the location of the group mean for a particular variable. To evaluate the 
normality of data distribution, we examined the skewness where the values between +1.0 and -1.0 were 
considered acceptable given the robustness of parametric statistical tests (Vaske, 2008, p. 276). We 
performed reliability tests for the scale variables were to verify the internal consistency of items as 







For examining relationships between the organization status and social outcomes, we took 
several steps of analyses with four research questions. The details of these steps are described in the 
following subsections.  
 
3.3.4.1. Testing the model of eight-predictors on ultimate social outcomes. 
We tested the regression model of eight explanatory variables to address the research question 
“does the model influence ultimate social outcomes of pastoral groups?” Since organization status was 
dichotomous, we used dummy variable multiple regressions (Vaske, 2008). We chose the eight-variable 
model resulted from the backward selection method (Ott&Lyman, 2010) using the equation (3.1).   
Y1-6  = iY + b1(X1) + b2(X2) + b3(X3) + b4(X4) + b5(X5) + b6(X6) +b7(X7)+ b8(X8) + Y   (3.1) 
 
3.3.4.2. Testing associations between the intermediate outcomes. 
For the path analysis, we excluded two intermediate variables: cooperation and income 
diversity. The PROCESS statistical software, we chose to use, had restrictions for maximum of four 
simultaneous mediators. We excluded these variables for two reasons. First, the two variables can be 
considered as outcomes of other four intermediate variables. Thus, there is less likelihood of these two 
variables serving as mediators for ultimate social outcomes. Secondly, we explained in the conceptual 
framework that donors’ facilitation followed a sequential order. Donors provided first essential 
information to local user groups, fostered their leadership and facilitated knowledge sharing. When local 
groups were sufficiently informed and motivated to cooperate, they were assisted to set more 
formalized rules for themselves (Schmidt, 2005). Statistically, these four factors have the required 





Further, we needed to determine the mediation model type: parallel or serial multiple 
mediators. As the former assumes no causal relationships between the mediators (Hayes, 2013, p. 143), 
we chose the serial model based on the results of a partial correlation20 test displayed in Table 3.3.  
 
  
                                                          
20
 Partial correlation is defined by Hayes (2013, p. 74) as “the Pearson correlation between the residuals from a 
model estimating Y from the covariates, and the residuals from a model estimating X from the covariates”. He 
advised examining partial correlation between mediators controlling X to define any causal associations between 





Table 3.2. Frequencies and Reliability of Variables and Indices 
 














Knowledge exchangeb:  
Livestock health, reproduction, and nutrition 
Livestock marketing  
Pasture rotation and resting 
Disaster preparedness and risk management 
 
Cognitive social capitalc: 
People always try to help each other  
People help each other in times of need 
Most people are trustworthy 
People mainly look out for themselvesd 
People will take advantage of others 
Our community is getting less friendly 
 
Leadershipc: 
My community has good informal leaders 
My community has some knowledgeable and 
respected people 
I know helpful organizations in my soum 




Rules exist to regulate the timing of grazing  
Rules exist to regulate the number of livestock  
Rules exist to regulate the type of livestock  
Rules exist to regulate use of hay areas 









































































































































 Cell entries show sample sizes from two datasets: household survey (N=706) and organization profile survey 
(N=142). 
b
 Items were coded as 0 = None, 1 = Some (1-3 people) and 2 = Many (3< people). 
c
 Items were coded as 0 
= Disagree, 1 =Neutral and 2 = Agree. 
d
 Items were reverse coded as 0 = Agree, 1 = Neutral and 2 = Disagree.  
e
 Items were coded as 0 = No Rules, 1 = Traditional or Informal Rules and 2 = Formal Agreed Rules. 
f
 Cronbach 
alpha is a coefficient of reliability showing consistency among items within an index variable, where score greater 







Table 3.3. Partial Correlation Matrix of Proposed Mediator Variables Accounting for the Effect of 
Organization Status 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Presence of rules .43 .41 1 - - - - - 
2. Cooperation 13.16 7.09 0.36** 1 - - - - 
3. Information diversity 7.68 1.77 0.21* 0.25** 1 - - - 
4. Knowledge exchange .59 .34 -.17 .07 0.42** 1 - - 
5. Income diversity 2.79 .51 -.07 .03 .08 0.17* 1 - 
6. Leadership 1.14 .36 -.14 0.19* 0.46** 0.53** .13 1 
* and ** indicate significant correlation at 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 
To define relationships between the four intermediate variables, we conducted multiple 
regressions controlling organization status and ecological zone. Standardized coefficients were used 
because of different units and scales of the intermediate variables. As shown in Figure 3.4, we found an 
interdependence of proposed mediators and created a sequential order based on the strength and 
magnitude of association as well as conceptual relationships.  
 
Figure 3.4. Interdependence of four intermediate outcome (mediator) variables 
accounting effects of organization status and ecological zone  (shown by dashed gray arrows): 
larger effects are shown by solid thicker arrows and smaller ones by thinner arrows. Arrows point to the 
dependent variable 





3.3.4.3. Testing the mediation effect of intermediate outcomes. 
 With the serial-multiple mediator model defined, we created a conceptual path model (Figure 
3.5.).  This figure illustrated a modified version of the conceptual framework in Figure 3.1 with four 
intermediate variables and placed in an ordered sequence. I excluded ecological zone from the 
conceptual framework as I tested the variable in the moderation model. The four mediators including 
information diversity (M1), leadership (M2), knowledge exchange (M3) and agreed rules (M4) were 
conceptualized to mediate the effect of organization status (CBRM vs. non-CBRM) on the ultimate social 
outcomes. We included ecological zone as a potential moderator of the combined effect of mediators 
and the organization status on social outcomes.  
 
Figure 3.5.  A conceptual path diagram shows organization status’ influence on ultimate 
social outcomes through serial multiple mediators : bold lines represent variable’s effect on 
other variables and arrows show the direction of the effect. Ecological zone moderates the combined 
effect of mediators (M1-4) and organization status (X) on ultimate social outcomes (Y1-6) shown by 
pecked lines. Our prior study (Chapter 2) showed the moderation effect of ecological zone on the 






Statistically, this method is defined as moderated mediation (Wu & Zumbo, 2008) or conditional 
indirect effect (Hayes, 2013) of the organization status (X) on social outcomes (Y). This test addressed 
the second research question “is the effect of organization status on social outcomes mediated by the 
four serial mediators?”    
Figure 3.6 depicts a statistical path diagram of the same analysis where boxes represent our 
measured variables, and arrows point to predicted variables. Arrows pointing away from variables are 
the predictors or independent variables. The diagram also shows the direct effect (c’) of the organization 
status (X) on social outcome variables (Y1-6) while holding all the mediator variables constant. Further, 
the figure illustrates specific indirect effects21 of the organization status on the mediators and specific 
indirect effects of the mediator variables’ on social outcomes (b1, b2, b3, and b4) controlling the effects of 
the organization status (a1, a2, a3, and a4). In addition, the diagram shows specific indirect effects of 
mediators on one another (d21, d31, d32, d41, d42, and d43). All the coefficients quantify the effects of 
predictor variables on their respective criterions.   
                                                          
21






Figure 3.6.  A statistical path diagram shows organization status’ influence on ultimate 
social outcomes through serial multiple mediators : bold lines represent variable’s effect on 
other variables and arrows show the direction of the effect. Ecological zone moderates the combined 
effect of mediators (M1-4) and organization status (X) on ultimate social outcomes (Y1-6) shown by pecked 
lines. Our prior study showed the moderation effect of ecological zone on the presence of rules depicted 
in the graph.  
c’ the direct effect of organization status (X) on ultimate social outcome variables (Y) holding M1-4 
a1-a4 the specific indirect effects of organization status (X) on each of four mediators (M1, M2,M3, and 
M4). b1-b4 the specific indirect effects of each mediator on a social outcome variable (Y) holding a1-4  
d21 d31 d32 d41 d42 and d43 the specific indirect effects of each mediator on the subsequent mediator 
variable 
 
The model had five different pathways by which the organization status is proposed to influence 
social outcomes of the groups. These pathways are presented by arrows tracing every possible way from 
the predictor variable (X) to a criterion variable (all six Ys). Based on the statistical diagram, we 
constructed five multiple regression equations22 as follows: 
                                                          
22
 Number of equations necessary is determined as k+1 where k is a number of mediators. It also refers as number of pathways 





M1 =    + a1X +             (3.2) 
M2 =    + a2X + d21M1 +            (3.3) 
M3 =    + a3X + d32M2+ d31M1+           (3.4) 
M4 =    + a4X + d43M3 + d42M2+ d41M1 +          (3.5) 
Y1-6 =    + c’X + b1M1 + b2M2 + b3M3 + b4M4 + eY      (3.6) 
 
For the path analysis, we used PROCESS software of Hayes, (2013), which offered higher 
statistical power while releasing normality assumptions for the sampling distribution of indirect effects 
(p. 106). This was plausible for our data with unequal subsamples. PROCESS model for serial-multiple 
mediators tests the indirect effects using bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals23. We used 5,000 
bootstrap samples for the hypothesis testing. The PROCESS outputs provided estimates for the total 
effects, direct effects, and total indirect effects as well as specific indirect effects. The estimations of 
indirect effects were calculated by multiplying the regression weights corresponding to each step in an 
indirect pathway. In our analysis, we have a total of 15 indirect effects (Ind1-15) of X on Ys as follows:  
Ind1 = a1b1   - effect through M1 (X  Infodiv  Yi) 
Ind2 = a1d21b2   - effect through M1 and M2 (X  Infodiv, Lead  Yi) 
Ind3 = a1d31b3   - effect through M1 and M3 (X  Infodiv, KnowExch  Yi) 
Ind4 = a1d41b4   - effect through M1 and M4 (X  Infodiv, Rules  Yi) 
Ind5 = a1d21d32b3  - effect through M1 M2 and M3 (X  Infodiv, Lead, KnowExch  Yi) 
Ind6 = a1d21d42b4  - effect through M1 M2 and M4 (X  Infodiv, Lead, Rules  Yi) 
Ind7= a1d31d43b4  - effect through M1 M3 and M4 (X  Infodiv, KnowExch, Rules  Yi) 
Ind8 = a1d21d32d43b4  - effect through M1 M2 M3 M4 (X  Infodiv, Lead, KnowExch, Rules  Yi) 
Ind9 = a2b2   - effect through M2 (X Lead  Yi) 
                                                          
23
 In bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals, “the endpoints are adjusted as a function of the proportion of k 
values (bootstrap estimates) of ab* (indirect effect of X on Y through M) that are less than ab, the point estimate 
of the indirect effect calculated in the original data.  The adjustments are based on the skew of the distribution k 





Ind10 = a2d32b3   - effect through M2 and M3 (X  Lead, KnowExch  Yi) 
Ind11 = a2d42b4   - effect through M2 and M4 (X  Lead, Rules  Yi) 
Ind12 = a2d32d43b4  - effect through M2 M3 and M4 (X  Lead, KnowExch, Rules  Yi) 
Ind13 = a3b3   - effect through M3 (X KnowExch  Yi) 
Ind14 = a3d43b4   - effect through M3 and M4 (X KnowExch, Rules  Yi) 
Ind15 = a4b4   - effect through M4 (X Rules  Yi)   
PROCESS also provided outputs for statistical tests for contrasts between all specific indirect effects, 
which we used for the analyses. Total effect of X on Y was calculated using the following formula: 
 c = c’ + a1b1 + a1d21b2 + a1d31b3 + a1d41b4 + a1d21d32b3 + a1d21d42b4 + a1d31d43b4 + a1d21d32d43b4 + a2b2 + 
a2d32b3 + a2d42b4 + a2d32d43b4 + a3b3 + a3d43b4 + a4b4                   (3.7)  
where c’ is the direct effect of X on Y while holding constant all the mediators. Hence, the total effect is 
partitioned into the direct effect and the total indirect effect (the sum of all 15 specific indirect effects). 
We tested the total effect model of PROCESS, it was tested by regressing a dependent variable on 
organization status. In our model the regression equation was as follows: 
c = c’+a1b1 + a2b2 + a3b3 + a4b4                                                                                                                    (3.8) 
 
3.3.4.4. Testing the moderation effect of ecological zone. 
To test the moderation effect of ecological zone, we used PROCESS, which allows a formal test 
of the conditional indirect effect of organization status on social outcomes. We wanted to address the 
third research question if the indirect (mediated) effect of organization status on ultimate social 
outcomes was moderated (conditioned) by the location of groups in a particular ecological zone. As the 
PROCESS serial multiple mediators’ model did not have a simultaneous test for moderation, we had to 
run it separately for those variables with a significant mediation effect. This model treated four 





four times with each ecological zone as a dummy variable. The moderation test used the following 
equation: 
Y1-6 =    + c’X + b1M1 + b2M2 + b3M3 + b4M4 + b5V + b6M1V + b7M2V + b8M3V + b9M4V + eY              (3.9) 
 In addition to the interaction effect test, PROCESS provides coefficients for the conditional 
indirect effect of X on Y through mediators between different values of moderator (e.g. desert steppe=1 
versus non-desert steppe=0)(Hayes, 2013, p. 403).   
Finally, Figure 3.7 depicts a modified conceptual framework that reflected the established order 
of four serial mediators transferring the effect of organization status on social outcome variables. It also 
shows a possibility of such relationships being conditioned by ecological zone of the groups.   
 Figure 3.7. The modified conceptual framework of the study for the path analysis reflects 
the chain of four serial mediators that transfers the effect of organization status onto 
ultimate social outcomes. The figure also shows a possibility of this relationship being conditioned 






In the following subsections we describe the results to address the three research questions 
stated in the introduction section. First, we report on results to the question about associations 
between intermediate outcomes for deciding for mediation model in the prior section.  
The mediators significantly influenced one another except the relationship between leadership 
and the presence of rules as Figure 3.4 showed. Among these, information diversity had significantly 
larger effects on other three mediators: =.38 on leadership, .39 on rules and .29 on knowledge 
exchange. Leadership had a significant effect on two mediators: information diversity and knowledge 
exchange (both =.35, p<.01). Knowledge exchange had a significant positive effect on information 
diversity and leadership (=.25 and .34, p<.01 respectively) and a negative effect on rules (=-.19, 
p<.05). Rules significantly influenced information diversity (=.31, p<.01) but had a significant negative 
effect on knowledge exchange (=.-17, p<.05). We placed the proposed mediators in an ordered chain 
based on the presence of statistical effect and its magnitude (standardized coefficient value). The 
sequential order was also verified using information from reports of donor projects about their 
facilitation approaches (Schmidt et al., 2009; Undargaa et al., 2007).  Information diversity was defined 
as the first variable in the chain of information diversity  leadership  knowledge exchange  rules. 
 
1. Does the model of eight-predictors influence ultimate social outcomes of the groups? 
The results showed a significant model fit for all social outcome variables (Tables 3.4-3.5). The 
latter shows that the model explained larger variations for behavioral variables: R2 was larger for 
proactiveness (.53), traditional practices (.38) and innovative practices (.34). Twenty-two percent of the 
variation in cognitive social capital and 30% of structural social capital was attributed to the model. Only 
13% of the variation in household assets was explained by the model.
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 Table 3.4. Results of Multiple Regressions on Rangeland Practices and Behaviors Variables  
Variable name Traditional practices Innovative practices Proactiveness 


































* and ** significant at the p<.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
1
 B – unstandardized regression coefficient 
Table 3.5. Results of Multiple Regressions on Assets and Social Capital Variables  
Variable name Cognitive social capital Structural social capital Assets 


































* and ** significant at the p<.05 and 0.01 level respectively. 
1





More intermediate outcome variables influenced behavioral social outcomes. Five intermediate 
variables including leadership (.54), knowledge exchange (.43), income diversity (.25), information 
diversity (.12) and cooperation (.02) significantly influenced proactive behavior at p<.05. Information 
diversity and income sources significantly influenced innovative practices (.39 and .97 respectively) and 
traditional practices (.31 and.57) at p<.05. Ecological zone had a significant negative effect on traditional 
practices (-.28, p<.05). This implied that groups located in northern zones may use fewer traditional 
practices compared with groups in the southern zones.    
The level of cognitive social capital was significantly influenced by leadership (.31) and ecological 
zone (-.04) at p<.05.  Similarly, the group’s structural social capital was significantly affected by 
leadership (.63), ecological zone (-.16) and income diversity (-.14) at p<.05. The essential household 
assets were significantly influenced by information diversity (.28) and income sources (.20) at p<.05. 
Cooperation was found to be the least influential among the predictors: its coefficients were very small, 
and it significantly influenced only proactive behavior (.02 at p<.05). We therefore decided to exclude 
cooperation from the mediator model.    
Overall, the model of eight explanatory variables significantly influenced all six social outcome 
variables, where income diversity significantly influenced five ultimate social outcomes, information 
diversity four outcomes, and leadership and ecological zone affected three social outcomes each.   
 
2. Is the effect of organization status on social outcomes mediated by the four serial mediators? 
We note that the output of the mediation test in PROCESS provides two types of results. Table 
3.6 and 3.7 illustrates the first part where direct (c’ controlling mediators) and indirect effects (products 
of all possible combinations of ai, bi and di tracing paths shown in the statistical diagram in Figure 3.6) 
were quantified. In principal, these were the output of multiple regressions as we did before with an 





F values, but slightly lower variations attributed to the model (R2). The results confirmed the significant 
interdependence of mediators on one another and the directions of the effects as shown earlier in 
Figure 3.4. However, contrary to our expectations, specific indirect effect of organization status on 
leadership and knowledge exchange (a2 and a3) was not significant. Also, rules had a significant negative 
effect on cognitive social capital and assets (b4=-.15 and -.53 respectively at p<.05). We now move to the 
second Total effect part of the test results.  
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Table 3.6. Model Summary Information of Organization Status Influence on Traditional Rangeland Management Practices through Serial Multiple 
Mediators 
 Dependent variables 
Independent   M1 (Infodiv)  M2 (Lead)  M3 (KnowExch)  M4 (Rules)  Y1 (TradPract) 









































































































































 = .194 
F(1, 140) = 33.62, p<.01 
R
2
 = .286 
F(2, 139) = 27.90, p<.01 
R
2
 = .364 
F(3, 138) = 26.34, p<.01 
R
2
 = .272 
F(4, 137) = 12.81, p<.01 
R
2
 = .353 
F(5, 136) = 14.87, p<.01 
Note. c’ the direct effect of organization status (X) on ultimate social outcome variables (Y) holding M1-4. a1-a4 are the specific indirect effects of organization 
status (X) on each of four mediators (M1, M2,M3, and M4). b1-b4 are the specific indirect effects of each mediator on a social outcome variable (Y) holding a1-4. 
d21 d31 d32 d41 d42 and d43 are the specific indirect effects of each mediator on the subsequent mediator variable.   
a
 LCI stands for Lower Confidence interval for 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval. 
b
 UCI stands for Upper Confidence Interval for 95% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence interval. 






















Table 3.7. Model Summary Information of Organization Status Influence on Behavioral, Social Capital Variables and Assets through Serial 
Multiple Mediators 
    Dependent variables     
Independent 
variables 






























































































































 = .294 
F(5, 136) = 11.30, p<.01 
R
2
 = .516 
F(5, 136) = 28.94, p<.01 
R
2
 = .230 
F(5, 136) = 8.13, p<.01 
R
2
 = .277 
F(5, 132) = 10.10, p<.01 
R
2
 = .173 
F(5, 136) = 5.70, p<.01 
Note. c’ the direct effect of organization status (X) on ultimate social outcome variables (Y) holding M1-4. a1-a4 are the specific indirect effects of organization 
status (X) on each of four mediators (M1, M2,M3, and M4). b1-b4 are the specific indirect effects of each mediator on a social outcome variable (Y) holding a1-4. 
d21 d31 d32 d41 d42 and d43 are the specific indirect effects of each mediator on the subsequent mediator variable.   
a
 LCI stands for Lower Confidence interval for 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval. 
b
 UCI stands for Upper Confidence Interval for 95% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence interval. 








Table 3.8 shows a significant total indirect effect of organization status on traditional and innovative 
rangeland management practices and proactive behavior of members (c-c’=.72, .76 and .44 respectively 
at 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals). Table 3.9 indicates a significant indirect effect of 
organization status on structural social capital only (c-c’=.37 at 95% of CI). Accordingly, the total effect of 
organization status on these four ultimate social outcomes was significant (c=1.05, 1.21, .74 and .31 for 
traditional and innovative practices, proactive behavior and structural social capital respectively at 
p<.01). We note that only proactive behavior had a partial mediation (c’=.30 at p<.05) while the other 
three outcomes were fully mediated by the serial-mediators (i.e. no significant direct effect).   
The significant indirect effect on four ultimate outcomes was channeled through the 
information diversity path alone: B=.52 on traditional practices, .62 on innovative practices, .20 on 
proactive behavior and .45 on assets. Information diversity and leadership together transferred the 
effect of organization onto traditional practices (B=.16), proactiveness and structural social capital 
(B=.11 each) and cognitive social capital (B=.05) with 95% of bias-corrected CI. Other paths had fairly 
small indirect effects compared to these two. Figure 3.8 illustrates the two influential paths for the 
significant indirect effect of the organization status on four ultimate outcomes. A contrast test shown in 
Table 3.10, indicate a significantly greater specific indirect effect on traditional practices through 
information diversity compared to the path through information diversity with leadership.  However, 
their effect on proactive behavior had no statistically different contrast.  
135 
 
Table 3.8. Summary of Total and Specific Indirect Effects of Community Organization Status on Behavioral Variables through Serial Mediators 
 Dependent variables 
Paths  Y1 (TradPract) Y2 (InnoPract) Y3 (Proactive) 















Total indirect effect 
Specific indirect effects  
Ind1: through M1(Infodiv) 
Ind2: M1 and M2 (Infodiv, Lead,) 
Ind3: M1 and M3 (Infodiv, KnowExch) 
Ind4: M1 and M4 (Infodiv, Rules) 
Ind5: M1 M2 and M3 (Infodiv, Lead, KnowExch) 
Ind6: M1 M2 and M4 (Infodiv, Lead, Rules) 
Ind7: M1 M3 and M4 (Infodiv, KnowExch, Rules) 
Ind8:M1 M2 M3 M4 (Infodiv, Lead, KnowExch, Rules) 
Ind9: through M2 (Lead) 
Ind10: M2 and M3 (Lead, KnowExch) 
Ind11: M2 and M4 (Lead, Rules) 
Ind12: M2 M3 and M4 (Lead, KnowExch, Rules) 
Ind13: through M3 (KnowExch) 
Ind14: M3 and M4 (KnowExch, Rules) 
Ind15: through M4 (Rules) 














































































































































































































 = .097 
F(1, 140) = 15.06, p<.01 
R
2
 = .117 
F(1, 140) = 18.50, p<.01 
R
2
 = .198 
F(1, 140) = 34.64, p<.01 
Note. c’ the direct effect of organization status (X) on ultimate social outcome variables (Y) holding M1-4. a1-a4 are the specific indirect effects of organization 
status (X) on each of four mediators (M1, M2,M3, and M4). b1-b4 are the specific indirect effects of each mediator on a social outcome variable (Y) holding a1-4. 
d21 d31 d32 d41 d42 and d43 are the specific indirect effects of each mediator on the subsequent mediator variable.   
a
 LCI stands for Lower Confidence interval for 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval. 
b
 UCI stands for Upper Confidence Interval for 95% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence interval. 









Table 3.9.  Summary of Total and Specific Indirect Effects of Community Organization Status on Social Capital Variables through Serial Mediators 
  Dependent variables 
Paths  Y4 (CognSC) Y5 (StrucSC) Y6 (Assets) 















Total indirect effect 
Specific indirect effects  
Ind1: through M1(Infodiv) 
Ind2: M1 and M2 (Infodiv, Lead,) 
Ind3: M1 and M3 (Infodiv, KnowExch) 
Ind4: M1 and M4 (Infodiv, Rules) 
Ind5: M1 M2 and M3 (Infodiv, Lead, KnowExch) 
Ind6: M1 M2 and M4 (Infodiv, Lead, Rules) 
Ind7: M1 M3 and M4 (Infodiv, KnowExch, Rules) 
Ind8:M1 M2 M3 M4 (Infodiv, Lead, KnowExch, Rules) 
Ind9: through M2 (Lead) 
Ind10: M2 and M3 (Lead, KnowExch) 
Ind11: M2 and M4 (Lead, Rules) 
Ind12: M2 M3 and M4 (Lead, KnowExch, Rules) 
Ind13: through M3 (KnowExch) 
Ind14: M3 and M4 (KnowExch, Rules) 
Ind15: through M4 (Rules) 











































































































































































































 = .022 
F(1, 140) = 3.15, p<.01 
R
2
 = .035 
F(1, 136) = 4.90, p<.01 
R
2
 = .022 
F(1, 140) = 3.15, p=.05 
Note. c’ the direct effect of organization status (X) on ultimate social outcome variables (Y) holding M1-4. a1-a4 are the specific indirect effects of organization 
status (X) on each of four mediators (M1, M2,M3, and M4). b1-b4 are the specific indirect effects of each mediator on a social outcome variable (Y) holding a1-4. 
d21 d31 d32 d41 d42 and d43 are the specific indirect effects of each mediator on the subsequent mediator variable.   
a
 LCI stands for Lower Confidence interval for 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval. 
b
 UCI stands for Upper Confidence Interval for 95% bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence interval. 
* and ** unstandardized coefficient is significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.  
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3. Is mediated effect of organization status on four ultimate social outcomes moderated by ecological 
zone? 
 From the four ultimate social outcomes with the significant mediation effect of four mediators, 
two were significantly moderated by ecological zone of the groups. Figure 3.9 displays these significant 
moderation effects detected at p<.05. Desert steppe ecological zone had a significant positive 
moderation of the indirect effect of organization status on proactive behavior through agreed rules 
(B=1.19). However, steppe ecological zone had a significant negative moderation of the same indirect 
effect (B=-.60). Eastern steppe ecological zone also had a significant negative moderation of the indirect 










Figure 3.8. The first part shows total indirect effect of organization status on ultimate 
social outcomes through serial mediators. The second part depicts two most influential 
mediating paths transferring the effect of organization status onto four ultimate social 
outcomes. Dashed lines represent the path going through information diversity alone. Solid dark lines 










Figure 3.9. Significant conditional indirect effect of the organization status on two 
ultimate social outcomes through four mediators is shown by solid lines . Desert steppe had 
a significantly positive moderation (pecked line) of the indirect effect of the organization status on 
proactive behavior of members through rules. Eastern steppe and steppe zones had a negative 
conditional indirect effect (pecked line) on proactive behavior and structural social capital through 




The present study aimed to respond to four sub-questions to address the broad research inquiry 
of how and why formal organization increases social outcomes of CBRM groups. First, we wanted to 
define if formal organization, six intermediate variables and ecological zone can predict the level of 
social outcomes of pastoral groups. Secondly, we asked if intermediate outcomes were associated with 
one another. Next, we wanted to identify whether the positive relationship between the formal 
organization and ultimate social outcomes was mediated by intermediate outcomes. Lastly, we wanted 





In respect to the first question, the study confirmed that eight factors can predict the level of six 
ultimate social outcomes: both types of rangeland management practices, proactive behavior, two 
forms of social capital, and household assets. Predictive relationships were strongest for behavioral and 
practices variables and less strong for social capital and assets. Income diversity, access to information 
and leadership were the most influential predictors. 
Regarding the second inquiry, we found significant association between the intermediate 
variables, which had a sequential order. Information access was the triggering variable influencing local 
leadership, which in turn fostered knowledge exchange among the members, leading to setting rules for 
resource management. However, rules were negatively associated with leadership and knowledge 
exchange.  In respect to the third question, the results confirmed the mediation effect of four 
intermediate variables on the positive relationship between the organization status and ultimate social 
outcomes. However, the mediation effect was found only for proactive behavior, traditional and 
innovative practices, and structural social capital but not for cognitive social capital and household 
assets. The most influential paths to transfer the effect of organization status onto four ultimate social 
outcomes were through information diversity, and information diversity together with leadership.  
Lastly, ecological zone moderated the indirect effect of organization status on two ultimate 
social outcomes. In other words, the magnitude of the mediation effect of intermediate outcomes was 
dependent on ecological zone. Specifically, the desert ecological zone had a positive moderation effect 
on the path to proactive behavior through agreed rules. The steppe ecological zone had a negative 
moderation effect on the same path. We also found a negative moderation of the eastern steppe 
ecological zone on the path to structural social capital through leadership. These results mean that 
ecological zone influences the variability of the mediation effect on ultimate social outcomes. In the 
following paragraphs, we will provide more detailed discussions addressing the proposed conceptual 





Our results were consistent with prior findings that an increase in social outcomes related to 
behavior and rangeland management practices due to the formal organization was more solid (Chapter 
2). Fostering proactive behavior of members required most of the intermediate factors while increasing 
traditional and innovative rangeland practices and assets were related to better access to information 
and diversified income sources. Leadership played an important role in increasing social capital of 
pastoral groups. The level of both cognitive and structural social capital was dependent on a group’s 
ecological zone. Confirming our prior results, the desert steppe ecological zone had greater social capital 
including both cognitive and structural types. Similarly, ecological zone influenced traditional rangeland 
management. Among the intermediate variables, income diversity, access to information, and 
leadership had the greatest influence on ultimate social outcomes (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014; 
Fernández-Giménez et al., 2012).  
Contrary to theoretical predictions, rules had a consistent negative effect on most ultimate 
social outcomes except structural social capital, although the effect was not significant. This negative 
effect may indicate that rules were not devised by group members, causing their ineffectiveness. CPR 
theory and past research have highlighted the importance of resource users’ participation in designing  
and enforcing rules (Ostrom et al., 1994). The degree of ownership of the rules by resource users was 
considered to be the important factor for success of CBNRM (Measham & Lumbasi, 2013). Moreover, 
potentially negative content of the rules may pressure users, prevent their trust and create more 
conflicts. For instance, in the pastoral context of high variability of resource availability both spatially 
and temporally, rules encouraging exclusive access rights to the resources with clear boundaries have 
been shown to be inadequate (Cleaver, 2002; Dyson-Hudson & Smith, 1978; Hogg, 1992). Such 
exclusivity alters essential pastoral strategies of mobility and flexibility to accommodate forage 
variability across time and space (Turner, 2011). Research found that exclusive rules of the organized 





was consistent with our earlier findings (Chapter 2). Nevertheless, further study is necessary to examine 
the reasons for the negative influence of rules on social outcomes of the groups.  
The results of the path analysis showed that the increase in leadership and knowledge exchange 
of pastoral groups was not directly associated with the formal organization (Table 3.7) when other 
mediators were considered. Rather, these increases were related to influences of other mediators; 
information diversity for leadership, and both information diversity and leadership for knowledge 
exchange. Our prior results (Chapter 2) showed that the greater leadership in CBRM groups was only 
due to members’ report on the presence of a helpful organization in their soum. Hence, this result may 
show the general decrease in leadership in rural Mongolia. It could also indicate the ineffectiveness of 
facilitation approaches to foster greater leadership among pastoralists. Both leadership and knowledge 
exchange significantly reduced the presence of rules. Such result might indicate one of the two 
possibilities. For those with already strong leadership and knowledge exchange and informal norms 
make formal rules unnecessary and possibly counter-productive. Conversely, it could be the lack of 
support from local leaders and experienced herders to existing resource rules, possible for the reasons 
speculated earlier. Additionally, the facilitation approach may have been inappropriate to ensure active 
participation and commitment of the local leaders, who are the key stakeholder in the local resource 
management.  
The larger mediation effect on rangeland practices compared to proactive behavior and 
structural social capital provides important evidence that intermediate outcomes are more effective in 
encouraging both types of rangeland management practices than the other two outcomes. Further, the 
fact that the path through information diversity alone was more powerful than the path through 
information diversity together with leadership for these two types of rangeland practices is worth 
noting. It may imply that adequate education and training is the key for herders to revive proven 





significant total effect on cognitive social capital was consistent with the earlier finding of the weak 
difference in this measure between CBRM and non-CBRM members (Chapter 2). Nevertheless, we 
highlight the fact that the significant positive specific indirect effect on cognitive social capital was 
transferred by five different paths, although the magnitude of each indirect effect was very small. This 
may point to the emerging nature of social capital, as proposed in Chapter 2. In addition, it hints at the 
complexity of strengthening trust and norms of reciprocity among resource users. Strengthening social 
capital would require multiple of mediators, unlike rangeland practice outcomes. Significantly negative 
specific indirect effects of rules and information diversity and rules on cognitive social capital and assets 
were consistent with the results of the five-predictor regressions of the path analysis. Further study is 
needed to understand how rules were set and their content, in order to explain this negative 
relationship.   
   The desert steppe ecological zone had a positive moderation effect on the mediated effect of 
organization status on proactive behavior through agreed rules. This can be explained by the greater 
level of social capital among desert steppe group members, which in theory would make it easier for 
group members to agree upon rules that meet their needs. As suggested above, if members designed 
their own rules, there would be greater ownership and commitment to enforce them. Their experience 
of enforcing those rules could encourage them to bring issues to local authorities and suggest changes in 
current pasture coordination. In contrast, the negative moderation of the steppe ecological zone on the 
same indirect effect may indicate a lack of self-devised rules. Our prior results showed the high level of 
social capital, leadership, and knowledge exchange among the steppe groups that determined the level 
of proactive behavior. Hence, this moderation effect can be associated with rules only. The negative 
moderation effect of the eastern steppe ecological zone on structural social capital may be related to 






This study has several implications for theory, methods and practice. First, the results largely 
confirm the benefits of formal CBNRM organizations for achieving social outcomes, especially, reviving 
traditional practices, introducing adaptive innovations in rangeland management, encouraging proactive 
behavior and social networking of pastoralists (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014; Leisher et al., 2012). The 
lack of an effect on social capital and household assets indicate the complexity for achieving these 
outcomes. In the Mongolian pastoral context, all eight conceptually-grounded factors including formal 
organization, ecological zone and six intermediate variables, were important to attaining greater social 
outcomes. This study contributes to commons theory by identifying underlying mechanisms for the 
positive relationship between formal organization and improved social outcomes. It shows that without 
intermediate variables, formal organization alone is not sufficient to achieve social outcomes. 
Information and training are especially critical to fostering social outcomes of Mongolian pastoral 
institutions (Baival & Fernández-Giménez, 2012). We showed that information triggers an ordered chain 
of mediation by encouraging local leadership and fostering knowledge exchange among community 
members that prepares them for setting collective rules for resource management. Further, this study 
deepened our understanding of how resource characteristics shape commons institutions. The fact that 
two ecological zones had a different effect on the same mediation path implied “when” and “for whom” 
this effect works. Based on these findings, we propose that CBRM has produced mixed results in the 
past due to the lack of understanding among those facilitating CBRM about mediating factors for desired 
social outcomes, and underlying order between mediators. With the consistent results across our two 
studies, we suggest that social outcomes such as proactive behavior of individual members and their 
daily resource use practices are “fast” variables, which are “building blocks” for fostering trust and 
norms of reciprocity and social networking among members. These are at the heart of commons 





and kin relationships. We suspect that starting facilitation for rule setting when resource users are at the 
stage of strengthening weakened social capital can be premature. Without increased social capital, it is 
difficult to achieve more complex social and ecological outcomes such as improved livelihoods and 
better resource conditions. Hence, in the pastoral context, the pace of progress seems to be important. 
The groups under the study had an average five-year experience of collective action and could achieve 
outcomes related to daily rangeland practices and self-mobilization for contributing to rangeland 
matters. This implies that the process would require more time and experience for revitalizing trust 
among the resource users and strengthening reciprocal relationships.  
Several policy implications emerge from this study. First, facilitation efforts and policy incentives 
for CBRM development should prioritize information and training to herders first and foremost. In the 
absence of information and training (as shown by the case of the control groups), it will be difficult to 
achieve necessary levels of leadership and knowledge exchange to proceed with rule-setting 
arrangements for resource management. Second, self-organized groups need to achieve desired 
changes in members’ behavior and their rangeland practices first to build groups’ confidence then to 
foster subsequent goals of improving trust, strengthening norms of reciprocity, and social networking.  
Building commons institutions requires long-term persistent efforts to achieve improvements in 
livelihoods and resource conditions. In this regard, the current practice of five-year projects by most 
multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors in Mongolia may not be adequate strategy. Empirical assessments of 
self-governing commons institutions raised concerns over rigid logical framework planning and fixed 
timing of donor programs supporting local institutions (Corson, 2011). Given a genuine interest in the 
development of sustainable institutions for local resource management, donors may need to consider 
reviewing this short-timed funding approach for CBNRM initiatives.     
From a methodological perspective, the serial multiple mediators’ model of the path analysis 





(Hayes, 2013). Despite some limitations, PROCESS software was critical in terms of providing statistical 
power for the analyses with its bootstrapping procedures while releasing all normality requirements of 
parametric statistics.   
Finally, this study calls for further research to define potential influences of facilitation 
approaches on social outcomes of formally organized groups. For example, we recommend qualitative 
inquiry to elucidate why rules have a negative effect on social outcomes of pastoral groups, and why 
local leadership and consultation with experienced individuals negatively influence for the presence of 
rules. Lastly, a closer look at specific governance processes within community groups in different 






CHAPTER FOUR: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS THAT MATTER MOST FOR COMMUNITY-BASED RANGELAND 





 This study tested the applicability of institutional design principles for predicting social 
outcomes of evolving pastoral institutions in post-socialist Mongolia. We assumed increased social 
outcomes as an integral part of long-enduring commons institutions. We had two types of dependent 
social outcomes: intermediate and ultimate social outcomes. Intermediate outcomes were mediating 
factors for achieving ultimate social outcomes. Given the donor-driven nature of community-based 
rangeland management (CBRM) in Mongolia, we also examined the effect of donor facilitation on 
institutional design. We collected data from 77 CBRM groups and 392 member households in 18 soums 
(counties). We compared facilitation approaches of three external donors.  
We found that donor facilitation significantly influenced group attributes and the external 
environment of the CBRMs, but had no effect on institutional arrangements. The study confirmed that 
small size, homogeneous interests, and heterogeneity of well-being are important group characteristics 
that can predict higher levels of intermediate social outcomes including information diversity, 
leadership, and income diversity. Institutional arrangements such as the presence of sanctions, group-
devised rules, frequent meetings, and recording group documents increased cooperation, agreed rules, 
and information diversity. Similarly, access to training and local government support provided a 
favorable external environment for these intermediate outcomes.   
Group characteristics such as dependence on livestock, homogeneity of interests and leader 
legitimacy were critical for increasing social capital, livelihoods, desired rangeland practices, and 
proactive behavior of members. Among institutional arrangement variables, frequent meetings of 





donor assistance were associated with increased trust and norms of reciprocity, rangeland management 
practices, proactiveness, and livestock holdings. In summary, group attributes and external environment 




 Mixed outcomes of commons institutions have triggered greater scientific attention to what 
contributes to desirable results of local resource management regimes. The debate around “the drama 
of the commons” (NRC, 2002) has gained significance because of a growing belief in the potential of 
local communities and their institutions to manage natural resources (Agrawal & Gibson, 2001; Berkes, 
1989; North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). Many view commons institutions as more effective than the state 
and market regimes given appropriate conditions (Oba et al., 2000). Such a paradigm shift seriously 
challenges proponents of state-led or neo-liberal solutions to resource management (Demsetz, 1967). In 
addition, this perspective offers options for addressing the dilemmas of common pool resource (CPR) 
management framed as the tragedy of the commons, prisoner’s dilemma (Hardin, 1968), and problem 
of collective action (Olson, 1965).  
 Persistent scientific efforts on the topic inspired by Ostrom (1990) have resulted in a “well-
developed framework” (Agrawal, 2014, p. 89) of design principles for commons institutions and the 
institutional development process (Ostrom, 2008). After analyzing 91 cases that tested the framework, 
Cox et al. (2010) found it to be a viable basis for future research. However, the framework also has been 
criticized for being incomplete (Agrawal, 2001; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Schlager et al., 1994), rigid 
(Blaikie, 2006; Cleaver, 2000) and for placing too much emphasis on rules while not accounting for social 
complexity (Blaikie, 2006; Cleaver, 1999). The critics were also concerned about the possibility of the 





understood as a set of propositions or general features of successful commons management (Agrawal, 
2002). In response, Ostrom highlighted the importance of “matching the rules of a system to the 
underlying biophysical world and type of human community involved” (2008, p. 16).  
The institutional design framework has been used to assess the effectiveness of commons 
institutions managing a range of resource types in varying social-ecological settings. However, interest in 
testing the framework for pastoral institutions has been modest; only 7% of the 91 cases reviewed by 
Cox et al. was in the pastoral sector (2010, p. 7). Notwithstanding, recent years have seen growing 
enthusiasm of pastoral commons scholarship for using institutional design principles or some of the 
individual elements represented by  Turner (2011) Quinn et al. (2007), Beyene (2014), Akudugu (2013) 
Schnegg and Linke (2015) and Crewet (2015), among others. This study aims to contribute to this 
scientific endeavor by examining the theoretical framework in the context of Mongolian pastoral 
commons management.  
By examining the effectiveness of different rangeland institutions’ designs in post-socialist 
Mongolia, we intend to assist the current institutional development efforts towards sustainable 
management of rangeland resources (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014; Upton, 2011; Usukh et al., 2010). 
Institutional strengthening is imperative in the context of increasing vulnerability of and risks to pastoral 
communities precipitated by ongoing climate change (Dagvadorj et al., 2010; Nandintsetseg & Shinoda, 
2013) and the transition to a democracy and market economy in the early 1990s (Fernandez-Gimenez et 
al., 2014; Fernández-Giménez et al., 2012; Upton, 2012). Our focus was on the social outcomes of the 
pastoral institutions as an integral part of institutional success and sustainability. We defined social 
outcomes as any positive status in the social well-being of group members, including useful resource 
management practices, constructive behavior, improved social capital, and livelihoods. Using data from 
77 community-based rangeland management (CBRM) groups facilitated by external donors in three 





facilitation influence the institutional design of CBRMs in Mongolia?, and (2) which institutional design 
elements have the strongest influence on social outcomes for Mongolian pastoral groups?   
This study builds on the results of our prior research assessing social outcomes of CBRM in 
Mongolia. Findings of early analyses demonstrated that the externally supported CBRM groups had 
greater social outcomes compared to traditional neighborhood (non-CBRM) groups (see Chapter 2). 
These social outcomes included rangeland practices, behavior, and social capital with exceptions of 
livelihood measures for income and livestock of member households. We also found that the level of 
rules and cooperation of the desert steppe CBRM groups did not differ from adjacent traditional groups. 
Our examination of relationships between formal organization and social outcomes revealed that six 
intermediate outcomes including information diversity, leadership, knowledge exchange, cooperation, 
income diversity and the presence of agreed rules given ecological zones significantly influenced the 
ultimate social outcomes (see Chapter 3). The former four intermediate outcomes significantly mediated 
the effect of formal organization for increasing the levels of rangeland practices, constructive behavior, 
and social networking during emergencies. In other words, the increase in these ultimate social 
outcomes was associated with not only the group’s formal organization, but also four factors, which 
included information diversity, leadership, knowledge exchange, and rules. This study examines the 
effectiveness of various institutional design variables in achieving greater social outcomes of pastoral 
institutions.  
In the following sections, we explain the theoretical foundation of the study and its 
operationalization in the Mongolian pastoral context. Following the details of the research method, we 
report the results of the data analyses in the order reflected in the conceptual framework. The 
discussion section elaborates on the results with specifics to Mongolian pastoral social-ecological 
systems highlighting relevant historical and cultural aspects. The last section summarizes the theoretical, 





4.2. Conceptual Framework 
 Figure 4.1 illustrates a conceptual framework of this study. Guided by prior studies on 
Mongolian CBRM (Baival, 2012; Leisher et al., 2012; Usukh et al., 2010), we conceptualized that donor 
facilitation approaches influence Mongolian community-based institutions primarily in terms of group 
attributes, institutional arrangements for internal governance and rules, and their external relationships. 
In line with design principles theory and supporting empirical studies (Agrawal 2001, Cox et al, 2010, 
Ostrom, 1990), these sets of institutional design elements will influence both intermediate and ultimate 
social outcomes of pastoral groups. Originally, the design principles were identified as “facilitating 
conditions” (Wade, 1988) for “long-enduring” (Ostrom, 1990) or “sustainable” (Agrawal, 2002) 
commons institutions. As we consider favorable social outcomes to be an essential indicator of 
successful commons institutions, we assumed a positive association of design principles with social 
outcomes of resource user groups. 
In the following subsections, we will elaborate on theoretical constructs and their 
operationalization in the Mongolian pastoral context. First, we describe the origin of CBRM in Mongolia 
and existing types of CBRM groups as shaped by their respective donors. We then explain our selection 
of institutional design variables dictated by specifics of pastoral social-ecological systems in Mongolia. 
Finally, we define what constitutes social outcomes for Mongolian pastoral groups.      
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Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework depicts a primary influence of external facilitat ion on the institutional designs including 
group attributes, institutional arrangements and  groups’ external environment, which, in turn, affect both intermediate and 




4.2.1. Group types by donor facilitation. 
Pioneering projects of the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) in the late 1990s (Ministry of Nature and Environment, 2007; Schmidt, 
2006) implemented the first community-based management projects in Mongolia. The process of 
engaging herder communities in natural resource management was further expanded by other external 
donors, initially in response to a series of dzud24 (severe winters) that caused high livestock mortality 
from 1999 to 2001. These efforts gradually led to institution-building objectives for rangeland 
management that was substantially weakened by the transitional reforms such as the de-collectivization 
and livestock privatization. According to a UNDP (2006) herder group assessment, by 2006 there were 
14 programs facilitating over 2000 herder groups in 19 aimags (provinces) of Mongolia. This study 
sampled pastoral groups supported by four external donors: UNDP, New Zealand Nature Institute (NZNI 
implemented GTZ project), Swiss Development Agency (SDC) and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). 
Donors named the groups they supported differently. Groups under UNDP projects were herder groups, 
SDC’s groups were Pasture User Groups or PUGs, and groups assisted by NZNI named themselves 
nukhurluls (Schmidt et al., 2009). This study adopted these naming conventions. NZNI and WCS 
nukhurluls were classified together because former NZNI facilitators assisted in the formation of the first 
WCS groups by applying the same facilitation strategies (WCS, 2010) as they used for nukhurluls.   
From numerous donor reports, it is clear that facilitation strategies of the community-based 
projects were mostly shaped by experiences of the GTZ/NZNI program (MSRM, 2010; Schmidt et al., 
2009; UNDP, 2004). The GTZ/NZNI program started CBRM facilitation efforts in 1998, while others 
commenced later: UNDP in 2003, SDC in 2005, and WCS in 2006. Donors reported implementing a 
participatory, bottom-up approach where the project facilitated initial problem analysis and planning 
                                                          
24
 Dzud is a Mongolian term for severe winter conditions with extremely low temperatures (possibly combined 
with climatic events such as snow blizzard or storm) that prevent livestock accessing forage causing starvation and 





together with resource users (Leisher et al., 2012). The donors applied co-management methods by 
bringing together relevant stakeholders including local government, the Protected Area Administration 
Office, the Soum25 Buffer Zone Council or Soum Pasture Co-management Committee as well as other 
donors working in the same soum (NZNI-IPECON, 2006; UNDP, 2008). All donors proactively aligned 
project objectives with the agendas of the national government such as Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and various UN conventions (MSRM, 2010; UNDP, 2006). As a result, the projects had good 
liaisons with related officials at the ministerial and provincial offices, which linked their work with 
multiple levels of the government.  
    A major difference among the donors was their approach to CBRM membership. Groups 
established with assistance of UNDP and NZNI/WCS, had voluntary membership. Some households 
chose not to participate in CBRM group activities although they shared the same resources with CBRM 
members. Hence, this approach had limitations for improving rangeland condition as some resource 
users were not part of the rules for restraining access to resources. For this reason, SDC adopted a 
territory-based approach, where CBRM membership was mandatory for all households sharing the same 
resources (Usukh et al., 2010).  
Another difference between the donors was their capacity-building focus for resource 
management. For instance, donors of voluntary groups had biodiversity conservation objectives, which 
shaped their facilitation strategies (Schmidt, 2006; UNDP, 2008; WCS, 2010). In contrast, territory-based 
groups had support for sustainable rangeland management only. The different membership approach, 
conservation program focus and, possibly, other dissimilarities in facilitation not obvious to outsiders 
may have shaped institutional designs of CBRMs in Mongolia. This motivated us to test the effect of 
group types a.k.a. donor facilitation approach on institutional designs for formal groups. In addition, this 
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study also identifies which facilitation approach produced design elements favorable for successful 
commons institutions.   
 
4.2.2. Design principles for successful commons institutions. 
 A substantial number of studies contributed to the identification of enabling conditions or 
design elements for successful commons institutions (Agrawal, 2002; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Cox et al., 
2010; Ostrom, 1990; Pagdee et al., 2006; Thompson, 2013; Wade, 1988). From these, we applied 
variables suggested by Agrawal (2002), who critically reviewed prior recommendations and incorporated 
new variables addressing the existing criticism. We selectively chose variables from three sets of 
variables in the original list excluding the resource characteristics (Refer to Table 4.1). Theorized 
attributes of the resource system such as small size, well-defined boundaries, and predictability are not 
easily applicable to pastoral rangeland systems (Behnke et al., 1993; Ellis & Swift, 1988; Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2002; Fernandez-Gimenez & Le Febre, 2006; Niamir-Fuller & Turner, 1999). In other words, 
this model predicts unsuccessful outcomes for pastoral institutions lacking all these resource 
characteristics. In addition, our focus was on social outcomes rather than on overall institutional success 
including improved resource condition. Due to the comprehensive explanations of these variables by 




Table 4.1. “Critical Enabling Condition” Variables by Agrawal (2002) versus Measured Institutional Design Variables 
Theorized enabling conditions Institutional design variables Variable operationalization/Survey questions  
Group characteristics 
i. Small size  
ii. Clearly defined boundaries  
iii. Shared norms  
iv. Past successful experiences – social 
capital  
v. Appropriate leadership  
vi. Interdependence among group members  
vii. Heterogeneity of endowments, 
homogeneity of identities and interests  
 
 
viii. Low levels of poverty 
 
High levels of dependence on resource 
system 
i.  Group size  
 
 
iv. Group experience 
 
v.  Leaders’ legitimacy 
 
vii.a. Heterogeneity of well-
being 
vii.b. Homogeneity of interests 
 
viii. Poverty level 
 
Dependence on livestock  
 
Number of individual members 
 
 
Years members worked together as a group 
 
Level of acceptance and legitimacy of the leadership among 
the group members and members of broader community 
Diversity of four categories of subgroups within a group 
including wealthy, average, poor and very poor 
Members recognize the value of the group and share the 
same goals 
Number of poor, very poor, single-woman headed and no 
livestock households within a group 
Percentage of livestock income in total household income 
Institutional arrangements 
i. Rules are simple and easy to understand 
  
ii. Locally devised access and management 
rules  
 
iii. Ease in enforcement of rules  
 
iv. Graduated sanctions   
v. Availability of low cost adjudication  
i.a. Ease of rules 
i.b. Awareness of rules 
ii. Group-devised rules 
 
 
iii. Quality of rules 
 
iv. Presence of sanction 
 
Ease of rules for herders to understand 
Level of members awareness of the existing rules 
Origin of rules: devised by the group, rules identical to other 
groups, rules identical to other groups but substantially 
modified for group’s own condition 
Fairness of rules, rules respected by members, rules clear 
about punishment for violation, and flexible for emergencies  
Presence of punishments for violation of agreed rules coded 







Continued from Table 4.1 
“Critical Enabling Condition” Variables by Agrawal (2002) versus Measured Institutional Design Variables 








Frequency of group leaders’ meeting 
Frequency of members meeting 
Members’ attendance in group meetings 
Availability of records/documentation for examination by 
others 
Number of documents the group records/maintains 
External environment 
i Technology: a) low-cost exclusion 
technology; b) time for adaptation to 
new technologies related the commons 
ii Low levels of articulation with external 
markets 
iii Gradual change in articulation with 
external markets 
iv State: a) central governments should not 
undermine local authority; b) supportive 
external sanctioning institutions; c) 
appropriate levels of external aid to 
compensate local users for conservation 
v activities; d) nested levels of 









iv.a. Local government support 
  
iv.b. External cooperation 
 
iv.c. Ongoing donor support 
 
iv.d. Donor approach  





Ease of accessing market by group members, calculated 
using GIS spatial analyst tool that considers distance and 
slope as costs for travel between two points 
 
Group’s working relationship with local government, its input 
and influence in local rangeland polices 
Cooperation with other CBRMsa, scientific organizations, 
NGOs, and donors 
Recently received financial and technical assistance from the 
donor 
Voluntary membership versus territory-based membership  
Organization of knowledge exchange and learning events by 
the group 





We added internal governance-related variables into the set of institutional arrangements 
(Thompson, 2013). Frequency of group meetings indicates lively collective action, where members 
discuss their plans, implementation issues, and information exchange on emerging matters. Similarly, 
frequent meetings of leaders demonstrate their enthusiasm, organization, and commitment to group 
endeavors. Attending group meetings is a costly activity for pastoralists who are scattered long distances 
from each other, because it involves fuel costs to reach the meeting place, their time away from herding 
and other important household chores. Good meeting attendance despite these trade-offs 
demonstrates a strong interest of members in group undertakings and enthusiasm for active 
participation.  
In addition to these organizational events, it was important to assess the extent to which 
decisions and deliberations were recorded and the accessibility of these documents to others. Recording 
and safely storing meeting decisions and other important group information are challenging tasks for 
frequently moving pastoralists. Usually, a few better-educated members with secretarial duties maintain 
documentation and keep them safe. Keeping good records and communicating their contents to 
members shows a formal level of group organization. Likewise, ease of accessing these documents by 
anyone interested in the examination indicates the level of organizational transparency and internal 
democracy.     
 Reflecting specifics of CBRM in Mongolia, we added several variables to the set of the external 
environment variables. As explained above, international agencies played an essential role in shaping 
the external environment of CBRMs. Group cooperation with other local organizations/CBRMs, outside 
researchers and NGOs was determined by the donor’s ability to facilitate such relationships (NZNI-
IPECON, 2006; Upton, 2008). This facilitation often took place in the forms of training, workshops, and 
field activities in the project target areas. Donors covered all costs for bringing experts and materials to 





for knowledge exchange and learning involving all community members. Hence, access to training, 
important for the group’s social outcomes, was subject to external assistance. In addition, we added a 
categorical variable indicating a voluntary versus territory-based approach to membership. Lastly, we 
included an ongoing donor support variable to test a prevailing view that, when donor support ends, 
CBRM positive effect ceases (Leisher et al., 2012; Upton, 2012).     
To avoid the problem of “too many variables” (Agrawal, 2002), we conducted a thoughtful 
review of institutional design sets in relation to the study context. Several variables were considered 
constant for the Mongolian pastoral social-ecological systems. These included external variables such as 
population, state influence, and technology, which remained relatively uniform in rural areas for the 
recent decades. A peculiarity of the latter for the pastoral economy is that the harvest rate is not 
directly dependent on technology as it is the case for sectors such as forestry or fishing (Haller & 
Merten, 2008). Rather, possession of trucks, tractors, motorcycles, cell phones and satellite dishes for 
TV, increase members’ access to resources, and their mobility, storage and information exchange 
(Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014). Due to a strong influence of such technical advancement on local 
power relationships (Haller & Merten, 2008; Tenenberg, 2008), technology integration seems to be a 
more important group attribute for Mongolian pastoral institutions rather than the external 
environment as theorized. Regarding relationships between resource characteristics and group 
attributes, there is a clear overlap of pastoral communities’ location and their pastures (Fernandez-
Gimenez, 1999; Mearns, 1996a). We also considered shared norms (Baland & Platteau, 1996) for 
rangeland management as constant among Mongolian pastoralists. Fernandez-Gimenez (2000) 
highlighted roles of shared norms of reciprocity during the emergencies and avoiding out-of-season 
grazing of spring and winter pastures significant for pastoral commons institutions. Although there could 





are always present as part of the cultural identity of Mongolian nomads (Bazargur et al., 1989; Simukov, 
1934; Upton, 2005). 
 
4.2.3. Ultimate social outcomes. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, we selected three sets of ultimate social outcome variables. Most 
evaluations of CBNRM consider livelihood outcomes and changes in resource conditions as key 
measures of CBNRM success (Conley & Moote, 2003; Hibbard & Lurie, 2012; Plummer & Armitage, 
2007). Following our research objectives, we focused on social outcomes related to the socio-economic 
well-being of Mongolian pastoralists rather than rangeland condition. Consequently, livelihood, social 
capital and rangeland management practices, and behavior present the ultimate social outcomes of 
CBRM institutions in Mongolia.  
For Mongolian pastoralists, livestock is the primary asset that defines wealth and power 
(Murphy, 2014; Sneath, 1999). Access to technology and equipment is also important to household 
production.  Essential assets such as vehicles, tractors, cell phones, and TV increase production capacity 
and herders’ access to information, which is critical in vast sparsely populated areas. Possession of these 
assets, a viable number of livestock, and cash income determine the capability of rural herding 
communities to meet their subsistence needs and address risks under uncertain and variable 
environmental conditions (Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2011).  
Previous research suggests that community members engaged in cooperation under agreed 
rules for managing common resources were more likely to adopt ecologically-friendly practices and 
behaviors for resource use (Baival et al., 2011; Ostrom & Hess, 2010; Upton, 2008). We considered two 
existing forms of rangeland practices in Mongolia. Traditional practices include those activities inherited 
from millennia-long adaptation of the nomads to their lands (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2000), which are 





2005). Innovative practices brought by supporting donor agencies or government include fencing key 
resource areas, monitoring pasture condition, improved animal breeding, and growing forage plants. All 
of these incorporate technological developments that may be seen as “both a motor and a product of 
social change”(Sneath, 1999, p. 223). Additionally, individual members’ proactive behavior on issues 
related to resource management is important in the group’s collective action. Consequently, the more 
groups implement traditional and innovative rangeland management practices and show proactive 
behaviors, the better their natural resource and livelihood outcomes would be.  
Theoretical models of commons institutions emphasize how social capital variables such as 
trust, norms of reciprocity and group member’s social networks influence both livelihoods and resource 
conditions. These three dimensions (Putnam, 1993) interact with each other and facilitate social 
outcomes through collective action and democratic governance (Titeca & Vervisch, 2008) while reducing 
its transaction costs (Ostrom, 1990). We adopted Uphoff et al’s (2000) concept of cognitive and 
structural social capital and measured both types among the group members. Trust and norms of 
reciprocity together with other social values were defined as cognitive social capital specific to local 
(micro) individual level (Grootaert, 2002) “resulting from mental processes”, while, social networking 
was called structural social capital (Uphoff et al., 2000, p. 4). Structural social capital was further 
subcategorized as bonding (horizontal network of like-minded individuals with similar social status) and 
bridging (ties with actors from different social or cultural backgrounds) social capital (Putnam, 2000, p. 
22). For pastoralists, strong bonding and bridging social capital present essential risk management 
strategies important for overcoming both household-level risks and community-wide covariate hazards 






4.2.4. Intermediate social outcomes. 
The intermediate outcomes shown in Figure 4.1 include six variables: access to information, 
local leadership, opportunity for knowledge exchange, cooperation and income diversification and a 
presence of rules to constrain resource use. Studies assessing successes of the CBNRM argue that these 
intermediate variables play an important role in ultimate achievements of CBNRM (Measham & 
Lumbasi, 2013) (NACSO, 2008; USAID, 2009).   
Ostrom in her foundational work (1990) showed that the ability to obtain and exchange credible 
information is an important factor for collective action of local users. The same applies to Mongolian 
pastoral groups. In post-socialist Mongolia, abrupt transitional reforms resulted in limited access to 
information as well as lack of training, skills, and government services, which all contributed to rural 
vulnerability (Marin, 2008; UNDP, 2011). With the demise of state-sponsored institutions in the early 
1990s, Mongolian herders lost their regular access to mail and newspaper delivery, local libraries, 
cultural clubs and mobile cinema26. These items had previously played a significant role in their daily 
activities and education as a population that lived remotely across large geographic areas with limited 
transportation and communication (Rossabi, 2005; Sneath, 1999).  
The transition to the market system required herders selling their products and purchasing 
necessities on their own, while dealing with laborious herding tasks under highly uncertain 
environments. In addition, pastoralists lacked forums and discussions to share their issues and exchange 
ideas that would help them network with each other (Swift, 1995). Many externally-funded CBNRM 
programs targeted filling this gap (Upton, 2008; Usukh et al., 2010) by initiating information delivery and 
local forums in remote rural communities. 
 During the socialist era, the state cooperatives provided leadership in rangeland management 
including allocation of pasture, coordination and support for of seasonal movements, emergency 
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 In 1987 Mongolia had 455 cultural clubs, 498 mobile cinema projectors, and 404 libraries with at least one per 





assistance, training and education, marketing and social services (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001; Mearns, 
1996a; Rossabi, 2005). Most collective leaders were either experienced herders or professionals in 
livestock husbandry who had a strong knowledge of traditional practices and specifics of the local 
ecological conditions (Swift, 1995). However, a few recent studies reported deteriorating trust in local 
formal leaders and wealthier community members who demonstrated individualistic strategies under 
the new market settings (Murphy, 2014; Rossabi, 2005; Upton, 2008).  
Traditionally, Mongolian pastoralists cooperated regularly at different levels of rangeland 
institutions. At the neighborhood level, cooperation included coordinating use of pastures, hay areas, 
water sources, and salt licks, as well as labor sharing for nomadic movements, clearing pastures from 
snow, or searching for lost animals (Mearns, 1996b). Some authors noted revival of such traditional 
cooperation following decollectivization, which was weakened during the state cooperative times 
(Mearns, 1996a). Others noted some forms of new cooperation encouraged by technical assistance 
projects (Upton, 2008; Usukh et al., 2010) such as fencing key resource areas for protection, monitoring 
pasture condition, and planting vegetables.  
Overall, we expected that the direction of the effects of design variables on social outcomes 
would be positive as specified by Agrawal shown in the first column of Table 4.1. We also hypothesized 
that the higher the scores of governance variables, the greater the social outcomes would be. Based on 
the specifics of CBRM development in Mongolia, we anticipated a larger influence from the external 
environment on the groups’ social outcomes compared to group attributes and institutional 






4.3.1. Sampling design.  
Our unit of analysis was local rangeland user groups. Following a methodological guidance of the 
International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI), a user group is defined as a set of individuals 
who use and maintain rangelands within a specific geographic location for consumptive or non-
consumptive purposes (IFRI, 2013). Data of the study were collected from 77 purposively sampled 
formal groups in 18 soums, which had the support of the aforementioned technical assistance 
organizations. Geographically, these groups were located across four ecological zones of Mongolia as 
shown in Figure 4.2.  
Figure 4.2 Map of study sites showing three group types and their locations across four 
ecological zones  
 
In SDC-supported soums, the sampling was random as most of the soum herder households 





al., 2010). On the contrary, in soums with UNDP, NZNI and WCS projects, which had voluntary 
participation in the CBRM, we had smaller sampling frames with limitations for random selection.  
Figure 4.3 details the sample sizes, representativeness and survey instruments we used. Further 
division of 77 groups by donor types resulted in unequal samples of 36 herder groups, 33 PUGs, and 
eight nukhurluls. At the household level, samples varied from 3 to 7 families per formal group.  Overall, 
we had 202 member herder group households, 155 PUG households, and 35 nukhurlul households. 
We designed the research instruments on the basis of prior studies in Mongolia’s rangelands 
(Fernandez-Gimenez, 2001; Fernandez-Gimenez & Batbuyan, 2004; Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2012), 
applying the IFRI approach (IFRI, 2013). Household interviews were quantitative questionnaires 
measuring member household’s demographics, livelihood, rangeland management practices, norms and 
behaviors, and their social networks. At the group level, we conducted interviews with group leaders 
and focus groups of the members. Based on information from member household questionnaires, focus 
groups, and leader interviews, the study team synthesized an organizational profile survey for each 
community group. This organization profile contained the group’s general information, organizational 
management, and social relations.  
The instruments were originally developed in English and then translated into Mongolian for 
data collection purposes. Two teams of Mongolian social researchers collected data between April 2011 
and June 2012. The collected data were entered into two separate Microsoft Access databases, which 
were designed in the same format as respective survey instruments. For the data analysis, we 







Our choice of two different statistical tools, ANOVA and multiple regressions, dictated different 
roles of key variables. Dependent variables in ANOVA functioned as independent variables in the 
multiple regressions.  
 
4.3.2.1. Independent variables. 
In ANOVA tests, group type was the independent categorical variable including herder groups, 
PUGs and nukhurluls. In the multiple regressions, we had three sets of independent institutional design 
variables including group attributes, institutional arrangements, and external environment (Agrawal, 
2001). Descriptives of the variables are shown in Table 4.2. Skewness in the variables’ curves was used 
to evaluate the normality of data distribution, where the values between +1.0 and -1.0 were considered 







Figure 4.3. Sampling design and size, survey instruments used for the comparative study 
of formal groups (N=77) in Mongolia  
a
 Aimag is the largest administrative unit in Mongolia equivalent of province. 
b
 Soum is a rural district, the 
administrative unit below aimag. 
c
 CBRM stands for Community-based Rangeland Management refers to formally-
organized groups. 
d
 Groups supported by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
e
 Groups supported by 
Swiss Development Agency (SDC). 
f
 Groups supported by New Zealand Nature Institute (NZNI) and Wildlife 
Conservation Society (WSC).  
 
In the following paragraphs, we will describe each variable and explain mean values of some of them 





Group attributes comprised of seven measured variables. Group size was the number of 
individual members in a CBRM group with substantial variation due to large sizes of PUGs occasionally 
reaching 482 persons. Group experience was the number of years of group operation from its formation 
to the study year. Leader’s legitimacy was a categorical variable showing a degree of leader’s acceptance 
as perceived by group members including 1 (not accepted at all), 2 (accepted by the majority) 3 
(accepted by the minority) and 4 (openly accepted). Because it is a categorical variable, a mean of 3.3 for 
example, shows members’ evaluation of their leaders being accepted by a minority of the members and 
having little legitimacy. Heterogeneity of well-being was a proxy for measuring heterogeneity of 
endowments using normalized Blau’s index27 for assessing diversity as a maximum variety within the 
group members (Harrison & Klein, 2007).  
  
                                                          
27
 Blaus index was calculated using the equation: 1-pk
2
 where k=4 categories of perceived well-being: (1) better-





Table 4.2. Descriptives of Institutional Design Variables (N=77) 





Heterogeneity of well-being 
Homogeneity of interests 
Poverty level 




Ease of rules 
Awareness of rules 
Group-devised rules 
Quality of rules 









Access to training 
Local government support  
External cooperation 




# of individual members 
Years since formation 
1-none to 4-high 
0-no;  1-high 
0-no; 2-high 
% of vulnerable households 





0-no one; 5-everyone 
1-from outside; 3-self-devised 
0-very poor; 4-very good 
0-no sanction; 1-yes, sanction 
 
1-not regular; 8-weekly 
1-not regular; 8-weekly 
1-few; 3-almost all 
1-only officials; 5-public 
15 types of records 
 
 
0-no access; 3-very good 
0-no support; 3-good support 
1-no cooperation ; 3-high 
0-none; 2-financial/technical support 
1-voluntary, 2-territory-based 




























































































It ranged between 0 and 1, where 1 indicated the highest diversity. Homogeneity of interests 
was the mean of two items asking the presence of shared values and goals among members. Poverty 
level was the percentage of vulnerable members including households with perceived poor and very 
poor status and families with no livestock and single female heads. Dependence on livestock was a proxy 
for members’ dependence on rangeland resources calculated as a share of livestock income in the total 





Institutional arrangement variables had two sub-types: rule variables and governance variables, 
each comprising five measured variables. Ease of rules was coded on a 3-point scale of (difficult to 
understand), (can be understood), and (easy to understand). Rule awareness was measured at a 5-point 
scale of (no one knows), (a few people), (half the people), (almost everyone) and (everyone). An average 
score of awareness of rules (3.31) means that half of the members were aware of the rules. Group-
devised rules were coded as 1 (adopted from others), 2 (adopted from others but made substantial 
modification), and 3 (did not adopt from others). The mean for group-devised rules indicated that on 
average, group rules were identical to other CBRM rules, but had substantial modification to adjust to 
the groups’ specifics. Quality of rules measured members’ evaluation of rules fairness, acceptance, 
clarity for sanctions, and flexibility for emergencies. It was a sum of these four items. An average 
evaluation of members for quality of rules (2.96) was “good rules”. Presence of sanction measured the 
presence of enforceable punishments for rule breaking.   
Regarding governance variables, frequency of leaders’ meetings, and members’ meetings was 
assessed from 1 (not regularly scheduled) to 8 (once a week). Averages for the two variables (3.18 and 
3.41) show that these meetings mostly take place once a year. Meeting attendance was evaluated on a 
3-point scale of (few members), (about half the members), and (almost all members). Transparency was 
a categorical variable showing the degree to which group records were available to others, with codes 
from 1 (only available to organization officials) to 5 (available to general public). The mean value for 
transparency (4.33) was coded as “documents can be accessible only by members of the organization”. 
Documents records were a sum of eight types of organization records such as members’ profile, 
financial documents and meeting minutes, etc.        
We operationalized external environment variables using six measures. Access to training was a 
sum of three dichotomous items of groups’ reports about learning and knowledge exchange events they 





to external support of government or development organizations. Local government support was an 
average of five items asking groups’ working relationship with soum and aimag government, groups’ 
input in local policies of rangeland management and influence in policy changes. Items were coded as 0 
(insufficient information to evaluate), 1 (low/negative), 2 (medium/neutral), and 3 (high/positive). We 
reasoned that participation in and influence on local policies was possible only when the local 
government was supportive of such contributions. External cooperation was a sum of four reported 
items on groups’ cooperation with other local organizations and CBRM groups as well as external non-
governmental, scientific organizations and international agencies. The codes were the same as in the 
local government support variable. Ongoing support was a sum of two items of groups’ report on recent 
financial and technical assistance that they received from their donor. Donor approach was a categorical 
variable coded as 1 (voluntary approach) and 2 (territory-based approach).    
We calculated the market integration variable using a least cost path analysis within a 
geographical information system (GIS). For evaluating pastoral groups’ access to market, we considered 
the fact that Mongolia28 has underdeveloped roadways but active consumption of motor transport 
means including vehicles and motorcycles.29 In the study, more households reported selling their 
cashmere, a product with the highest commercial value, at aimag markets. Hence, we calculated the 
distance to market, adjusting for steepness of slopes30 in the terrain as distance to the aimag center. We 
made two assumptions. First, herders will go to the nearest aimag center, not necessarily to their 
administratively affiliated aimag. Second, the cheaper the travel in terms of time and distance to an 
aimag center, the higher the group’s market integration will be. We used Shuttle Radar Topography 
                                                          
28
 According to U.S. Central Intelligence Office’s World Factbook, in 2013, Mongolia ranked 78
th
 among 222 
countries in terms of its development of roadways with 90% of roads being unpaved (U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2014). 
29
 Data from the National Statistical Office shows that there is at least one motor vehicle per 20 residents in the 
study aimags (NSO, 2014). Moreover, 79% of the study households reported about their possession of a 
motorcycle.    
30
 We limited the slope steepness to be less than 35 degree which is feasible for travel by standard motorcycles or 





Mission (SRTM) data downloaded from the website of Consortium for Spatial Information of 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research or CGIAR-CSI with a resolution of 90 m x 90 m 
for each pixel. We assumed the average travel speed in rural Mongolia as 50 km per hour. We estimated 
the cost of moving across a pixel with a triple increase per each 10-degree rise in slope. Using these 
assumptions, we calculated speed for traveling across a flat terrain or no slope to be 6.48 
meters/second and 19.44 m/s for corresponding 10-degree increase in slope. We converted the 
calculated cost-distance to kilometers.     
       
4.3.2.2. Dependent variables. 
In ANOVA, all institutional design variables were dependent while there were two types of 
dependent variables in the multiple regressions: intermediate and ultimate social outcomes (Refer to 
Table 4.3). Intermediate outcome variables included information sources available to the members, 
perceptions about leadership, including community and local government leaders, knowledge exchange 
within and outside of the group, agreed rules for rangeland management among members, income 






Table 4.3. Descriptives of Social Outcome Variables (N=77) 
















Herd sizec,g   
 
Social capital:  
Cognitive social capitalc,i  







categorical; 3 typesa  
 
 
Mean of 5 types on a scale of 0-2 
Sum of 39 cooperation types 
Sum of 16 information sources 
Mean of 4 items on a scale of  0-2 
Sum of 17 income sources  




Sum of 15 household assets  
Per capita annual income in USD 
Per capita livestock number in SFUh 
 
 
Mean of 6 items  
Sum of 13 items  
 
 
Sum 16 traditional practices  
Sum of 19 innovative practices  






































































































 Group type included herder groups (1) supported by UNDP, Pasture User Groups or PUGs (2) supported by Swiss 
Development Agency, and nukhurluls facilitated by New Zealand Nature Institute and Wildlife Conservation 
Society. 
b
 Rules is a group level variable coded as 0 = No Rules, 1 = Traditional or Informal Rules. 
c 
These variables 
from household survey dataset were aggregated to the organization level by taking the mean value for the 
sampled households within each organization or neighborhood group. 
d 
Knowledge exchange items were coded as 
0 = None, 1 = Some (1-3 people) and 2 = Many (3< people). 
e
 Leadership items were coded as 0 = Disagree, 1 
=Neutral and 2 = Agree. 
f
 This winsorized variable trimmed 3% of the distribution at each end and replaced those 
values with -1,195 and 2,283, the next valid values at each side of the distribution to address extreme outliers 
(Vaske, 2008, p. 562). 
g 
This semi-winsorized variable trimmed the upper 3% of the distribution and replaced those 
values with 555, the next valid value in the distribution to address extreme outliers (ibid.). 
h
 Sheep Forage Unit is 
used to estimate forage use by different types of grazing and browsing animals. In Mongolia 1 camel is equivalent 
of 5 SFU, 1 horse is 7 SFU, 1 cattle – 6 SFU, 1 goat - 0.9 SFU. 
i
 Cognitive social capital items were reverse coded as 0 
= Agree, 1 = Neutral and 2 = Disagree. 
 
Three of the intermediate outcome variables were dichotomous and indicated the presence of 
cooperation, sources of information and income for member household. The cooperation had two 
types: a) traditional activities (16 items) that groups used to do from pre-collective and collective times 





note that these two forms of cooperation somewhat overlap with two rangeland management practices 
in terms of types because herders cooperate in these dominant rangeland practices. However, 
methodologically, these are two different variables measured separately; cooperation was measured at 
the group level while practices were measured at the member household level.        
 The remaining three intermediate variables had response scales: knowledge exchange assessed 
if the members have someone to consult and exchange ideas on essential topics of rangeland 
management. Leadership measured the presence of legitimate local leaders. Lastly, agreed rules 
indicated the presence of rules for five regulation areas including grazing time, livestock number, and 
species, use of wells and hay fields.   
Ultimate social outcomes comprised of three main variables: livelihood, social capital and 
rangeland practices and member’s behaviors. We measured livelihood using three variables: possession 
of essential household assets, annual per capita net cash income in USD31 and livestock number per 
household member (aka. per capita) in sheep forage unit32. Cognitive social capital measured the level of 
trust and norms of reciprocity among members. Structural social capital indicated the presence of 
bonding and bridging social ties of the members. Behaviors and practices included reports of traditional 
and innovative rangeland management practices.  Proactiveness was measured using members’ 
responses on their actions and initiatives related to local rangeland issues.   
 We calculated six of eight ultimate outcome variables from the household dataset. We 
aggregated household variables to the organization level by taking the mean value for the sampled 
households within each organization.   
                                                          
31
 Cash values were converted to USD for two reasons: a) to reduce decimal numbers in MNT (Mongolian tugrik at 
the exchange rate of 1USD=1712 as of January 2014) and b) to ease reader’s understanding of the values by 
expressing them in a more commonly used currency than MNT. 
32
 Sheep Forage Unit is used to estimate forage use by different types of grazing and browsing animals. In Mongolia 





The survey response rate was complete for most of the variables (N=77) except two missing 
cases in ultimate social outcomes. Table 4.3 displayed value ranges of the variables to give an idea of the 
location of the group mean for a particular variable along the existing interval. Reliability tests for the 
scale variables were performed to verify the internal consistency of items as shown in Table 4.4.  As 
shown in Table 4.2, three variables including group size, poverty level, and transparency were fairly 
skewed. For the multiple regressions, we standardized institutional design variables due to the skewness 
detected as well as differences in scales and units.   
  
4.3.3. Analysis. 
We used ANOVA to answer the first research question “Does group type or donor facilitation 
influence design of CBRMs in Mongolia?” Our goal was to identify the most effective facilitation type 
thus there were no specific predictions. For multiple comparisons of outcomes between the group 
types, we used the Games-Howell procedure, known to be the most robust for non-orthogonal and 
simultaneous tests for unequal samples with unequal variances like ours, to control family-wise error 
rates (Hilton & Armstrong, 2006; Toothaker, 1993). We also tested strength of the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables (effect size) for assessing practical significance of a statistical 
difference (Vaske, 2002). We chose eta squared as a measure of effect size suitable for comparisons of 
more than two sets of observations within a single study (Lakens, 2013).   
Next, we tested items of institutional design variables that had a statistically significant 
difference among the group types. Such item analyses helped to define where the differences between 
the types occur, which greatly facilitated interpretation of the results. Among  several variables with 
statistical differences, we prioritized those with larger effect sizes or greater magnitude of effects 
(Lakens, 2013; Vaske, 2008). Considering a small sample size of nukhurluls (n=8), we set p-value at .10 






Table 4.4. Descriptives and Reliability of Items in Index Variables for Community-Based Rangeland 
Management (CBRM) Groups (N=77) 
 














Knowledge exchangeb:  
Livestock health, reproduction, and nutrition 
Livestock marketing  
Pasture rotation and resting 
Disaster preparedness and risk management 
 
Cognitive social capitalc: 
People always try to help each other  
People help each other in times of need 
Most people are trustworthy 
People mainly look out for themselvesd 
People will take advantage of othersd 
Our community is getting less friendlyd 
 
Leadershipc: 
My community has good informal leaders 
My community has some knowledgeable and 
respected people 
I know helpful organizations in my soum 




Rules exist to regulate the timing of grazing  
Rules exist to regulate the number of livestock  
Rules exist to regulate the type of livestock  
Rules exist to regulate use of hay areas 









































































































































 Cell entries show sample sizes from two datasets: household survey (N=382) and organization profile survey 
(N=77). 
b
 Items were coded as follows: 0 = none,  1 = some (1-3 people), and 2 = many (3< people). 
c
 Items were 
coded as 0 “disagree,” 1 “neutral,” and 2 “agree.” 
d
 Items were reverse coded as 0 “agree,” 1 “neutral,” and 2 
“disagree.” 
e
 Items were coded as 0 “no rules,” 1 “traditional or informal rules,” and 2 “formal agreed rules.” 
f
 
Cronbach alpha is a coefficient of reliability showing consistency among items within an index variable, where 
score greater than .65 is desirable (Vaske, 2008). 
 
We used multiple regressions to answer the second research question “Which institutional 
design elements are more influential in achieving greater social outcomes for Mongolian pastoral 





social outcomes. The test was exploratory without clear direction of the effect. We used the following 
equations:  
Y1-6  = iY + b1(X1) + b2(X2) + b3(X3) + b4(X4) + b5(X5) + b6(X6) +b7(X7) + Y    (4.1) 
where: 
Y1-6 = six intermediate social outcome variables 
iY = the intercept  
b1-5= standardized coefficients for X1-5 
X1-5= five group attributes variables  
Y1-6  = iY + b1(X1) + b2(X2) + b3(X3) + b4(X4) + b5(X5) + b6(X6) +b7(X7) + b8(X8) + b9(X9) +b10(X10) + Y (4.2) 
where: 
Y1-6 = six intermediate social outcome variables 
iY = the intercept  
b1-10= standardized coefficient for X1-10 
X1-10= ten institutional arrangement variables 
Y1-6  = iY + b1(X1) + b2(X2) + b3(X3) + b4(X4) + b5(X5) + b6(X6) +b7(X7) + Y    (4.3) 
where: 
Y1-6 = six intermediate social outcome variables 
iY = the intercept  
b1-5= standardized coefficients for X1-5 
X1-5= five external environment variables  
For ultimate social outcomes we used the same equations except number of dependent 






 First, we will present results of ANOVA tests comparing three group types a.k.a. donor 
facilitation by institutional design variables. Next, we will report the results of the multiple regressions 
by three sets of independent institutional design variables: group attributes, institutional arrangements 
and external environment. We will begin with the description of the effects on intermediate social 
outcomes, followed by the ultimate social outcomes.  
 
4.4.1. Effect of group type on institutional design 
4.4.1.1. Group type effects on group attributes. 
We found a significant difference in four group attribute variables among the group types (Table 
4.5). As expected, PUGs had a significantly larger group size, with an average of 154 members per group 
(F=21.32, p<.01). Herder groups and nukhurluls had almost three times smaller group size than PUGs 
having an average of 44 and 55 members, respectively. On average, PUGs had three years of group 
experience, which was significantly less than herder groups’ and nukhurluls’ ( 5 and 9 years respectively) 
experience (F=16.07, p<.01). We found that herder groups were significantly less diverse ( ̅= =.40) in 
terms of members’ well-being than PUGs ( ̅=.58, F=6.44, p<.01). Herder group members had higher 
homogeneity of interests and values than that of PUG members ( ̅=1.75 and  ̅=1.49, F=5.21, p<.01). 
Among these significant differences, group size, and experience had large effect sizes (η2 = .38 and .30 
respectively, both large33).  
 
                                                          
33 Eta squared is the proportion of variation in Y that is associated with membership of the different groups 
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4.4.1.2. Group type effects on institutional arrangements. 
Internal institutional arrangements did not differ by group types except recording of groups’ 
documents (refer to Table 4.5.) On average, PUGs and nukhurluls maintained records of 9 documents 
while herder groups had 6 records (F=7.60, p<.01). This difference had a large effect size (.18).  
 
4.4.1.3. Group type effects on external environment. 
Table 4.5 shows that the group types significantly differed in their access to training, ongoing 
donor support and level of market integration. Herder groups’ average score of 2.39 in access to training 
was significantly greater than PUG’s average of 1.55 (F=5.61, p<.01). PUG members reported a 
significantly higher score of available technical and financial support (1.07) compared to members of 
herder groups (.44, F=5.34, p<.01). Herder groups had significantly greater market integration with less 
expensive travel costs (on average, 82 km) as compared to PUG members (average of 137 km, F=11.79, 
p<.01).  These differences had medium to large effect sizes: access to training and market integration 
had .13 or medium, while ongoing donor support had .14 or larger.    
180 
 
Table 4.5. Results of Comparisons of Institutional Design Variables by Group Types: Herder Groups (n=36), Pasture User Groups (PUGs, n=36) and 
Nukhurluls (n=8)  
Institutional design variables 
Sample Herder groupsa PUGsb Nukhurlulsc 
F η2e 











s Group size 
Group experience 
Leaders’ legitimacyd 
Heterogeneity of well-being 
Homogeneity of interests 
Poverty level 






















































































 Ease of rules 
Awareness of rules 
Group-devised rules 
Quality of rules 























































































































Access to training 
Local government support  
External cooperation 





















































 Groups supported by the United Nations Development Programme, 
b
 Pasture User Groups supported by the Swiss Development Agency, 
c
 Groups supported 
by the New Zealand Nature Institute and Wildlife Conservation Society, 
d
 Variable was coded as follows: 1 = Not accepted at all, 2 = Little acceptance, 3 = 
Majority acceptance,  4 = Openly accepted. 
e
 Eta squared is the proportion of variation in Y that is associated with membership of the different groups defined 




=.06) and large (η
2
=.14) (Cohen, 1988). 




 Table 4.6 displays the results of comparative tests for items of index variables that significantly 
differed across group types. The results revealed that 75% of herder group members had access to 
formal knowledge exchange events compared to 33% of PUG member’ (F=6.92, p<.01). We found the 
statistical difference in heterogeneity of well-being because of the difference in average income groups 
between PUGs and nukhurluls (46% vs. 73% respectively, F=4.37, p<.05). In other words, nukhurluls had 
greater number of average income households, while PUG’s average income group was not large. 
Significantly greater percentage of PUG members stated the presence of financial (48%) and technical 
(62%) support of their donor compared to the percentage of herder groups reporting on this (19%, 
F=3.63 and 27%, F=4.22 respectively at p<.05).    
 A significantly higher percentage of PUG members reported the presence of seven different 
types of organizational records their group maintained as compared to herder group members. These 
included documents on loan repayment (94% vs. 39%, F=15.41, p<.01), loans taken (91% vs. 38%, 
F=13.80, p<.01), loans given (94% vs. 45%, F=12.96, p<.01), conflicts (30% vs. 0%, F=8.34, p<.01) and 
organization income/expenditure (79% vs. 44%, F=5.39, p<.01).  Nukhurluls also reported good record of 
their activities, particularly, all nukhurluls’ report on documentation of various contributions was 







Table 4. 6. Comparison of Items of Four Institutional Design Variables with Significant Differences among 
Group Types (N=77) 
Group types 
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Proportion of wealthy households 
Proportion of average households 
Proportion of poor households 
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Records of contributions 
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Harvested hay and fodder 
Distributed hay and fodder 
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 Groups supported by the United Nations Development Programme, 
b
 Pasture User Groups supported by the 
Swiss Development Agency, 
c
 Groups supported by the New Zealand Nature Institute and Wildlife Conservation 
Society, 
d-p
 Means in the same row that share the same superscripts differ at p<.01 in the Games-Howell multiple 
comparison test. 
q
 Eta squared is the proportion of variation in Y that is associated with membership of the 




=.06) and large 
(η
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=.14) (Cohen, 1988). 
 *, ** and *** significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively 





4.4.2. Effect of institutional design on social outcomes.  
4.4.2.1.1. Effect of group attributes on intermediate social outcomes. 
Group attributes had significant positive effects on all intermediate outcomes while three 
individual elements negatively influenced three outcomes (Table 4.7). Group attributes explained larger 
variations in cooperation (R2=.30, F=3.40, p<.01), knowledge exchange (R2=.29, F=3.39, p<.01) and 
income diversity (R2=.24, F=2.59, p<.05). Among the group attributes, homogeneity of interests, group 
size, and experience significantly influenced three to four intermediate outcomes. Homogeneity of 
interests increased the levels of information diversity (=.35), leadership (=.36) and cooperation 
(=.29) and rules (=.23). Group size increased rules (=.38) and cooperation (=.21) but decreased 
income diversity (=-.33). Group experience positively influenced income diversity (=.24, p<.10), but 
reduced knowledge exchange and leadership (=-.42 and -.22 respectively).  
Four group attributes were important for cooperation: group size, leader’s legitimacy, 
heterogeneity of well-being and homogeneity of interests. Group experience (=-.45) and heterogeneity 
of well-being (=-.42) had a negative effect on knowledge exchange. Only leader’s legitimacy increased 
the level of knowledge exchange (=.26, p<.05). 
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Table 4.7. Results of Multiple Regressions of Institutional Design Variables on Intermediate Social Outcomes 
Dependent variables 
Independent variables 











Heterogeneity of well-being 
Homogeneity of interests 
Poverty level 
Dependence on livestock  
























































Ease of rules 
Awareness of rules 
Group-devised rules 
Quality of rules 
















































































Access to training 
Local government support 
External cooperation 
Ongoing donor support 
Donor approach 
Market integration 

















































*, ** and *** significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively 
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4.4.2.1.2. Effect of institutional arrangements on intermediate social outcomes. 
Institutional arrangement variables were less influential on intermediate outcomes than group 
attributes (Table 4.7). We found a significant effect of these variables on only three intermediate 
outcomes: rules (R2=.54, F=5.03, p<.01), cooperation (R2=.43, F=3.25, p<.05) and information diversity 
(R2=.31, F=1.89, p<.10). Among institutional arrangements, presence of sanctions had a significant 
positive effect on three intermediate outcomes, rules (=.30, p<.05), cooperation (=.45, p<.01) and 
information diversity (=.32, p<.10). Document records greatly increased rules (=.43) and cooperation 
(=.42) at p<.01. Group-devised rules improved leadership (=.26, p<.10) and income diversity (=.39, 
p<.05). Leader meeting frequency increased cooperation (=.32, p<.10) and information diversity (=.38, 
p<.10). We found a significant negative effect of institutional arrangements on four intermediate 
outcomes. Surprisingly, more frequent member meetings reduced information diversity (=-.40), and 
attendance at these meetings had a negative association with the presence of rules (=-.33) at p<.05. 
Good transparency negatively affected cooperation (=-.30, p<.10). Easy rules reduced income diversity 
(=-.29, p<.05).    
The model strongly influenced cooperation with significant influences of four variables. 
Presence of sanctions, leaders’ meeting frequency, and document records positively affected 
cooperation and negatively influenced cooperation. Presence of sanctions and document records 
positively influenced rules while meeting attendance reduced rules. Leader meeting frequency, 
presence of sanctions and ease of rules had a positive influence on information diversity.  
  
4.4.2.1.3. Effect of external environment on intermediate social outcomes. 
The external environment significantly influenced four intermediate outcomes (Table 4.7). 
External environment explained larger variations in rules (R2=.36, F=5.59, p<.01), information diversity 





local government support were most influential in increasing levels of three intermediate outcomes 
each. The training had a positive effect on rules (=.46, p<.01), cooperation (=.42, p<.01) and 
information diversity (=.25, p<.10). Support of local government was essential for leadership (=.37, 
p<.01) and knowledge exchange (=.31, p<.05). We found a positive effect of ongoing donor support on 
rules only (=.37, p<.01) contrary to our expectations. External cooperation had a negative influence on 
the rules (=-.29, p<.05). For rules, favorable external environment included access to training and 
ongoing donor support.  
 
4.4.2.2.1. Effect of group attributes on ultimate social outcomes. 
Group attributes significantly affected most ultimate social outcomes except structural social 
capital (Table 4.8). Group attributes explained the most variation in cognitive social capital (R2=.40, 
F=5.44, p<.01), herd size (R2=.31, F=3.73, p<.01) and proactive behavior (R2=.23, F=2.48, p<.05). Three 
design elements were more influential; dependence on livestock significantly influenced six outcomes, 
homogeneity of interests and leaders’ legitimacy influenced four ultimate outcomes each. Essentially, 
dependence on livestock had a positive effect on herd size (=.33), assets (=.33) innovative and 
traditional practices (=.28 and .26), and cash income (=.27) at p<.05. However, it decreased the level 
of trust and the norms of reciprocity (=-.32, p<.05). Homogeneity of interests increased both types of 
social capital: cognitive (=.39, p<.01) and structural (=.32, p<.05) and proactiveness (=.24, p<.10), but 
negatively influenced herd size (=-.24, p<.10). Leaders’ legitimacy increased the levels of traditional 
practices (=.36, p<.01), proactiveness (=.32, p<.05), herd size (=.22, p<.10) and cognitive social 
capital (=.19, p<.10). 
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Local government support 
External cooperation 
Ongoing donor support 
Donor approach 
Market integration 
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.25/3.22*** 
*, ** and *** significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. 
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Five group attributes were important for cognitive social capital: homogeneity of interests and 
leader’s legitimacy increased it while heterogeneity of well-being (=-.30, p<.05), poverty (=-.24, p<.05) 
and dependence on livestock (=-.36, p<.01) reduced trust and norms of reciprocity. Similarly, four 
group attributes influenced livestock number: dependence on livestock and leader’s legitimacy 
increased its level while homogeneity of interests and group experience (=-.24 and -.26, p<.05) 
decreased it. Apparently, group size reduced the level of assets (=-.33, p<.05) and innovative practices 
(=-.23, p<.10).  
 
4.4.2.2.2. Effect of institutional arrangements on ultimate social outcomes. 
Table 4.8 shows that the model had a significant fit for only two ultimate social outcomes: 
structural social capital (R2=.30, F=1.79, p<.10) and innovative rangeland practices (R2=.36, F=2.38, 
p<.05). Six institutional arrangement variables influenced innovative practices. Presence of sanction and 
leaders’ meeting (=.44 and .40 respectively, p<.05) and ease of rules (=.40, p<.01) were favorable. 
However, quality of rules (=-.44), members’ meeting (=-.37) and transparency (=-.33) had a negative 
effect on innovation at p<.05. Leaders’ meeting (=.42) and group-devised rules (=.35) had a positive 
effect on structural social capital. Among institutional arrangements, the leaders’ meeting was the most 
influential variable increasing the levels of assets (=.47, p<.05), structural social capital, traditional 
(=.41, p<.10) and innovative rangeland practices, and proactive behavior (=.39, p<.10). Interestingly, 
institutional arrangement variables had a mixed effect on innovative rangeland practices while they 
positively influenced structural social capital. 
    
4.4.2.2.3. Effect of external environment on ultimate social outcomes. 
External environment significantly influenced four ultimate social outcomes and had no effect 





explained more variations in cognitive social capital (R2=.27, F=3.60, p<.10), innovative practices (R2=.29, 
F=4.06, p<.01) and proactiveness (R2=.25, F=3.22, p<.01). Among external environment elements, local 
government support was the most influential with a positive effect on four ultimate outcomes: cognitive 
social capital (=.41, p<.01), proactiveness (=.36, p<.01), traditional practices (=.28, p<.05). For 
innovative rangeland practices, ongoing donor support was favorable (=.25, p<.10) while donor 




 4.5.1. Donor facilitation influenced group attributes and their external environment.  
Group type or donor facilitation was important for shaping group attributes and the external 
environment of Mongolian CBRMs. However, it did not influence institutional arrangement sets. A 
prevailing dichotomy was shown between herder groups and PUGs in overall design. Herder groups had 
more of the attributes theorized to promote successful outcomes in commons institutions, such as 
smaller size, longer experience working together, and homogenous interests of the members. Herder 
groups also had greater access to training and markets. On the other hand, PUGs had three features 
predicted to be advantageous to group outcomes: heterogeneity of well-being, maintaining good 
documentation and available external assistance. We note that PUG formal records were mostly 
financial in nature while documents related to resource use were few.  
 Regarding influence on intermediate outcomes, the study confirmed that small size, group 
experience, and homogeneous interests are important group characteristics that predict levels of 
intermediate outcomes. Aligning with theory, institutional arrangements such as the presence of 
sanctions, group-devised rules, frequent leader meetings, and document records increased cooperation, 





provided a favorable external environment for these three intermediate outcomes, as well as 
leadership.   
For ultimate social outcomes, group characteristics such as dependence on livestock, 
homogeneity of interests and leader legitimacy were critical for increasing social capital, livelihood, 
rangeland practices and proactive behavior of members. From institutional arrangement variables, 
leader meeting frequency was the most influential for ultimate social outcomes. Local government 
support and ongoing donor support increased trust and norms of reciprocity, rangeland management 
practices, pro-activeness, and herd size.  
In terms of the second research question about influential design elements, group attributes 
and external environment sets were more influential determinants of social outcomes of pastoral 
CBRMs in Mongolia than institutional arrangement sets. Along with these theoretically supported 
outcomes, we found contradictory results as summarized in Table 4.9. We suspect that most of these 
negative influences could be associated with group size (Agrawal, 2002; Ostrom, 1990).  
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Table 4.9. Summary of Negative Relationships Potentially due to the Group Size 
Institutional design 
variable with a 
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We now move to detailed discussions of the results that address the second research question, 
“which institutional design elements have the greatest influence on social outcomes for Mongolian 
pastoral groups?” The first three sections will underline influences of each of the three sets of 
institutional design variables on intermediate outcomes. The remaining sections will summarize effects 
on ultimate social outcomes. Table 4.10 provides a summary of more influential institutional design 







4.5.2. Group attributes had mixed effect on intermediate social outcomes 
The set of seven group attribute variables significantly increased the levels of three intermediate 
social outcomes; cooperation, information diversity and rules. However, attributes such as small size, 
heterogeneity of well-being, and group experience had a negative influence on knowledge exchange, 
income diversity, and leadership. From the prior results, it is intuitive that the larger the group size, the 
less frequent to interact with each other and more difficult to communicate in the Mongolian pastoral 
setting. In terms of the negative effect of heterogeneity of well-being, it is possible that the more the 
groups are economically diverse, the more dissimilar their areas of interests, which may prevent 
knowledge exchange. Lastly, when members become more experienced working together, they do not 
require frequent consultation with each other unless some unexpected issues arise.  
 Among the group attributes, homogeneity of interests and group size had the strongest positive 
influence on cooperation and rules. We reported that herder groups had more favorable group designs 
as predicted. Hence, it is possible to conclude that the facilitation of herder groups was more effective in 
terms of achieving greater cooperation, information access, and rules.   
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 Table 4.10. More Influential Institutional Design Elements for Social Outcomes of Community-Based Rangeland Management Groups in 
Mongolia 
 Favorable institutional 
design variable 




Group size (large) 
Heterogeneity of well-being 
 
Homogeneity of interests 














Traditional practices, proactive behavior, herd size, 
cognitive social capital  
 
Cognitive social capital, structural social capital, 
proactive behavior 
  
Assets, herd size, innovative practices, traditional 
practices, cash income 
Institutional arrangements 
Ease of rules 
Group-devised rules 
Presence of sanction 





Leadership, income diversity 
Cooperation, rules, information diversity   
Cooperation, rules  
Cooperation, information diversity  
 
 
Assets, innovative practices,  
 Structural social capital  
Innovative practices  
 
Traditional and innovative practices, proactive 
behavior, structural social capital  
External environment 
Access to training 
Local government support 
Ongoing donor support 
Market integration  
 
Cooperation, rules, information diversity  
Leadership, knowledge exchange  
Rules   
 
Traditional practices, structural social capital  
Proactive behavior, cognitive social capital  
Innovative practices, herd size 
Proactive behavior  
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4.5.3. Institutional arrangements influenced rules, cooperation and information diversity. 
 The set of institutional arrangements significantly influenced three out of six intermediate 
outcomes. The effect of individual design elements on the three intermediate outcomes was not 
unidirectional. For instance, the presence of sanctions, document records and group-devised rules 
consistently increased the levels of intermediate outcomes. The presence of sanctions was positive for 
cooperation and information diversity. On the other hand, the following relationships were negative: 
meeting attendance reduced rules, transparency was negative to cooperation, members’ meeting 
frequency reduced information diversity. Regarding these negative relationships, here we provide our 
thoughts. Table 4.5 showed that more members of herder groups and nukhurluls attended meetings. 
We also highlighted their limitations for setting rules involving all resource users in the same geographic 
area due to the voluntary membership. Hence, the number shows that small sized herder groups and 
nukhurluls had fewer rules.  
In terms of transparency, the results may signal cautious application of this concept in a small 
rural community setting. Prevailing understanding about transparency as being necessary for the 
organization management for increasing trust, legitimacy, and reputation has been concerned with 
higher levels of social institutions (Wehmeier & Raaz, 2012). On the other hand, many of the 
transparency discussions within commons institution literature have been framed by the co-
management model, where transparency of planning and decision-making of state and donor 
organizations or local elites was imperative (Shackleton & Campbell, 2001; Thompson, 2013; Vollan, 
2012). We know relatively little about the level of transparency necessary for small communities where 
members have intimate knowledge about each other across generations, as is the case in rural 
Mongolia. 
Members’ meeting is one source of information for CBRM groups. Hence, more frequency of 





talking to more experienced members. Since PUGs had frequent meetings, we speculate about possible 
mediation of group size for the decline of information diversity. Essential sources of information such as 
exchanges with technical experts and access to training are more limited for the members of larger 
groups. This fact may explain the negative relationship between the members’ meeting and information 
access. 
 
   4.5.4. External environment increased the levels of four intermediate outcomes. 
 External environment had a greater influence on intermediate outcomes compared to the 
institutional arrangement variables. External environment was important for four outcomes: rules, 
cooperation, information diversity and leadership. Among the external environment variables, access to 
training and local government support were most influential. Contrary to our expectations, external 
cooperation and donor approach negatively influenced the presence of rules and income diversity 
respectively. We coded the territory approach with larger value. Hence, the result implied less income 
diversity for territory-based groups and more for voluntary groups. The latter had a greater access to 
skills training (refer to Table 4.5) thus for other income generation opportunities. Accordingly, fewer 
members of large territory-based groups benefited from such training due to resource and logistic 
constraints of the donor. The negative relationship between external cooperation and the presence of 
rules was puzzling as we expected positive roles of external agents for having more rules for resource 
use. Without examining the local context and process of setting rules, it was difficult to explain such 
relationship.  
  
4.5.5. Group attributes were most influential for ultimate outcomes, but the effect was mixed. 
 Despite the fact that the group attribute model significantly influenced all ultimate social 





higher levels of dependence on resources, homogenous interests, and leader legitimacy led to more 
increased ultimate outcomes. However, greater homogenous interests and group experiences were 
negative for herd size. We reported that voluntary groups had more of these characteristics from prior 
discussions (Table 4.5). Unlike territory-based groups, voluntary groups had objectives for biodiversity 
conservation. Hence, these groups received more training and education towards decreasing 
competition for resources between wildlife and livestock. As compensation, voluntary groups had more 
skills training that resulted in significantly greater income diversification compared to territory-based 
groups. We discussed this earlier in relation to the negative effect of donor approach on income 
diversity. Correspondingly, the average score of dependence on livestock for PUGs was above the 
sample mean (i.e. less income diversification) while the voluntary groups’ average was below the sample 
mean (Table 4.5). Overall, this result did not confirm our hypothesis of a positive effect of the two group 
attributes (homogeneity of interests and group experience) on herd size as an ultimate livelihood 
outcome. Nonetheless, it suggests that, with appropriate facilitation, resource users can reduce grazing 
pressure.    
The negative effect of heterogeneity of well-being and livestock dependence on cognitive social 
capital was not expected. However, the negative influence of heterogeneity of well-being on knowledge 
exchange, discussed earlier, can help explain this relationship. The greater difference in well-being, that 
caused less knowledge exchange, may further reduce trust and norms of reciprocity due to dissimilar 
economic interests, social connections, and power. The reason that higher resource dependence leads 
to less trust and reciprocal norms, may be related to the group size. PUGs were more resource 
dependent, but their sizes were too large for necessary interactions among the members to build 





4.5.6. Institutional arrangements influenced innovative practices and social networking only. 
Similar to intermediate outcomes, ultimate social outcomes had a minor influence on 
institutional arrangements. Although the model increased structural social capital, it had an inconsistent 
effect on innovative rangeland practices. Among six institutional arrangement variables with a 
significant influence on innovative rangeland practices, three had a negative effect. These included 
quality of rules, members’ meeting, and transparency. We detected the negative effect of rules on 
ultimate social outcomes in the prior analyses of relationships (Chapter 3). Small-sized voluntary groups 
had a higher average score for quality of rules. We suspect that for kin-related members in such small 
groups, rules may be less necessary. Customarily, a senior more experienced and well-respected 
member can lead the group while achieving the same level of cohesion as rules are designed to attain. 
We need to investigate further the process of setting rules and rule contents to explain the negative 
effect on innovations. The relationship could also be related to the limitations of small groups in 
coordinating resources due to the exclusiveness of neighboring herders who share the same resources. 
Similarly, without further examination of group meetings in terms of their content and the way of 
convening, it was difficult to interpret the result. As discussed earlier, frequent but inefficient meetings 
reduced member access to multiple sources of information. For instance, information sources such as 
interactions with professionals and attending training in and outside of the soum were shown to be 
critical for innovative practices. This may explain the negative effect of members meetings on innovative 
practices. In contrast, leaders meetings were consistently positive, demonstrated by increasing levels of 





4.5.7. External environment influenced four ultimate social outcomes: local government 
support was most positive.  
The influence of the external environment on ultimate social outcomes was greater34 than 
institutional arrangements but less than group attributes. In line with the results of prior analyses 
(Chapters 2 and 3), external environment increased rangeland practices, behavior, and social capital, 
rather than livelihood measures. Local government support was the most positive, increasing trust and 
norms of reciprocity, traditional rangeland practices, and proactive behavior of members. The negative 
effect of ongoing donor support on structural social capital may be related to the group size. We 
measured structural social capital by reports of members for accessing various sources of help during 
their hardships. We suggest that the higher proportion of members benefitting from assistance from 
multiple sources can be easily achieved within a smaller group compared to a larger one. Consequently, 
in the case of PUGs having ongoing support, their structural social capital was smaller than the score of 
voluntary groups. Similarly, group size may also affect the unfavorable influence of donor approach on 
assets and innovative rangeland practices. Donor-funded equipment, as well as delivery of training, may 
not be accessible to each member if the group size is large.    
       
4.6. Implications  
Theory predicts more challenges for commons institutions whose resources are large-sized with unclear 
boundaries and unpredictable resource flow with resource users scattered over large areas (Wade, 
1988). These unfavorable characteristics are representative of the Mongolian pastoral social-ecological 
system (Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002). In addition, socio-political transitions for the past century have 
further complicated commons institutions in Mongolia. Social transformations to the socialist system, 
then to the free market economy, negatively influenced Mongolian pastoralism, contributing to the loss 
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or erosion of essential elements of the traditional institutions (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999, 2001; Mearns, 
1996a). All these factors together manifest the level of complexities for CBRM development in 
Mongolia. This study, in a broader sense, contributed to the ongoing debate on institutional designs 
favorable for the emergence of sustainable commons institutions (Agrawal, 2002). From a narrow 
perspective, the study shed light on mechanisms that influence social outcomes of evolving pastoral 
commons institutions in Mongolia. Despite the scarcity in Mongolian pastoral systems of resource 
conditions that are theorized to facilitate successful commons institutions (such as small size and clear 
boundaries of resource and resource users), the design principles for user groups’ attributes and 
external environment were shown to be applicable for predicting social outcomes of Mongolian pastoral 
institutions. The institutional arrangement set with ten elements (Table 4.5) did not demonstrate the 
same influence as other two sets. This may reflect the current stage of CBRM development in Mongolia, 
where resource governance arrangements are emerging and not necessarily the inapplicability of these 
factors. The results were in line with our early finding of weak rules for major resource regulations for 
number and types of livestock and use of wells and hay areas.  
In addition to the theoretical implications, we highlight several methodological issues specific to 
the Mongolian pastoral context. Theorized market pressure on local resources and users can be  seen as 
increased demand for cashmere since early 2000, which resulted in a substantial change in species 
composition in the national herd. Most dramatically, in 1992 goats  made up 22% of the national herd, 
and this increased to a 43% share in 2012 (NSO, 2015). However, a prevailing view of the negative effect 
of goats on pastures has not been confirmed (Addison et al., 2012). In the absence of research showing 
a market influence on the pastoral economy, we considered the ease of market access to be an indicator 
of market integration of local communities. Secondly, heterogeneity as a group attribute needs to be 
elaborated from the socio-economic perspective of the Mongolian pastoralism. Theories defined two 





1988)- with differing consequences for outcomes of commons institutions. While the former implied 
mutually beneficial exchange favorable for the resource institutions, the latter meant different 
economic specialization and interests of members disadvantageous for institutional outcomes. In the 
Mongolian pastoral context, heterogeneity incorporates both features with paralleling results in social 
outcomes as shown by this study. Historically, better-off members of pastoral community provided 
subsistence to weaker members, while the latter offered their labor assistance to wealthy individuals for 
dealing with large herds (Simukov, 1934; Sneath, 2003). Using well-being groups as a heterogeneity 
measure for Mongolian CBRMs appeared to be contextually-grounded.          
 The results provided a potential solution to the current disputes over the appropriate size of 
CBRM groups in Mongolia. The study demonstrated that for the majority of social outcomes, traditional 
small groups were more effective, while for cooperation and setting rules, large groups sizes were 
appropriate. Hence, CBRM facilitation should start from small groups (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Olson, 
1965  Wade, 1988) to achieve “fast” outcomes at individual household levels including increased 
rangeland management practices and proactive engagement of members. During this collaborative 
process, members learn to participate in internal democratic processes of formulating group plans, 
holding meetings, recording documents and making participatory decisions. Such frequent interactions 
strengthen their social capital and networking and increase their group cohesion. Indeed, voluntary 
membership in CBRM groups allowed resource users to make their choices for social grouping, which 
were mostly based on traditional social units such as khot ail or saakhalt ail. This was a winning  strategy 
for groups to start their new endeavor with members already having a necessary level of social capital 
and cooperation. Apart from these advantages, if successful such new initiatives set a reputation for 
cooperation (Baland & Platteau, 1996) they may influence risk-averse agents and encourage them to 
collaborate (NZNI-IPECON, 2006). Only when groups realize limitations of small size in terms of collective 





into a nested system (Ostrom, 1990) by forming a PUG-like structure. External facilitation can support 
such self-originated group demand by encouraging cooperation at the higher level of organization and 
setting formal rules that govern landscape-based resources. When comprised of socially strong small 
groups, a landscape-based organization, inclusive of all resource users, may facilitate greater social 
capital and livelihood outcomes than those of small groups. Such a strategy would enable stronger 
collective action and sustainable pastoral institutions for more efficient resource management.    
 The results pointed to the need for further qualitative research on the process of rule setting 
and rule contents, the ways the group meetings take place and topics of discussions at the meetings to 
investigate the negative relationships found.  
  This study suggests that external facilitation for CBRM development may be necessary in the 
absence of access to information by mobile Mongolian communities. Following Blomquest et al. (1994), 
it is challenging for pastoralists to utilize institutional means for resource management due to inherent 
limitations of resource storage and unpredictability that, in turn, require high costs for reliable 
information. In the Mongolian CBRM context, external donors brought crucial information, easing the 
cost problems. One policy implication from these findings is that unless an appropriate system for 
delivering information to pastoral communities is in place, there has to be a facilitating agent, be it 
government, a development agency or a civil society organization. However, we caution that such 
facilitation has to be grounded on careful consideration of local context and needs of resource users 
with clear objectives for strengthening pastoral institutions rather than solving unconfirmed problems of 
resource degradation and resource disputes (Turner, 1999).     
 Along with external facilitation, the role of local government in achieving social 
outcomes of CBRMs has a profound policy implication. Despite the significance of local government 
support for pastoral institutions, it remained moderate as shown by the data. Hence, there is ample 





theory recommends, the national government should not hamper local resource management 










This chapter presents a synthesis of the study results in light of the literature review provided in 
the introductory chapter. The chapter summarizes study findings with respect to research questions 
stated in Chapter 1 and outlines the practical, theoretical and methodological implications of these 
findings. The chapter concludes with recommended policy options for CBRM development in Mongolia.  
       
5.1. Summary of Findings 
This section encapsulates the findings of the entire study reported separately in Chapters 2, 3 
and 4. In this summary, I highlight answers to the seven research questions stated in the introductory 
section. Before presenting the summary, I remind the reader of my core assumption that intermediate 
outcomes or output-type variables precede ultimate social outcomes in time, which has important 
implications for my analysis and subsequent interpretation of results. Intermediate outcomes included 
six factors essential for ultimate social outcomes: information diversity, leadership, knowledge 
exchange, presence of rules, cooperation, and income diversity. Eight ultimate social outcomes were 
grouped into three broad categories: (a) rangeland management practices, (b) social capital and (c) 
livelihood. Rangeland practices included traditional rangeland practices, innovative rangeland practices 
and proactive behavior. Social capital was comprised of cognitive social capital, a measure of trust and 
norms of reciprocity, and structural social capital, an indicator of social networking. Livelihood included 
cash income, per capita herd size, and household assets.     
RQ1. Does CBRM increase social outcomes of pastoral groups in Mongolia? I found that formal 
CBRM groups had more information sources, stronger leadership, greater knowledge exchange, greater 





management issues and used more desired rangeland practices than traditional neighborhoods. 
However, the two types of groups did not differ in livelihoods measured as annual cash income and herd 
size per family member. Also, I found no difference in cooperation and the presence of rules between 
the two types of groups in the desert steppe. There was a weak difference in both social capital types, 
assets and income diversity, with CBRM members having greater social capital and more income 
sources. Based on these findings, I concluded that CBRM increased all intermediate outcomes (excluding 
cooperation and rules in the desert steppe) and six ultimate social outcomes, all except cash income and 
herd size.   
 RQ2. Next, I asked if formal organization and six intermediate social outcomes including 
information diversity, knowledge exchange, leadership, cooperation, income diversity, and the presence 
of rules can predict increased ultimate social outcomes of pastoral groups given different ecological 
zones. (Non-significant livelihood variables: cash income and herd size, were dropped from the analysis). 
The model predicted increased proactive behavior, traditional and innovative rangeland management 
practices, and cognitive social capital with some variations among ecological zones. The model weakly 
influenced social networking (structural social capital) and assets where income diversity negatively 
influenced social networking. I concluded that the eight-variable model can predict an increase in four 
ultimate social outcomes: proactive behavior, traditional and innovative rangeland management 
practices and cognitive social capital.  
RQ3, 4, 5. Next, I explored how and why social outcomes of CBRM groups differ from those of 
traditional (non-CBRM) groups in similar social, political and environmental contexts. In order to fully 
respond to this broad question, first, I asked whether four intermediate variables, critical for ultimate 
social outcomes were causally associated (QR4). These variables were information diversity, knowledge 
exchange, leadership and the presence of rules. The results revealed two important findings. First, the 





sequential order among them. I found that information diversity had a triggering effect on other three 
variables creating an ordered chain of information diversity  leadership  knowledge exchange  the 
presence of rules.  
Next, the analysis revealed a mediation effect of the four intermediate variables on four 
ultimate social outcomes. In other words, the effect of formal organization on four ultimate social 
outcomes including traditional and innovative rangeland practices, proactive behavior, and social 
networking was positively facilitated by the four intermediate variables. This shows that formal 
organization alone is not sufficient to increase pastoralists’ use of traditional and innovative practices, 
their proactive behavior or their social networking.  
Further, I asked how ecological zone influences this mediated relationship between formal 
organization and four ultimate social outcomes (RQ5).  I found that ecological zone moderated the 
effect of formal organization on members’ proactive behavior and their social networking mediated by 
leadership and rules. In other words, the strength of the mediation effect of two intermediate variables 
on two ultimate social outcomes, proactive behavior and social networking, depended on the ecological 
zone. The mediating effect of rules on proactive behavior was stronger in the desert steppe while it was 
weaker in the steppe. The mediating effect of leadership on social networking was weaker in the eastern 
steppe than in non-eastern steppe zones.  
These findings guided my response to Research Question 3 as follows. Ultimate social outcomes 
of CBRM and non-CBRM groups differed due to three major factors: formal organization, four 
intermediate outcomes, and ecological zone.  
RQ6. I then asked how donor facilitation approaches influence the institutional design of CBRM 
in Mongolia. I found that donor facilitation was significantly associated with CBRM group attributes and 
their external environment, but had no differing effect on internal institutional arrangements and rules. 





experience of cooperation, the level of well-being heterogeneity in the group, and the homogeneity of 
interests or group cohesion. In terms of CBRM groups’ external environment, donor facilitation was 
associated with availability of training, continuity of donor support, and level of market integration.  
RQ7. Lastly, I sought to identify which institutional design elements were most influential in 
achieving greater social outcomes of Mongolian CBRM groups, considering all intermediate and ultimate 
outcomes. With respect to intermediate outcomes, I found that three group characteristics, namely, 
small size, homogeneous interests, and heterogeneity of well-being, positively influenced information 
diversity, leadership, and income diversity. Institutional arrangements including the presence of 
sanctions, group-devised rules, frequent group meetings, and recording group documents increased 
cooperation, agreed rules, and information diversity. Similarly, external environment variables including 
availability of training and local government support positively influenced the levels of cooperation, the 
presence of rules, knowledge exchange, leadership, and information diversity.   
Regarding ultimate social outcomes, dependence on livestock, homogeneity of interests and 
leader legitimacy were critical group attributes for increasing social capital, livelihoods, rangeland 
practices, and proactive behavior. Among institutional arrangement variables, frequent meetings of 
leaders were the most influential for ultimate social outcomes, increasing social networking, both types 
of rangeland practices, proactive behavior and assets. Among external environment variables, local 
government support and ongoing donor support were associated with increased trust and norms of 
reciprocity, rangeland management practices, proactiveness, and herd size. Overall, group attributes 
and external environment factors were more influential determinants of CBRM social outcomes than 
institutional arrangements. From these findings I draw two conclusions. First, among the three sets of 
theorized institutional design principles, group attributes and external environment variables were most 
important for achieving greater social outcomes. Donor facilitation approach had a significant 





most influential were: group characteristics of homogeneity of interests, dependence on livestock, and 
leader’s legitimacy  institutional arrangements including frequent leaders’ meetings and the presence of 
sanctions; and external environment including available training and local government support. These 
findings provide an empirical basis for study implications described in the following section.  
      
5.2. Study Implications 
The above findings enable me to describe the status of Mongolian CBRM at the edge of the first 
decade of the 21st century in comparison to the outcomes reported internationally. In subsequent 
sections, I summarize theoretical, methodological and practical implications of my study.   
  
5.2.1. CBRM status in post-socialist Mongolia 
This broad-scale assessment across 142 groups in 36 soums and four ecological zones leads to a 
conclusion that the initial process of CBRM development since 1999 has been positive in Mongolia. In 
my sample, there was no evidence of diminished social outcomes compared to traditional 
neighborhoods, or the wide-spread negative consequences as reported in other rangeland regions of 
the world (Balint & Mashinya, 2006; Cleaver, 2005).   
To varying degrees in different ecological zones, CBRM has clearly contributed to increasing 
proven traditional rangeland management practices, learning and applying new innovative practices, 
and shifting pastoralists’ passive dependent position of waiting guidance from the top (Muller & Bold, 
1996) to more proactive constructive behavior in rangeland matters.  
CBRM has facilitated reemergence of local cooperation and trust among households and 
between herders and the local government, which were reported lacking prior to CBRM (Baival, 2012; 
Upton, 2008), and strengthening traditional norms of reciprocity. However, group-level outcomes that 





member household levels. This trend may confirm Ostrom’s conclusion that it takes a learning process when a 
greater number of members involved in the resource management to interact frequently, cooperate and exchange 
to build a rigorous resource institution.    
Pastoral groups were able to attain increased social outcomes by accessing diverse information 
and exchanging knowledge, under strong local leadership supported by donor programs. In contrast, 
traditional groups showed lower levels of social outcomes, highlighting the significance of these factors 
for attaining increased social outcomes.   
The external support of bringing training and education, encouraging learning and local 
leadership strongly influenced the changes in practices and behavior of CBRM members. In contrast to 
results in other regions of the globe where externally-facilitated knowledge has not always been 
favorable (Kellert et al., 2000; Ruiz-Mallen & Corbera, 2013), in Mongolia external facilitation has led to 
the increase in outcomes.   
Although CBRM did not succeed in improving well-being of members in terms of their income 
and livestock holdings, livelihoods were maintained at levels similar to non-CBRM households. Some 
studies of CBRM in Africa reported worsening livelihoods due to corruption, elite capture, or increased 
costs of conservation (Saito-Jensen et al., 2010; Satria et al., 2006; Suich, 2010). In the Mongolian 
context, it appears that there are limitations for CBRM to substantially influence livelihood outcomes. 
Sales of cashmere and live animals, and government support payments that comprise 68% of the total 
annual income of an average herder household (see Chapter 1) largely depend on market prices and 
government revenue. These factors are beyond the influence of CBRM programs. CBRM may have some 
potential to diversify household income sources by facilitating non-livestock income generation, 
including vegetable growing, souvenir making or providing seasonal services to tourism operators, as 
reported by Leisher et al. (2012). However, these income sources are supplementary and not every 





5.2.2. Theoretical implications 
This study made contributions to theories of the commons in several ways. Results of the study 
show that CBNRM can be an effective strategy to address the common pool resource (CPR) dilemma. 
Social outcomes of CBRM in Mongolia contribute most to addressing provision problems. When 
pastoralists increase their traditional rangeland management practices such as setting aside winter and 
spring pastures, or dzud reserves, or digging a new well35, they avoid overexploiting resources. Practices 
such as culling unproductive animals reduces grazing pressure, and cutting hay and preparing hand 
fodder, store resources and lessen future appropriation problems (Schlager et al., 1994). These 
strategies ultimately should help to maintain resource conditions. Similarly, many innovative practices 
contribute to sustaining local resources, namely, fencing pastures36, hay areas and water sources, and 
taking actions to protect key resources. These practices are exercised not only at the household level 
but also at the group level by increasing their cooperation and coordination of timing of grazing, and use 
of wells and hay areas. Such collective action requires proactive behavior of individual members who 
actively raise issues for discussion and seek for solutions to sustain resources.  
My findings also contribute to the debate about what makes CPR institutions successful. These 
results are in agreement with previous research that the information, leadership, communication and 
exchange and agreeing on rules among resource users are preconditions of successful CPR institutions 
(Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990). In addition, treating these intermediate variables as output-
type factors distinct from ultimate social outcomes proves to be theoretically essential. This distinction 
depicts the existing relationships among different contributing factors, which I will elaborate later.  
                                                          
35
 I consider digging a new well can open access to unused pastures while releasing grazing pressures in more 
crowded areas in Mongolia. Although it is possible that creating too many wells can facilitate overgrazing.   
36
 Temporary fencing of small patches of critical resources for conservation purposes that some CBRM groups 
practiced is considered here. The author acknowledges the negative consequences of permanent fencing of 





Further, this study deepened our understanding of how resource characteristics shape commons 
institutions. The significant influence of ecological zones on social outcomes of pastoral groups accords 
with the major theoretical claim for the importance of resource characteristics on institutional outcomes 
(Agrawal, 2002; Niamir-Fuller & Turner, 1999). Commons theory predicts better outcomes of commons 
institutions in resource-rich areas such as steppe and eastern steppe with relatively stable and 
predictable production. In contrast, successful collective action and resulting outcomes are anticipated 
to be more challenging in areas with unpredictable patchy production such as the desert steppe 
(Schlager et al., 1994). Our findings showed differences among ecological zones, potentially associated 
with their resource characteristics. However, in contrast to predictions, we observed more proactive 
behavior and social networking among desert steppe CBRM members. Further, more proactive behavior 
and social networking among herders in the harsher desert steppe environment were in line with our 
prior findings of higher levels of reciprocal norms and mutual assistance in the desert steppe groups 
(Chapter 3). Overall, our findings suggest that the mixed conclusions about CBRM reported by past 
studies may be explained in part by failure to consider mediating and moderating factors and the 
sequential order of intermediate variables during the CBRM implementation.  
From the institutional design perspective, my results support the assertion that attributes of 
resource user groups and their external environment play a significant role in institutional outcomes. 
Small group size, homogeneous interests among group members, strong leadership and dependence on 
resources were influential in achieving social outcomes of CPR institutions in Mongolia. Among the 
theorized external environment factors, external aid and access to learning and education are in line 
with the institutional design theory (Agrawal, 2002; Baland & Platteau, 1996).  
An important empirical contribution to the commons theory might be my findings about 
underlying associations (1) among factors facilitating desired social outcomes of CBRM and (2) between 





results fall into the category of research investigating conditions for successful CPR institutions (Agrawal, 
2014; Ostrom, 2008). The sequential order of information delivery local leadership  knowledge 
exchange  setting rules can be tested in other field settings. However, in our study, this result was 
possible in the context of strong participatory facilitation of external agencies. Second, the findings show 
that information diversity, leadership, knowledge exchange and the presence of rules explain how 
formal organizations of resource users achieve ultimate outcomes including rangeland management 
practices, proactive behavior, and social networking among users. Among these outcomes, proactive 
behavior and social networking vary with ecological zone. 
These theoretical contributions have a solid methodological foundation that addressed major 
gaps in studies of the commons using larger samples of comparative cases while investigating underlying 
aspects of factors contributing to CPR institutional sustainability (Agrawal, 2002; Poteete & Ostrom, 
2008). The study also enriched the current studies of pastoral commons, which have a limited scope in 
the overall CPR literature.  
   
5.2.3. Methodological implications 
This study showed the applicability of statistical causal models to analyze CBRM in pastoral 
social-ecological systems. In addition, I tested the institutional design model of emerging commons 
institutions for Mongolian CBRM groups. Operationalization of several social variables in the Mongolian 
pastoral context may provide a useful basis for further studies.   
In this study, I used two statistical models known to test causal relationships involving the effect 
of third variable: mediation and moderation tests (Hayes, 2013; Wu & Zumbo, 2008). Although these 
tests are frequently used in psychological studies (Hayes, 2009), their recent applications in the human 
dimensions of natural resource management inspired me to use them to understand social outcomes of 





of resource users towards local resources and their strategies for efficient resource use. My application 
of these models shows their applicability for testing indirect effects on already established relationships 
between the formal organization and social outcomes of CPR institutions. Particularly, in the pastoral 
context, intermediate outcome variables demonstrated a good fit for mediators while ecological zone 
had a classic moderator function. In addition, PROCESS software of Dr. Hayes (Hayes, 2013) provided a 
powerful statistical tool for conducting these tests. The software had two key advantages: it can be 
added to SPSS with similar application tabs where independent, dependent, mediator and moderator 
variables can be inserted. For statistical tests, the software uses bootstrapping procedures that release 
normality requirements of parametric statistics. However, it had three limitations for my study. First, the 
number of serial-multiple mediators in a model was limited to four variables only, which forced me to 
eliminate two intermediate outcomes. Second, a moderator has to be either a continuous or 
dichotomous variable. Hence, I had to recode my categorical ecological zone variable into four different 
dichotomous variables. Lastly, the serial-multiple mediator model did not allow simultaneous testing of 
moderator effect. For this reason, I had to use a parallel-mediator model for testing a moderation effect 
of ecological zone on four ultimate social outcomes including two types of rangeland practices, 
proactive behavior and structural social capital (social networking). 
I also tested the applicability of the institutional design model for predicting social outcomes of 
Mongolian pastoral institutions. I excluded the set of resource characteristics variables from the original 
four-set model suggested by Agrawal (2002) due to my research goal for examining social outcomes. The 
results show that the two out of three sets of institutional design elements, namely group attributes and 
external environment models well predicted social outcomes of CBRM in Mongolia. I mentioned earlier 
specific design elements influential for both types of social outcomes. The fact that the set of 
institutional arrangement variables did not influence social outcomes may be related to two factors: (1) 





(2) the possibility that generally rules have to be loose and flexible due to unique culture embedded in 
the pastoral institutions.  
The division of social outcomes into two types was shown to be an empirically-grounded 
method for measuring social outcomes of externally-driven CBRM institutions. Intermediate and 
ultimate social outcomes have different timing and complexity to achieve following the formal 
organization of groups: pastoral groups achieved intermediate outcomes sooner than ultimate 
outcomes. Institutional design elements have differing influence on the two types of social outcomes 
though some design elements affected both types. For instance, small size, homogeneous interests and 
heterogeneity of well-being were important for intermediate outcomes, but for achieving ultimate social 
outcomes two design elements, namely, leader’s legitimacy and homogeneity of interests were most 
influential.  
Operationalization of two institutional design variables including market integration and 
heterogeneity of endowments, required grounding in the Mongolian pastoral context. In Mongolia, 
theorized market pressure on local resources and users can be  seen as increased demand for cashmere 
since early 2000, which resulted in a substantial change in species composition in the national herd. 
Most dramatically, in 1992 goats  made up 22% of the national herd, and this increased to a 43% share 
in 2012 (NSO, 2015). However, a prevailing view of the negative effect of goats on pastures has not been 
confirmed (Addison et al., 2012). In the absence of research showing a market influence on the pastoral 
economy, we considered the ease of market access to be an indicator of the market integration of local 
communities.  
Secondly, heterogeneity as a group attribute needs to be elaborated from the socio-economic 
perspective of the Mongolian pastoralism. Theories defined two types of heterogeneity: of endowments 
and interests (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Olson, 1965; Wade, 1988)- with differing consequences for 





the resource institutions, the latter meant different economic specialization and interests of members 
disadvantageous for institutional outcomes. In the Mongolian pastoral context, heterogeneity 
incorporates both features with parallel results in social outcomes as shown by this study. Historically, 
better-off members of the pastoral community provided subsistence to poorer members, while the 
latter offered their labor assistance to wealthy individuals for dealing with large herds (Simukov, 1934; 
Sneath, 2003). Using well-being groups as a heterogeneity measure for Mongolian CBRMs appeared to 
be contextually-grounded.  
         
5.2.4. Practical and policy implications 
This study has a number of practical implications that provide policy options for CBRM 
development in Mongolia. First, the results largely support the benefits of formal CBNRM organizations 
for achieving social outcomes, especially, reviving traditional practices, introducing adaptive innovations 
in rangeland management, encouraging proactive behavior and social networking of pastoralists 
(Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014; Leisher et al., 2012). As argued above, these social outcomes facilitate 
addressing provision problems of CPR management. Hence, my findings provide sufficient ground for 
further policy advancement for supporting CBRM in Mongolia.  
Eight conceptually-grounded factors, namely, formal organization, ecological zone and six 
intermediate variables including information, leadership, knowledge exchange, rules, cooperation and 
income diversity, are important to attaining greater social outcomes. We learned that without 
intermediate variables, the formal organization of resource users alone is not sufficient to achieve social 
outcomes. Importantly, access to information triggers a sequential chain of mediation by encouraging 
local leadership and fostering knowledge exchange among community members that prepares them for 





guidance for CBRM facilitation and policy back-up by investing in these contributing intermediate 
outcomes. 
In Mongolian CBRM, external donors have substantial power in shaping the attributes of the 
groups they support as well as groups’ external environment. The donors decide on group size, influence 
the diversity of members by requiring inclusion of poor households, and affect group cohesion by 
encouraging them to act collectively. By facilitating groups’ relationship with local government and 
external professionals, and helping to market their products, the donors facilitate a positive context for 
newly evolving groups. Hence, external facilitation agency has a determining role in emerging CPR 
institutions as well as shaping power relations and social equality in local settings. Such position, in turn, 
requires high professionalism and competence in both theoretical understanding of CPR issues, and 
specifics of Mongolian pastoralism.     
Theory suggests that group size is important to emerging commons institutions (Ostrom, 1990; 
Wade, 1988). In the context of Mongolian CBRM, small sized groups had greater group cohesion and 
longer cooperation experience, and ease of accessing information and training than large groups. 
However, small size was disadvantageous for addressing larger scale coordination to address provision 
problems. As shown, large sized groups had a higher level of cooperation and more rules but were not 
as effective as small size groups in attaining outcomes. These findings support the appropriateness of a 
theorized nested structure of institutions (Ostrom, 1990). Also, the actual group size discussed in this 
study is Mongolia-specific. Large size implies an average of 156 individuals or 39 households while a 
small group has an average of 44 individuals or 11 families. Hence, Mongolian “large” is much smaller 
than the 15,000 appropriators Ostrom refers to (1990, p. 182). 
Most findings were in line with the theorized relationships among contributing factors for 
emerging CPR institutions except a few Mongolia-specific phenomena. For instance, added variables to 





group formal documents, local government support, and availability of donor’s assistance were vital for 
achieving CBRM social outcomes. The importance of these factors to groups may also indicate the 
current dependence of pastoralists on outside guidance and their acknowledgment of groups’ collective 
action. In other words, groups’ strong reliance on the support of local government, donor assistance, 
and their leaders points to the fact of weak ownership of local groups.   
I suggest that social outcomes such as proactive behavior of individual members and their daily 
resource use practices are “fast” variables, which are “building blocks” for fostering trust and norms of 
reciprocity and social networking among members. Trust and norms of reciprocity are at the heart of 
commons institutions to overcome inherent “social dilemmas” and require broader interactions beyond 
household and kin relationships. Without high levels of trust and strong norms of reciprocity, it is 
difficult to achieve more complex social and ecological outcomes such as improved livelihoods and 
better resource conditions. Hence, in the pastoral context, the pace of progress seems to be important. 
The groups in this study had an average of the five-year experience of collective action and could 
achieve outcomes related to daily rangeland practices and self-mobilization for contributing to 
rangeland matters. More time and experience may be required to achieve greater levels of social capital 
and well-being.  
 
5.3. Conclusions and Recommendations 
I note that this assessment did not cover outcomes of CBNRM in a broader sense including other 
resources, which may have different results. Hence, conclusions and recommendations follow, relate 
specifically to rangeland management in Mongolia.  
The last decade of CBRM development in Mongolia has shown a healthy progress with 
promising initial results. External donors initiating CBRM have applied appropriate facilitation, 





resources and strategies that best fit their environment. The donors have played a catalyzing role by 
filling governance gaps brought by rapid political and economic reforms, especially in improving herders’ 
access to information, opportunities for collective learning, and forums for discussion of local issues. 
This increased communication and interaction has helped overcome distrust. The donor-supported 
programs have also funded most costs for supporting CBRM with minor input from the government and 
resource users. Many of the donor-facilitated CBRM practices have shown to be well-grounded in the 
Mongolian social-ecological systems thus require acknowledgment and replication. A few other 
strategies such as determining group size for supporting CBRM organization and sequence, pace and 
length of facilitation need some adjustments as highlighted in the prior section.  
Despite prevailing increase in social outcomes, the current progress of CBRM has rather limited 
scope bounded by available resources of donors. For instance, voluntary groups of herder groups and 
nukhurluls could reach about 20% of their respective soum pastoral population. Pasture User Groups 
with a mandatory membership, covering almost entire soum herder population currently are present in 
126 soums or 37% of all rural counties in Mongolia.   
The central government has remained rather reserved in relation to CBRM. Importantly, the 
government accepted initial suggestions to experiment CBRM (Agriteam-Canada, 1997) and let donors 
implement their programs in various regions of the country as they choose. In a later stage, the 
government endorsed policies supporting CBNRM development including two orders of the 
Environment Minister (GoM, 2006, 2010b) and additions to the Law of Environmental Protection and 
the Government Livestock Sector Development Program (GoM, 2010a). Thanks to the latter, soum 
government obtained three additional government officers responsible for rangeland management. The 
reserved position of the central government may be positive without excessive intervening of local 





resource management organization (Ostrom et al., 1994) remained absent (Dulamsuren et al., 2011; 
Fernandez-Gimenez et al., 2014). 
Regarding CBRM institutional status, the formal organization of resource users have attained 
initial changes in their behavior and attitudes through increased education and awareness of necessary 
sustainable resource management. CBRM institutions are in the process of strengthening their social 
capital and cooperation preparing for a larger scale goal for livelihood improvement. However, a major 
issue appears to be their weak ownership of management and organizational matters, particularly, in 
relation to rules. Such weak ownership could be also associated with the lack of a need for strong 
resource regulation. If a resource is relatively abundant with no conflict over it, there is no dilemma and 
no need for strict resource regulations. Equally, it is possible that formal rules threaten informal social 
norms as shown by other research in Mongolia (Addison, 2012) and eslewhere (Arnold & Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2007; Cleaver, 2002).   
These concluding remarks lead us to suggest following policy options for furthering CBRM 
development in Mongolia. 
CBRM in Mongolia must be scaled out to fulfill its promise in addressing CPR dilemmas. Lessons 
learned from this study can be reflected in several strategies of CBRM development. The current 
practice of donor site selection has not been effective in ensuring strong ownership of resource users 
and in identifying dilemma situation. Ideally, those local users facing resource overuse and conflicts 
should self-organize and seek external support for solving their issues. If resource users are satisfied 
with the current situation and do not see big problems or conflicts, they can continue relying on 
customary norms currently practiced. To initiate change, the central government needs to adopt a Law 
on CBRM with a clear definition of CBRM organization, their rights, and responsibilities over communal 
management of local resources, and relationships with other stakeholders. One of their rights should be 





conflicts and threat of overuse. Within this legal environment, donors can support those groups already 
self-organized but which need external support to solve their problems.   
Under this strategy, the available donor resources can be used for national level education and 
training programs. Considering the fact that over 80% of herder households possess TV and radio, there 
is great potential for herder- and soum government staff-targeted education and training programs 
using mass-media outlets. To motivate self-organization of resource users, persistent and substantial 
amounts of education and training, sharing local successes or lessons, participants’ reflections need to 
be broadcast.  
A further process of CBRM facilitation can replicate best practices shown to be effective for the 
last decade with inherent participatory facilitation and processes. Consideration of supplying 
intermediate outcomes first by their order should be an essential element of CBRM facilitation. A plan 
for a nested structure in the future while starting from small groups compatible with the traditional 
social organization has to be in the mind of external facilitators.  
Finally, this study calls for a further qualitative inquiry to elucidate why rules have a negative 
effect on social outcomes of pastoral groups. Particularly, the process of rule setting and rule contents, 
and assessing rules potential for addressing CPR dilemma require further examination. A closer 
investigation of specific governance processes within community groups and their local context in 
different ecological zones would help explain differing levels of social outcomes across four ecological 
regions. Further, a qualitative inquiry is necessary to determine whether elite capture is occurring and to 
address issues of power dynamics within CBRM groups.   
Globally, the promising case of CBRM in Mongolia may encourage mobile pastoral communities 
elsewhere to cooperate on the sustainable management of their resources. However, as the study 
showed, careful facilitation is needed to achieve intermediate outcomes, and  consideration of the 
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role of third party 
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collective action, 
social capital and 
group formation, 
issue of longer 
term access to 
resource and 
equity  
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9 herders CBRM 




No wealth and age difference between 
CBRM and non-CBRM members 
Wealthier, more remote households 
and those with more labor force did 
not join CBRM.  
Group of 33 was too large and failed. 
Access to labor was the key incentive 
for joining CBRM 
Bonding social capital strengthened. 
Increased organized cooperation. 
Access to training and peer learning 
increased. 
Exclusion of others for accessing 
membership, improved water sources 
and some delineated management 
areas. 
Third party had a catalytic role in 
facilitating face-to-face interaction, 
building trust not only among member 
herders but with local government  
2) Fernandez-









Role of CBRM 













5 soums of Tuv, 
Overall reported conflict over 
resources was low. More conflicts 
reported in mountain steppe zone.  
Compared to non-CBRM herders, 
CBRM members were more mobile 
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Law: Progress and 
Issues. Final 





























SDC and UNDP 
project sites 
and more likely to use desirable 
management practices: going for otor, 
reserving winter and spring pastures. 
They had slightly better knowledge 
about land law provisions. More CBRM 
herders belonged to various local 
associations and had more sources for 
obtaining help.    
More herders of CBRM perceived 
honesty among the group members 
than non-CBRM herders. The level of 
trustworthiness and mutual assistance 
did not differ.  
Study highlighted two weaknesses of 
small herder groups: 1) potential for 
elite capture, 2) mismatch between 
social and spatial boundaries to 
effectively manage resources; 
Weaknesses of large pasture user 
groups included 1) high transaction 
costs for communication and 
management, 2) weak 
ownership/participation of herders 
Herder organizations are capable of 
planning and managing their pastures 
and obtaining high level of compliance 
from their members. 
The study highlighted the conflicting 
nature of exclusivity for tenure security 
with mobility and flexibility of pastoral 
systems. It reported that herders and 
local government officials preferred 
flexibility and mobility over tenure 














Land rights, land 
use  
Influence of 
CBRM on systems 
of land rights and 






of property rights 









































1 CBRM group contracted pastures for 
15 years in nearby project area 
Growing sense of exclusion from 
membership/hardening social 
boundaries 
More exclusions from summer 
pastures around a water source 
improved by CBRM donor 
3 WBSLP-facilitated NGOs had 
contracts in 2004 for 5 years. 
Increasing concerns over access rights 
to resources 
Warning for need to consider 
implication for livelihoods and equity 
of non-members and existing power 
structures 










































22 soums in 9 
aimags; 
Four donor 
project sites: SDC, 
WBSLH, UNDP, 
IFAD RPRP 
PUGs have greater potential for 
rangeland management than herder 
groups. Larger structures better for 
pasture management and mobility 
Difficult to run organization without 
supporting agency, strong leadership 
and support of local government 
Setting boundaries difficult 
Collective management is not efficient 
in desert steppe: less collective action, 
controlling livestock number is more 
problematic. 
Conflict over access to pasture 
between members/non-members 
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The more years of group operation the 
greater is frequency of collective 
action. 
Leadership and good relationship with 
local government increases 
sustainability of PUGs. 
Common weaknesses were financial 
sustainability, relationships with non-
members and marketing of products. 
Seasonal movements outside soum are 
more problematic than within soum. 
Coordination of movements at 
soum/aimag levels is needed. 



























tenure reforms  
and social 
innovations with 


























Low conflict among non-CBRM groups; 
equity and compliance with rules in 
use better, no evidence of open access 
situation. 
Some CBRM groups had contracts for 
15 years in UNDP site. 
Little understanding of those contracts 
among the CBRM members  
Concerns among non-members over 
potential limits to their mobility. 
Confirmed prior findings of hardening 
social boundaries for accessing CBRM 
membership by non-members. 
Declining mobility and access to 
pastures by non-members apparent. 
Exclusion of non-members from 
pasture use and haymaking areas  
These contracts were ineffective in the 
face of ninja mining incursions. 
Compulsory group membership has 





like paper groups although seemingly 
addresses the issue of exclusion. It 
does not address intragroup dynamics, 
power relations and ensure equity in 
resource access. 
Herder group’s capacity is weak. 
Legislative provision is vague. 
6) Murphy 2011 
 
Going on otor: 
Disaster, mobility, 






















Major incentives for joining 
cooperatives were well contract with 
operating rights, registering customary 
campsites, obtaining possession 
contracts, other opportunities for 
vegetable farming and hay-cutting, 
acquiring tractor for large-scale 
farming. 
For senior wealthy herders these were 
means to cement their control over 
wells and pasture territories with 
exclusive rights. 
Program failed in reducing poverty and 
improving environmental condition. 
Increased inequality among 
community members making poor 
herder more vulnerable.  
Only wealthy and powerful members 
benefited from it. 
The program also failed in other goals 
of labor distribution, and risk 
management. 
The program supported territorial 
exclusion and deepened disparities by 
formalizing rights of powerful 
members.  
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Fernandez-









































Document review  











involved in CBRM project.  
CBRM members had more 
communication networks with greater 
interaction with outsiders and other 
groups, and had higher leadership 
qualities than non-CBRM herders. 
CBRM members had greater access to 
training, which allowed their 
interaction and mutual exchange that 
encouraged their innovation for 
resource management.  
Interacting with diverse people helped 
CBRM herders to increase their social 
capital.  
After the project end, CBRM members’ 
collective action fell slightly. 
 Only a small number of people 
benefitted from project support in 
Jinst. 
8) Dulamsuren et 
al. 2011 








In book edited by 
Fernandez-







cover, basal cover 
and basal gaps  
Evaluate 
performance of 
















PUGs learned a new important 
practice of fencing off hay-cutting 
fields with potential for reducing 
vulnerability of members. New 
innovation of revolving funds was the 
key for supporting other grassland 
management activities such as fencing, 
digging water sources, purchasing new 
equipment, and income generation.  
PUGs showed potential for better use 
of pasture, and cooperation among 
herders, contributed to decrease in 
poverty rate in Ikhtamir soum. 














of constant update of rules adjusting 
to new requirements. PUG’s rules set 
up at the time of group formation 
remained without update created 
occasional conflicts among different 
PUGs. Particularly, setting boundary 
with full participation of all herders 
was stated to be significant.  
It also emphasized a need for a legal 
structure for PUGs nationwide.  














































9 herders CBRM 
4 non-CBRM  
 
GTZ/NZNI39 and 
WB SLP project 
site 
No donor-supported group effect in 
mobility. Observed exclusion around a 
mechanical well repaired by donor 
support. 
CBRM supported income 
diversification in the form of vegetable 
growing but it ceased to non-existence 
due to large supply at the market.  
CBRM were more effective in 
communal pooling of their labor and 
marketing their livestock products. 
In emergency times, members 
preferred kin networks rather than 
nukhurlul network as some go for otor 
which weakened communal pooling.  
No CBRM effect in storage activities. 
CBRM members had better economies 
of scale accessing more distant 
markets with better prices but that 
ceased with the end of project. 
CBRM group resilience had limitations. 
Many activities ceased with the end of 
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the project, and members turned back 
to their traditional reliance.  
CBRM has shaped adaptive strategies 
for members.  




















Explore the range 































Document review  
2008-2009 
mountain steppe 
and desert steppe  
2 CBRM soums 
(Jinst, Khujirt) and  
2 non-CBRM 
(Bayantsagaan, 









CBRM facilitated management of key 
resources, encouraged proven 
traditional practices improved 
knowledge and social capital of 
members. 
CBRM influenced local government’s 
rangeland management planning also 
at national level facilitated 
formulation/adoption of a new 
Livestock Program in 2010. 
CBRM was engaged at 3 levels of 
cooperation: household/khot ail (3-5), 
group level (5-20) and territorial 
cooperation (20-50). 
After the project end some groups 
ceased their activities. 
Reported a sense of exclusion and 
competition among herders.  








































CBRM sites generated 11% more 
biomass on average than non-CBRM 
12% greater median income of CBRM 
households and other social outcomes. 
18% greater average income of CBRM 
households. 
More income from value added items 
and non-livestock sources. 
More assets owned by CBRM members 
including TV, satellite dish and 
car/truck. 






Role of women increased: active 
participation, skills development,  
Key to success included community-
driven approach, knowledge 
exchanges and strong community 
leadership, facilitation of soum staff 
12) Fernandez-















































Desert steppe  
2 CBRM soums: 















Sites of UNDP and 
SDC projects 
Cross-boundary and cross-level 
dynamics (hoofed dzud, inadequate 
aid procedures) can contribute to 
vulnerability of herders. 
Local stakeholders have an 
opportunity to learn from dzud and 
reflect learning into their actions. 
However, this process in turn depends 
on strong cross-level institutions to 
coordinate mobility, development of 
livestock market and value-added 
processing.  
CBRM groups were more likely to be 
better prepared for winter, more 
proactive, had greater collective action 
thus had less loss from dzud.  
CBRM has potential to strengthening 
adaptive capacity and resilience of 
pastoral groups.      
13) Addison et al. 
2013 
 
Do pasture user 



























Groups were inactive in the sites.  
Few activities were present. 
Reported existence of spatial 
boundaries but exclusion was not 
enforced as perceived by herders. 






condition in the 
Mongolian Gobi 
desert? 






CBRM was viewed as unsuitable for 
desert areas.  
No deliberate control to prevent 
encroachment of livestock to others 
grazing areas. 
CBRM was viewed more beneficial in 
terms of livelihood rather than 
regulation of pasture access.  
Steppe-type PUG had better rangeland 
condition but little evidence that 
CBRM institutionally improved 
rangeland condition. 
Improvement may be due to non-
institutional factors (irrigation for 






















ability to combine 
different 

















Document review  
mountain steppe 
and desert steppe  
2 CBRM soums 















CBRM members’ knowledge increased 
and applied that knowledge into their 
practices. 
Knowledge integration occurred in 
response to critical events like dzud 
and drought. These included expert 
knowledge of pasture management, 
donor knowledge about effective 
community organization, local 
government cooperation and local 
rules. 
Non-CBRM members wanted to have 
their own organization but lacked 
leadership, access to information how 
to do that. 
Both group types shared 1) strong 
traditional knowledge, practices and 





management; 2) knowledge and 
leadership of local government present 
in both types, 3) reciprocal information 
and experience sharing was part of 
mutual support system  
More similarities than differences were 
found. 
Major differences included diversity of 
knowledge sources, processes of 
knowledge integration and resulting 
adaptive capacity.  
CBRMs had all five types of knowledge. 
Non-CBRM lacked expert and donor 
innovative knowledge. 
More diverse network for knowledge 
exchange among CBRM members.  
CBRMs lacked facilitation and 
leadership for knowledge exchange.  
15) Fernandez-
Gimenez et al. 
2014 
 










































government staff  





2 soums in 
mountain steppe, 
Arkhangai; 2 











6 groups /91 
 
CBRM facilitates implementation of 
adaptive strategies that reduce 
vulnerability to dzud. 
CBRM members were more likely to go 
for otor. 
Resource pooling was much greater 
among CBRM members. 
CBRM members had more income 
diversification skills. 
More access to information and 
knowledge exchange among CBRM 
groups. 
CBRM members were more likely to 
monitor pastures and take actions to 
protect pastures. 








SDC (13 groups) 
and UNDP (6 
groups) sites  
 
 
important role in helping herders to 
respond to dzud. 
CBRM members were better prepared 
for winter, more innovative with 
higher adaptive capacities. 
These were explained by greater 
access to information, opportunity for 
knowledge exchange, and social 
networking. 
No difference found in structural social 
capital, income diversity and 
livelihoods, but Small difference in 
trust. 
Lack of sustained financial and 
technical support may limit CBRM to 
scale up further for increasing adaptive 
capacity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
